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Abstract 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and queer (LGBTQ) people in North America have historically 
been categorized as “disfavoured reproducers” and, through various legal, social, and political 
means, have been denied the right to parent. The past 30 years, however, have been marked by 
staggering social, legal, and political change in relation to LGBTQ families and people across 
the LGBTQ spectrum in Canada are increasingly making use of Assisted Human Reproduction 
(AHR) services as part of their family-building processes.  
However, despite significant gains in social and legal recognition for LGBTQ people in 
Canada, LGBTQ people are often unhappily marginalized when they seek reproductive 
assistance and are brought under the rubric of a highly medicalized, profit-making system within 
which their bodies, and families, most often do not fit.  
Drawing on 40 qualitative interviews from the CIHR-funded Creating Our Families project, 
which was designed to explore the experiences of LGBT people with AHR services in Ontario, 
this dissertation explores the ways that LGBTQ identities and kinship structures are often 
misrecognized and, in many cases, unintelligible in the fertility clinic context. The assumptions 
of the heterosexual matrix, in alliance with the culture of the fertility industry, can result in 
violations or ruptures to the personhood of queer and trans people as they make their way 
through the clinic. The strategies that people adopt in order to enhance their flow through the 
clinic can at times contribute to these violations.  
The dissertation explores the contours of a more ethical relation between LGBTQ people and 
fertility clinics, and finally, considers some pedagogical issues related to what is at stake when 
health care providers are asked to adopt a stance of “not-knowing” that recognizes the radical 
alterity of the Other.   
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Dr. Norman Epstein, my dad 
  
iv 
 
 
Acknowledgements  
   I am indebted to the people who worked on the Creating Our Families research project: my 
long-time friend and colleague, Lori Ross, and the Re:searching for LGBTQ Health team at the 
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, especially datejie green, Lesley Tarasoff, Scott 
Anderson, Leah Steele and Stu Marvel. 
   Thank you to my committee: supervisor Don Dippo, Chloe Brushwood-Rose, and Lorna 
Erwin. Each of your contributions made this a stronger piece of work.  Thanks also to the other 
members of the examining committee, Jane Ward, Judith MacDonnell and Dan Yon, for your 
generous reading and thoughtful questions. I extend thanks also to earlier supervisors of my 
work (this PhD has been a long time coming): Celia Haig-Brown and Sharon Todd, and to 
Barbara Hanson, an early cheerleader.  A special thank you to Graduate Program Assistant 
Elizabete Petersons who kept everything on track over the years.   
   I am blessed to be surrounded by rich and overlapping communities of family, friends and 
colleagues who, in a multitude of ways, loved, nurtured and supported me throughout the course 
of this project.  Mary J. Daniel generously read everything; her insightful, smart and challenging 
critique pushed me to think better. Thanks to my posse – Carol-Anne O’Brien, Elspeth Brown, 
Jess and Eli Abraham, Jake Pyne, Lorie Rotenberg, Margarita and Alisa Miniovich, Pat Rayman, 
Rachel Warden and Xochil Argueta-Warden – who supported me in untold ways; and to the 
other family/friends who enrich my life, including: Aaron and Dini Densmore, Alice Klein, Amy 
Gottlieb, Aziza Elwin, Elinor Widden, Eric Epstein, Hershel Russell, Honey Maser, Marc 
Cannon, Maureen FitzGerald, Marylin Kanee, Michael Epstein, Nancy Pollak, Nina and Lola 
Rabinovitch, Penny Goldsmith, Sally Shamai and Sheila Block. A very special thank you to Lois 
v 
 
Fine and Sadie Epstein-Fine for providing steadiness and love in the face of the vicissitudes of 
life; and to my father, Norman Epstein, for his example.   
   Many of those above, as well as Karleen Pendleton Jimenez, Margot Francis, Meg Gibson, 
Nadya Burton, Nicki Pascetta, and Shauna Lancit provided intellectual support through reading 
and conversation. Ann Tutt, Graham Jackson, and Julia Gotz nurtured my body and soul.  My 
colleagues at work, Andy Inkster, Anna Travers, Chris Veldhoven, Dana Baitz and Nila Gupta 
picked up the slack as I absented myself to write. Paula Klein kept me writing; Jacqueline 
Larson tidied everything up at the end.  
   Finally, thank you to the Creating Our Families participants for lending their stories and to the 
communities of LGBTQ parents and parents-to-be, in Toronto and beyond, who for so many 
years have been a source of connection and inspiration. I hope this work contributes something 
to our understanding of how things work and so to our capacity to make change. 
  
vi 
 
Contents 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... iv 
Chapter 1: Background / Theoretical Framework / Methodology .......................................... 1 
Some Personal History ................................................................................................................ 1 
Some LGBTQ Parenting History ................................................................................................ 4 
Working for Change .................................................................................................................... 9 
The Current Project ................................................................................................................... 13 
Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................................. 15 
About Terminology ................................................................................................................... 26 
Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 30 
Chapter 2. Literature Review: Reproductive Technologies, Kinship, and Queer and Trans 
Families ........................................................................................................................................ 45 
Feminist Scholarship on RTs: A Dichotomized View .............................................................. 45 
Reproductive Technologies and the Broadening of Kinship Studies ........................................ 51 
A Shift in Feminist Scholarship: Acknowledging Complexity ................................................. 56 
Queer Studies of Kinship — Tensions in Biology and Normalization ..................................... 59 
Normative Families and the Need for a Dad ............................................................................. 63 
Non-Normative Identities and Family Structures ..................................................................... 66 
Ethnographies of RTS: Thompson and Mamo .......................................................................... 70 
Chapter 3: Space Invaders ......................................................................................................... 76 
Ontological Choreography ........................................................................................................ 77 
Gender Work ............................................................................................................................. 78 
Objectification ........................................................................................................................... 86 
Ethics: Personhood and Technology ......................................................................................... 89 
Enter Space Invaders ................................................................................................................. 91 
Institutional Plumbers: Identifying Blockages .......................................................................... 94 
Administrative Blockages ......................................................................................................... 95 
The People ................................................................................................................................. 97 
Generic Bureaucratization: The Waiting Room ...................................................................... 100 
Hyper-conventional Gender in the Clinic ............................................................................... 106 
vii 
 
Body Parts: The Pelvic Exam/Ultrasound ............................................................................... 108 
Meeting with the Doctor ......................................................................................................... 112 
Sex-Segregated Space (Invaders): The Andrology Lab .......................................................... 115 
Strategies to Benefit the Long-Term Self ............................................................................... 117 
Chapter 4. Queer Kinship in the Fertility Clinic: Policy and Administrative Practices that 
Erase Queer and Trans Families ............................................................................................. 123 
The People ............................................................................................................................... 124 
Naturalization of Kin Relations: Who Are the Real Parents? ................................................. 127 
Donor Decisions ...................................................................................................................... 132 
Barriers to the Use of Known Sperm Donors ......................................................................... 134 
Administrative Blockages: The Canadian Semen Regulations ............................................... 137 
Lying in Waiting Rooms: Frustrations with the Semen Regulations ...................................... 138 
Inventive Pragmatism / Normative Resistance ....................................................................... 141 
The Relationship That Has No Name ..................................................................................... 148 
Recognizing LGBTQ People in AHR Services: A Two-Step Process ................................... 151 
Chapter 5. Towards a Queer Ethics of Care .......................................................................... 154 
Ethics and the Other ................................................................................................................ 155 
A Discomfiting Other in the Clinic ......................................................................................... 158 
The Limits of Empathy ........................................................................................................... 161 
Doctor Knows Best ................................................................................................................. 164 
Five Minutes with a Change Maker: What People Want ........................................................ 168 
Pedagogical Questions ............................................................................................................ 171 
Interrogating Sameness ........................................................................................................... 173 
Teaching Not-Knowing ........................................................................................................... 175 
Appendix A: Lesbian and Bisexual Women’s Recommendations for Improving the 
Provision of AHR Services ....................................................................................................... 181 
Appendix B: Advisory Committee Members ......................................................................... 183 
Appendix C: Selected Demographic Characteristics of Participants .................................. 184 
Appendix D: Interview Guide .................................................................................................. 186 
Appendix E: Consent to Participate in a Research Study..................................................... 190 
Appendix F: Demographic Questionnaire .............................................................................. 194 
viii 
 
Appendix G: Ethics Approval — CAMH Research Ethics Board ....................................... 197 
Appendix H: Glossary of LGBTQ Terms ............................................................................... 199 
References .................................................................................................................................. 202 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Background / Theoretical Framework / Methodology  
Some Personal History 
 I got pregnant in 1991 with the assistance of a sperm bank and a fertility clinic. After making 
our initial appointment with the clinic, my female partner and I received a letter in the mail 
addressed to Mr. and Mrs. Epstein, informing us that “Since Infertility is a problem that affects 
couples, your appointment has been made for both partners. You will both be interviewed and 
examined and a plan of management will be defined.” On the day of our appointment the doctor 
suggested that if we found our own sperm donor he would happily provide cycle monitoring 
(daily blood work and vaginal ultrasounds to determine the time of ovulation), and then send us 
home to inseminate in the old-fashioned lesbian way (turkey baster or, more practically, syringe 
— without the needle). But, alas, that known donor did not materialize so we made the decision 
to choose a sperm donor from the catalogue and to do cycle monitoring and insemination at the 
clinic.  
Choosing a donor was not simple because my partner and I were both Jewish and we wanted 
a Jewish donor. I believe there were three to choose from, none of whom matched the physical 
characteristics I wanted (dark hair and eyes like me), but we chose one anyway. Later we 
discovered that two other queer women in a support group I had been attending, also seeking a 
Jewish donor, had selected the same donor and that our children, all born within a year of each 
other, were donor siblings — a fact we disclosed to our three offspring 18 years later. The 
phenomena of “donor siblings” is, of course, common in heterosexual communities as well, and, 
in fact, a website known as the Donor Sibling Registry has now been established to assist donor 
siblings to find each other (www.donorsiblingregistry.com). However, LGBTQ communities 
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tend to be much more socially overlapped, and so the experience we had of our children 
knowing each other and, in a sense, growing up together, is a much more common occurrence.  
But back to the fertility clinic. Those who have had the fertility clinic experience are familiar 
with the routine of the early rise, the (in my case) bike ride to the clinic, the waiting room filled 
with parent wannabes, and the long daily waits for blood tests and ultrasounds. The hope that 
you will be pricked by the one who hurts least, the hope that the follicles on the ultrasound 
screen will produce fertile eggs and, of course, the hope that the insemination will result in a 
pregnancy. In my case, given that I did not ovulate until day 54 of my cycle (14 is average), I 
was there for many mornings, anticipating ovulation.  
The fertility clinic experience worked for me. I embraced the morning cycle and immersed 
myself in a book while I waited to be poked and prodded. I was grateful for the technology that 
could pinpoint my ovulation, something I was unable to do myself. When I was shown the 
swelling follicles on the ultrasound I felt almost pregnant and called my partner triumphantly. 
And when I did actually get pregnant on my second try, despite a (probably inaccurate) 
diagnosis of Polycystic Ovarian Syndrome, I was ecstatic. Of course I did have to stand firm 
against the doctor’s suggestion, after the first insemination attempt, that I take Clomid (a first-
line fertility drug that, among other side effects, increases one’s chances of multiple births) to 
make things simpler for everyone. And, as I lay spread-eagle in the stirrups awaiting 
insemination, he told me that “they had had others like me in their clinic.” I was not sure exactly 
what he meant. Lesbians? Single women? Women over 35? Jews? With hairy legs? It’s hard to 
know. On the second insemination he asked my partner if she would like to perform the act, 
pushing the sperm down the tube to near my cervix. However, she was too busy watching the 
sperm swimming on the monitor he had in his office, to even hear his offer. “Look at those 
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sperm,” he announced proudly, “we freeze sperm better than anyone in North America! Look at 
that motility, look at them swim!” He seemed proud of all the babies he had made. My daughter, 
conceived with an anonymous sperm donor, is now 22 years old.  
In 1997, I was approached by the midwife who attended my daughter’s birth. She asked if I 
would develop, with her, a course for lesbian, bisexual, and queer (LBQ) women considering 
parenthood. Dykes Planning Tykes was born. The course, which originated as a seven-week 
course, run through the Queer Exchange, a community-based program sponsored by the Centre 
for Lesbian and Gay Studies, has now expanded to 12 weeks long. It is institutionalized as a 
partnership between the LGBTQ Parenting Network at the Sherbourne Health Centre and Queer 
Parenting Programs at The 519 Church St. Community Centre in Toronto, and has spawned 
three other queer and trans family-planning courses: Daddies and Papas 2B; Trans-Masculine 
People Considering Pregnancy; and Queer and Trans Family Planning(s). Dykes Planning Tykes 
has now run more than 30 times over the past 16 years, with close to 700 participants.  
In 1997, as part of the first Dykes Planning Tykes course, some friends and I developed and 
performed an interactive Forum Theatre script about a lesbian who, unable to find a man willing 
to act as a known sperm donor, turns to a clinic to get pregnant, only to be refused service by the 
doctor. Forum Theatre is a method developed by Brazilian theatre director and activist, Augusto 
Boal (1979). It encourages people, through participatory theatre, to actively explore and analyze 
their realities in order to become effective actors in their own lives. In this case we had people 
stopping the action and entering the scene attempting to convince the doctor that he should grant 
lesbians access to insemination services. At the time, this was not an unlikely argument. In the 
early 1990s, 19 out of 33 assisted insemination programs surveyed by the Royal Commission on 
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New Reproductive Technologies would refuse lesbians’ “treatment at the clinic” (Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993, p. 454)  
Some LGBTQ Parenting History 
 The past 30 years have been marked by staggering social, legal, and political change in 
relation to LGBTQ families (Epstein, 2012), including significant change in the practices 
associated with LGBTQ reproduction. Thirty years ago lesbians and gay men were losing their 
children in court (Mackay, 1982; Chesler, 1986) and fertility clinics either denied services to 
those outside of the heterosexual, cisgender (non-trans) norm, or required that one jump through 
gatekeeping hoops such as a “letter to the doctor” or a psychiatric assessment, in order to gain 
access. At play were a series of arguments, originally developed as fuel in the 1970s and ‘80s 
custody cases that found lesbians and gay men to be “unfit” parents (Pollack, 1990). LGBTQ 
people and their allies have spent decades rebutting these arguments (Epstein, 2003, 2012) but 
such views continue to circulate in ways that profoundly affect the daily lives, institutional 
encounters, and sense of entitlement to parent among LGBTQ people. However, people across 
the LGBTQ spectrum in Canada are increasingly making use of services offered by fertility 
clinics as part of their family-building processes. LBQ women began appearing at clinics in the 
early 1990s, mostly to gain access to donor sperm and insemination and sometimes to make use 
of IVF technology as a means to create a “biological” connection to two parents. More recently 
queer women have been joined by gay, bisexual, and queer (GBQ) men who require IVF 
technology as part of surrogacy arrangements, and by trans women and men who, depending on 
where they are in a transition process and the implications of this for fertility, are accessing 
clinics to freeze gametes (sperm/eggs) or to achieve pregnancy. Sometimes people simply want 
to monitor their cycles (an accurate way of identifying the time of ovulation), in order to 
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inseminate at home, and, of course, some LGBTQ people experience the fertility problems that 
the clinics were set up to address. In Toronto, some fertility clinics estimate that as many as 15 
to 25 percent of their clients are from LGBTQ communities (Epstein, 2008).  
The broad set of technologies developed to assist and monitor conception and pregnancy were 
initially referred to as “reproductive technologies” (RTs) or, in the early years of their 
development, as “new reproductive technologies” (NRTs). More recently the services offered by 
fertility clinics are commonly referred to as Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR) services. Here 
I use RTs when I refer to the technologies themselves, and AHR when I am referring to the 
services offered by fertility clinics.  
Historically, decisions about who should and should not be allowed to access AHR services 
were made based on a “best interests of the child” approach, similar to that which frames most 
adoption practices, and reminiscent of the arguments that framed early lesbian custody cases. 
This model evaluates some people as “better,” “more appropriate,” and “more deserving” 
parents, and some family configurations as closer to “normal,” often because they are deemed 
more “natural.” The term “stratified reproduction,” was first articulated in 1995 by Shellee 
Colen in a piece on West Indian caregivers (Ginsburg & Rapp, 1995). By “stratified 
reproduction,” Colen refers to the social, economic, and political processes by which “physical 
and social reproductive tasks are accomplished differentially according to inequalities that are 
based on hierarchies of class, race, ethnicity, gender, place in a global economy, and migration 
status” (p. 78). The term conceptualizes arrangements “by which some reproductive futures are 
valued while others are despised” (p. 3), and is useful in explorations of LGBTQ parenting 
because it gestures toward the ways that, in the world of reproduction and parenting, some 
people are seen as “ideal” parents and others as “unfit” parents.  
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LGBTQ people in North America have historically been categorized as what Thompson 
(2005) calls “disfavoured reproducers.” Through various legal, social, and political means we 
have had children taken away from us and have been disentitled from becoming parents. In the 
everyday world of reproduction the heterosexual nuclear couple (who can produce “naturally,” 
and who are therefore, “normal”) is privileged, while lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 
queer (LGBTQ) parenthood (among others) has historically been discouraged, denigrated, and, 
in many cases, denied. Thus, the experience portrayed in the Forum Theatre piece we performed 
at the first Dykes Planning Tykes session, of a queer woman being denied access to reproductive 
services, was common in many North American settings until the mid-1990s.
1
  
In more recent years, access to AHR services for LGBTQ people has been facilitated 
by a gradual shift in the criteria for access to reproductive technologies from a model 
that centres the “best interests of the child” to one that is more about adult rights — the 
adult citizen’s right to reproduce (Thompson, 2005; Mamo, 2007). This shift has also 
been hastened by the fact that AHR services, for the most part and increasingly, are 
deeply embedded in a system of commercialized biomedicine that operates 
fundamentally from a profit motive. Mamo (2013), in a recent self-authored response to 
her 2007 work, raises important questions about queer involvement with this industry. 
She argues that queer and trans people have become “parents-in waiting,” having been 
granted access to an ever-expanding international on-line trade in human sperm, eggs, 
and wombs, and the “panoply of biomedical services that rely on third and fourth 
                                                 
1
 For discussion of issues of access by and discrimination towards LGBTQ people in AHR services see Amato & 
Jacob, 2004; Baetens & Brewaeys, 2001; De Sutter, 2001, 2009; Gurmankin, Caplan, & Braverman, 2005; 
Greenfield, 2007; Greenfield & Seli, 2011; Murphy, 2010; Peterson, 2005; Stern, Cramer, Garrod & Green, 
2001.  
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parties” (p. 233). Reminiscent of early feminist writings on RTs, she raises issues of 
bioethical ethics in the face of queer movement from the margins to the center of 
Fertility Inc. (a term Mamo and others have used to describe the corporate, profit-
making enterprise of fertility services in North America). She asks: 
Who will provide the eggs and the wombs necessary to enable these family 
forms? From what towns, communities, and countries will the bio-materials be 
drawn? From whose gendered, raced, and classed bodies will they be drawn? 
Will these services follow capitalism from the west to the rest to secure the 
bodies and labor necessary to fulfill our American Dreams? How can we be 
accountable to these collaborative reproducers? And…where are queer 
practices, queer bodies in these debates? (Mamo, 2013, p. 235) 
These are hugely significant questions that require serious attention from queer and non-queer 
“parents-in-waiting” alike. At whose expense do some become parents, while others are 
excluded from parenthood or serve to provide the gametes and reproductive services necessary 
for still others to become parents? Under what conditions and dynamics of power do these 
interactions take place?  
Fertility Inc. does not necessarily differentiate (or care) from whom the buck flows. Currently 
the primary obstacle to access to AHR services in North America is financial; AHR services are 
set up to serve those who can pay for them, resulting in highly stratified access, particularly 
along lines of class and race. In the early 1990s queer people came knocking on the doors of 
fertility clinics who, confronted with a supply of services that was outweighing demand, let them 
in as paying customers. 
However, the history of queer entry into the world of AHR has not been a smooth or unified 
one. Despite an increased clientele who are forming non-normative families, AHR services 
remain profoundly heteronormative spaces. They were established to assist cisgender, 
heterosexual, financially resourced couples who are experiencing “infertility,” and these are the 
people who continue to be imagined as the “appropriate” and ultimately, “deserving” users or 
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what Mamo (2007, p. 133) calls the “configured users” of AHR services. A quick look at the 
images on clinic websites, or in fertility industry magazines (see for example, Creating Families, 
the magazine of the Infertility Awareness Association of Canada at www.iaac.ca) makes it clear 
who the imagined users are: white, cisgender, heterosexual couples with money and good looks.  
As a result, LGBTQ people (many of whom are good looking, but lack the other criteria) are 
often unhappily marginalized when they seek assistance within AHR systems and are brought 
under the rubric of a highly medicalized, profit-making system within which their bodies, and 
families, most often do not fit. While lesbian, gay, and bisexual people are more routinely 
accessing AHR services, trans-identified people are currently being subjected to debates in AHR 
circles about their right and/or abilities to parent, and subsequently, to whether or not they 
should be served by AHR practitioners (Pyne, 2012; see also Baetens, Camus, & Devroey, 2003; 
Brothers & Ford, 2000; Buckett, 2011; De Sutter, 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2003; Jones, 2000).  
Reminiscent of and overlapping with the arguments used to discredit LGB people as parents 
(i.e., concerns about sexual immorality, promiscuity, and abuse; that children will be confused 
about gender and/or develop a homosexual orientation themselves; that children will lack 
properly gendered “role models”; that children will be subjected to stigma and hostility from 
their peers), these arguments focus particularly on the “anti-social” and “aberrant” behavior of 
trans people (Jones, 2000 cited in Pyne, 2010, p. 22), the instability of trans people, particularly 
trans women (Baetens et al., 2003; Buckett, 2011), and the recommendation that trans people 
have “completed” a transition before becoming parents — although the author does support the 
rights of trans people to have children (De Sutter, 2001b). Baetens, Camus, and Devroey (2003) 
also note the high levels of discrimination that trans people face as a possible reason to restrict 
trans people’s access to AHR. Pyne (2010) points out the lack of empirical evidence to support 
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these claims, the ambiguity about what it means to “complete a transition,” and “the paradox 
inherent in denying a social right on the basis that one has been damaged by the denial of social 
rights” (pp.11-12).  
Despite these debates trans-identified people are joining LGB people in accessing fertility 
clinics, although barriers to access continue to operate in more subtle ways for LGBTQ people 
across the board. These include lack of information on clinic websites and promotional materials 
(Johnson, 2012), compulsory counselling sessions (the purpose of which is unclear), clinic forms 
and practices that do not allow for LGBTQ identities and/or family structures, and policies that 
act as barriers to LGBTQ family structures. For example, the semen regulations in Canada 
permit insemination with fresh (i.e., not frozen) sperm only from a “spouse” or “sexual partner,” 
but otherwise require sperm to be frozen and quarantined for six months, a process which 
necessitates delays and a financial burden.
2
 
Working for Change 
 But, you might ask, haven’t the practices of clinics changed at all to accommodate this new 
group of users? What actually is happening when LGBTQ people enter these profoundly 
cisgendered, heterosexual spaces? What research and community knowledge exists to describe 
and/or analyze these encounters? And what kinds of educational initiatives and/or approaches 
might lead to effective change in clinic environments?  
                                                 
2
 Health Canada Directive: Technical Requirements for Therapeutic Donor Insemination, July 2000. 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/brgtherap/applic-demande/guides/semen-sperme-acces/semen-
sperme_directive-eng.php 
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For more than 15 years I have worked in a research partnership with Dr. Lori Ross who leads 
the Re:searching for LGBTQ Health team at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in 
Toronto. We have collaborated on several major research projects, with her acting as the 
“academic partner” while I am the “community partner,” in my capacity as coordinator of the 
LGBTQ Parenting Network, a well-established community development project that works with 
and on behalf of LGBTQ parents, prospective parents, and their families (see 
www.lgbtqparentingconnection.ca). The projects have been based on a community-based 
research model, with both of us, and sometimes other partners, actively involved in research 
design, data analysis, and knowledge mobilization. 
In 2003 Dr. Ross and I, along with Dr. Leah Steele (St. Michael’s Hospital, University of 
Toronto), conducted a study of LBQ women’s experiences of preconception, pregnancy, and the 
first year of parenting. Among other things, the research resulted in two articles in high-impact 
fertility industry journals: Fertility and Sterility (Ross, Steele, & Epstein, 2006a) and the 
Canadian Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology (Ross, Steele, & Epstein, 2006b). In these 
articles we formulated a series of recommendations for AHR practitioners looking to improve 
the quality of their services to LBQ women. (See Appendix A.)  
These findings and recommendations were presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian 
Fertility and Andrology Society (CFAS) in 2007, and condensed into a fact sheet that was 
distributed to clinics across the country. One of the strongest recommendations, based on 
participant interviews, was the need to train and educate staff in LGBTQ culture. Since that time 
my colleagues and I have conducted training sessions with most of the major downtown Toronto 
clinics and presented at rounds to OB/GYN departments of several downtown Toronto hospitals. 
I have also sat on committees of the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency in Ottawa, written a 
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position paper, with others, on LGBTQ concerns with the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 
and advocated at individual, local, provincial, and federal levels for the inclusion of LGBTQ 
people and families in the reproductive agenda of the country and in the daily practices of AHR 
services.  
In 2010 we received a Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) grant (through a 
special call for proposals relating to the Psycho-Social Aspects of AHR) to conduct a pilot study 
of LGBTQ experience with AHR services in Ontario. The study, entitled Creating Our Families 
(COF), was conducted as a partnership between Dr. Lori Ross of the Re:searching for LGBT 
Health Team at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health; Dr. Leah Steele, St. Michael’s 
Hospital; and myself, Coordinator of the LGBTQ Parenting Network, Sherbourne Health Centre. 
We later added another investigator, Stu Marvel, from Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University. Several research assistants and students also worked on the project. We conducted a 
total of 40 interviews with 66 lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and/or queer people across Ontario, 
who had either used or considered using AHR services since 2008.  
In the course of these interviews we heard many complex stories that included descriptions of 
clinic encounters that were experienced as disappointing, frustrating, and, in some cases, 
extremely troubling. People described feeling invisible, unheard, angry, scared, and/or anxious. 
We also heard stories from people who were grateful for the services they were able to access 
and, in some cases, who were happy overall with the treatment they received at clinics. 
Sometimes people’s accounts seemed linked to the expectations they held going in and/or to the 
strategies they adopted in advance of or in response to clinic encounters. Many people told 
stories that were a mixture of appreciation, frustration, and a myriad of other sentiments.  
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The final question we posed in the interviews was “If you could have five minutes with 
someone who could really make change in the AHR system, what would you want to say to 
them?” A summary of people’s responses to this question was written up in an article that was 
submitted to Fertility and Sterility (See Ross et al., 2014 for a version that was eventually 
published in the Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada). The journal rejected it with a 
short comment: “A very interesting paper but with limited data provided and the overall 
recommendations to improve practice are fairly self-evident (training, inclusion of alternative 
families in clinic materials, etc.). While the inclusion of men and trans people is a strength, the 
vast majority of participants are women (who have been previously studied with similar 
results).”  
This rejection was frustrating because although the recommendations are “self-evident,” they 
have, for the most part, not been implemented or, it seems, taken overly seriously by clinics. 
Perhaps repetition is required. Or perhaps, given that there continues to be a regular stream of 
LGBTQ clients lining up at fertility clinic doors, the clinics are not feeling compelled to change 
their practices since they have no impact on their bottom line. For whatever combination of 
reasons, those interviewed in 2010 reiterated things interviewees said in 2003 because the 
practices of clinics have not significantly changed, despite increased access to clinics by LGBTQ 
people, significant gains in social and legal recognition for LGBTQ people in Canada generally, 
and despite our team’s publications in leading journals, training in clinics, presentations at 
conferences, and many people’s advocacy at all levels. Of course, change happens slowly, 
inconsistently, and unpredictably. But how is it that we can receive an eager, engaged, and 
sincere response from a group of Toronto clinic staff, including doctors, nurses, lab technicians, 
counsellors, clinic managers, and receptionists at a training session, and then the next day (or 
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week or month) attend a conference where one of the physicians in a session makes a remark 
clearly illustrating that he missed the point—and that we continue to hear repeated stories from 
LGBTQ people complaining about the forms, language, and assumptions embedded in their 
AHR treatment and about feeling marginalized, invisible, disrespected, and sometimes belittled 
in their interactions with clinics?  
Of course there are many answers to this question. Institutional change and education are 
always non-linear, unpredictable, and complex. Britzman, in her 1998 essay on queer pedagogy, 
addresses some of the difficulties and complexities of “anti-homophobia education” that, in its 
focus on an empathic approach to the “other,” may in fact actually reproduce the difference it 
aims to overcome (1998, p. 87). Similarly, outcomes of “cultural competency training” (a term 
that needs some deconstruction in my view, since it implies it is possible to become “competent” 
in another’s culture) are inconsistent and difficult to measure. Advocacy efforts often fall on the 
unlistening ears of bureaucrats; clinic staff leave to work elsewhere; and old habits die hard.  
The Current Project  
This project draws on the data generated from the COF interviews to explore, in more depth, 
the dynamics of LGBTQ interactions with fertility clinics. While others have written about the 
workings of fertility clinics in relation to heterosexual couples (Thompson, 2005) and lesbians 
(Mamo, 2007), I expand this area of study by exploring the negotiations that take place between 
trans-identified people and LGBTQ people in non-normative family configurations with AHR 
systems, specifically lesbians and their known sperm donors, as well as those who undertake 
reciprocal IVF (an egg is retrieved from one person, fertilized and implanted in another). I 
approach this data with the following research questions:  
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 How do LGBTQ people, whose bodies, identities, and kinship systems 
are often not intelligible within the biomedical world of AHR, negotiate the 
discursive and institutional practices of these systems?  
 How does LGBTQ entry into the biomedical world of AHR serve to 
disrupt and/or reinscribe normative discourses, power, and social relations with 
regard to sex, gender, and kinship?  
 What is at stake in the land of assisted human reproduction when 
LGBTQ people enter the scene? What would a more ethical relationship 
between LGBTQ people and AHR services look like and how might this inform 
educational strategies in this, and other, sectors?  
I have chosen the themes of sex/gender and kinship because it is under the rubric of these 
categories that LGBTQ bodies, sexualities, gender identities/expressions, kinship systems, and 
family configurations, in their interactions with AHR services, confront a system in which they 
do not fit. In the chapter on sex/gender (chapter 3) I look to the narratives of trans-identified 
people to explore questions related to the intelligibility of sexed and gendered bodies in the 
fertility clinic setting. What happens when well-meaning clinic staff confront bodies and 
identities that are unintelligible to them? How do those who are not intelligible negotiate this 
lack of recognition? Similarly, in the chapter on kinship (chapter 4) the narratives of non-
normative queer women-led families inform an exploration of the intelligibility of LGBTQ 
kinship systems and family configurations in the AHR setting. The final chapter explores the 
possibilities for a more ethical relationship between LGBTQ people and AHR services, and 
addresses issues of education in professional settings. It explores possibilities for educational 
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strategies that might account, in a more meaningful way, for what is at stake when LGBTQ 
bodies, identities, and kinship structures encounter the bio-medical world of AHR.  
Theoretical Framework 
Like every researcher/writer I come to this project with assumptions about the nature of the 
social world. Here is my attempt to articulate the assumptions I make and their implications for 
this project.  
My view of social relations, interactions, power, and social change relies heavily on the work 
of Michel Foucault, while also drawing on feminist and critical theory, as well as queer theory 
and trans studies. Having grown up immersed in and heavily influenced by 
Marxist/socialist/anarchist views of power and resistance, it is difficult for me to completely 
move away from theoretical frameworks that suggest a structural view of power. However, my 
experience both as a community organizer/activist and as a professional mediator and teacher of 
communication skills, has shown me, time and again, that power does not operate in simple, 
linear, or dualistic ways, and that simplistic formulations of power often lead to simplistic, short-
lived, and not-so-effective strategies for social change. And so I have come to embrace a more 
Foucauldian-influenced stance that views power not as a simple and unidirectional force but as 
circulating in social relations—as both productive of subjectivities and of subjection, of 
constraints as well as of possibilities, and as operating through a proliferation of discourses. 
Foucault’s conceptions of power, subjectivity, discourse, and normalization are key to the 
theoretical work of this project. At the risk of oversimplification, what follows is a brief 
summary of these concepts.  
16 
 
Foucault 
 Foucault conceives of power not as an overriding sovereign power, resting in the hands of 
certain individuals who impose it in a repressive, violent, and/or coercive manner on others, but 
rather as relational, as circulating in the social: 
Power is not to be taken to be a phenomenon of one individual’s consolidated 
and homogeneous domination over others, or that of one group of class over 
others… Power must be analysed as something which circulates or rather as 
something that only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or 
there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of 
wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And 
not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always also the 
elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of 
power, not its points of application. (Foucault, 1980, p. 98) 
Foucault was not interested in an overarching, global analysis of bourgeois power, but rather, in 
the more localized and unpredictable ways that power is enacted in specific settings, within 
particular sets of social relations. He was interested in what he called the “micro-mechanisms” 
of power and their workings within institutions:  
The role for theory today seems to me to be just this: not to formulate the global 
systematic theory which holds everything in place, but to analyse the specificity 
of mechanisms of power, to locate the connections and extensions, to build little 
by little a strategic knowledge (savoir)… the theory to be constructed is not a 
system but an instrument, a logic of the specificity of power relations and the 
struggles around them… this investigation can only be carried out step by step 
on the basis of reflection (which will necessarily be historical in some of its 
aspects) on given situations. (Foucault, 1980, p. 145) 
Key to this understanding of power, are the concepts of “discourse” and “subjectivity.” To 
Foucault, discourses and discursive practices delineate what is accepted as “reality,” what can be 
“said,” in a given historical moment in a particular society. Discursive practices not only “say” 
things, but they “do” things, establishing what he called regimes, or effects, of truth:  
Now I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing the line between that 
in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or truth, and that 
which comes under some other category, but in seeing historically how effects 
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of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor 
false. (Foucault, 1980, p. 118) 
Discourse, and the ways that power circulates in discourse through identifications and 
disidentifications, also works to constitute human beings as “subjects,” with 
“identities,” creating subjectivities based in regimes or effects of truth: 
In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain 
gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and 
constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-à-vis of power; it 
is, I believe, one of its prime effects. The individual is an effect of power, and at 
the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect it is the element 
of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same 
time its vehicle. (Foucault, 1980, p. 98) 
Discourses, like power, are not simple or stable in their effects. They can “subject” human 
beings in ways that are limiting or constraining, and they also create possibilities for altered and 
unforeseen subjectivities and discursive practices. So, for example, in his analysis of the history 
of sexuality, Foucault describes how the social controls and institutional surveillance applied by 
psychiatry, the law, and literature to the area of “perversity,” also made possible the formation of 
a “reverse” discourse: “homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its 
legitimacy or ‘naturality’ be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same 
categories by which it was medically disqualified” (Foucault, 1978, p. 101). To Foucault, 
discourses are not carriers of a stable sovereign power, but rather are the vehicles within which 
power circulates, creating both limits to truth and new truth possibilities: 
To be more precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between 
accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse 
and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can 
come into play in various strategies…Discourses are not once and for all 
subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We 
must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse 
can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a 
stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also 
undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possibly to thwart it. 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 101)  
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However, Foucault did not view power as “the best distributed thing in the world” (1980, p. 
99). Instead he documented the infinitesimal mechanisms of the workings of power, and the 
historical shift from the power of the law to a disciplinary form of power that operates through 
techniques of normalization and institutions and apparatuses of surveillance. In Foucault’s 
analysis, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were marked by the development of a new 
form of power, what he called “bio-power.” Power had to  
gain access to the bodies of individuals, to their acts, attitudes and modes of 
everyday behavior… to grapple with the phenomena of population, in short to 
undertake the administration, control and direction of the accumulation of men. 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 125) 
His History of Sexuality, Volume 1 is largely concerned with the development of techniques 
for regulating populations through the disciplining of the body and the emergence of 
“norms,” that “produced a new subject and object of knowledge and a new target of 
power, namely, Man [sic]. As Rabinow (1984) puts it in his introduction to the Foucault 
Reader,  
An essential component of technologies of normalization is the key role they 
play in the systematic creation, classification, and control of “anomalies” in the 
social body… certain technologies serve to isolate anomalies… one can then 
normalize anomalies through corrective or therapeutic procedures, determined 
by other related technologies. In both cases, the technologies of normalization 
are purportedly impartial techniques for dealing with dangerous social 
deviations. (p. 21)  
With the development of techniques of normalization came the Human Sciences and the 
bureaucratic welfare state, both designed to discipline bodies — not through a direct, legally 
based coercive form of power, but rather through statistical and bureaucratic methods attached to 
concepts of normalcy and deviancy. Bio-power operates in and through the social sciences, 
medicine, social work, psychiatry, education, prison systems— institutions designed to 
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ubiquitously control populations through the establishment of norms and through their 
internalization in populations.  
It is perhaps clear why these Foucauldian concepts are central to this project. Much of 
Foucault’s later work centred on the historical development of categories of sexual deviancy, as 
well as analysis of the role of the “family” and medical institutions in policing these categories. 
Disciplining populations includes the establishment of norms related to sexuality, gender, 
reproduction, kinship, the family, and the connection of all of these spheres of life to the 
discourses and practices of biomedicine. LGBTQ people are brought into subjectivity through 
discourses of “homosexuality,” and “gender identity,” and our kinship systems and desires to 
parent are often in conflict with “norms” related to reproduction, family, sexuality, and gender. 
We live and breathe these forms of normalization in most areas of life, and both embody and 
contradict them in our interactions with medical and other kinds of service providers. My project 
aims to explore the micro-mechanisms of power as they are negotiated in the fertility clinic 
context.  
Sex/Gender 
 There exists a rich and vast feminist scholarship on questions of sex and gender — how they 
should be conceived and how, as concepts, they relate to one another (see Risman & Davis, 
2013). As Pascoe (1995) points out, the term gender dates back to at least the fourteenth century. 
Writing in the 1990s, Pascoe dates the contemporary scholarly use of the term to the 1970s, 
when “path-breaking feminist scholars began to distinguish between the biological 
characteristics they labeled ‘sex’ and the attitudes, behaviours, and social structures they labeled 
‘gender’” (1995, p. 273). Anthropologist Gayle Rubin (1975) famously called it the “sex/gender 
system” and encouraged an examination of the ways in which biological sex was transformed 
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culturally into social gender. Feminist scholars across disciplines took up this challenge (Pascoe, 
1995, p. 273). In the 1980s Rubin extended this questioning of the “natural” to an exploration of 
sexuality, arguing that “sexuality,” like “gender” was culturally constructed. And in the 1990s 
scholars began to suggest that even the categories of biological sex difference might, in fact, be 
culturally constructed (see Butler, 1990; Laqueur, 1990).  
In 1987 West and Zimmerman published a pivotal essay in which they argued that gender is 
something we do more than something we are. They distinguished sex, sex category, and gender 
from one another, and suggested that recognition into a particular sex category requires 
appropriate gendered behaviour (clothes, hair, behaviour)—that gender is something produced 
through “required identificatory displays” (West & Zimmerman, 1987, p. 127). This concept of 
“doing gender” has had an enormous impact on sociological and feminist explorations of gender, 
and I will draw on some of this literature in this project. People have written about Doing 
Gender (West & Zimmerman, 1987), Accounting for Doing Gender (West & Zimmerman, 
2009), Doing, Undoing, or Redoing Gender (Connell, 2010), and Doing Gender, Doing 
Heteronormativity (Schilt &Westbrook, 2009), among others. Of particular interest is some 
recent work by Jane Ward (2010), in which she develops the term “gender labour,” to describe 
work done, beyond achieving one’s own gender coherence, in order to help others achieve the 
varied forms of gendered recognition they long for. Her work is based on interviews with 
feminine subjects in femme/FTM sexual relationships, and explores how gender subjectivities 
are constituted through the labours of intimate others. This notion of the work required of others 
in order to assist a desired gender recognition might be relevant to discussions of service-
provider practices in relation to clients.  
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In 1990 Judith Butler made a hugely significant contribution to the discussion of the social 
construction of sex, gender, and sexuality with her book Gender Trouble. Arguing, as a 
philosopher, that “in fact, perhaps ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed perhaps it 
was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender 
turns out to be no distinction at all” (p. 7), Butler suggests that the categories of gender and sex 
are discursively produced as cultural norms through reiterative performativity. While Butler’s 
theory of gender as performative overlaps with West and Zimmerman’s concept of “doing 
gender,” they differ in the conception of the “self” that does gender. West and Zimmerman were 
writing in a tradition that recognizes some sort of stable, unified “self,” whereas Butler 
conceives of the self as always unstable and discursively produced (Risman and Davis, 2013).  
For Butler, the binaries of sex, gender, and sexuality are produced as natural, coherent 
identities through performative acts that have no origin. Sex, gender, and sexuality are seen as 
naturally flowing one from the other: biological sex (female) implies gender (femininity), 
implies sexuality (attraction to men for women, and vice versa, therefore, heterosexuality). 
Butler uses the term heterosexual matrix to “designate that grid of cultural intelligibility through 
which bodies, genders, and desires are naturalized” (1990, p. 151).  
In Butler’s analysis, these stabilizing concepts of sex, gender, and sexuality produce 
“identity” and cultural intelligibility. But of course intelligibility for some implies lack of 
intelligibility for others, and much of Butler’s work focuses on the social dynamics of exclusion, 
and a recognition that every inclusion, of necessity, creates exclusions. Just as women of colour 
in the 1990s developed a critique based on their exclusion from the term woman, so too, when 
we are inquiring about those whose sex, gender identity, and/or sexuality falls outside of the 
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realm of culturally intelligible “personhood,” must we do a “genealogical critique” of the queer 
subject by asking: 
For whom is outness a historically available and affordable option? Is there an 
unmarked class character to the demand for universal “outness”? Who is 
represented by which use of the term, and who is excluded? For whom does the 
term present an impossible conflict between racial, ethnic, or religious affiliation 
and sexual politics? What kinds of policies are enabled by what kinds of usages, 
and which are backgrounded or erased from view? (Butler, 1993, p. 227)  
For Butler (and Foucault), every discourse is based in relations of power that create the 
possibilities for some human identities, activities, and ways of being, while at the same time 
limiting, constraining, or making impossible, others. Democracy, for Butler, lies in the 
recognition of discourse’s historical nature, and a willingness to interrogate the exclusions upon 
which discourse, and identities, are produced.  
The ideas articulated here are central to my project. In the world of AHR, the bodies, genders, 
and sexualities of LGBTQ people are often unintelligible within available discourse. The 
question becomes how do LGBTQ people disrupt, resist, and subvert these normalizing 
discourses? What strategies do they deploy or not deploy as they make their way through 
fertility clinics? And what theories of resistance might be helpful in understanding these 
negotiations?  
Recognition / Resistance / Resignification  
I do not assume that LGBTQ people become clients of AHR clinics in order to consciously or 
intentionally “resist” anything. People go to fertility clinics to get pregnant, to donate or freeze 
gametes, as intended gamete donors and/or non-biological parents, or to accompany and/or 
support others. However, in the process, a complex set of interactions takes place—an 
ontological choreography as Thompson describes it. At play are discourses of fertility and 
infertility, of family planning and heterosexual reproduction, kinship, femininity and 
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masculinity, parenthood and biomedicine, as well as those of queer and trans identities, and of 
queer parenting and queer family creation. It is these nuanced and complex discursive 
negotiations of identity, bodily experience, subjectivity, and “the microscopic processes of 
power” (Ringrose, 2013, p. 74) that I explore.  
Of course this relates to discussions and debates about the concepts of “resistance” and 
“agency” and about how subjects actively or passively, consciously or unconsciously, resist 
and/or change the dynamics of power that have an impact on their lives. Raby (2005) offers an 
overview of theories of resistance, particularly in the context of youth studies, that is useful here. 
She contrasts modernist approaches that assume a known, rational, pre-discursive, internally 
coherent, acting subject, with a clear position in relation to domination and a clear source of 
agency, with poststructuralist approaches that view subject positions as flowing from discourse, 
as unstable and fragmented, and that perceive power as variegated, rejecting the concepts of 
grand narratives or “absolute truth” (p. 155). She explores the usefulness and limitations of each 
of these approaches, concluding that while modernist approaches might do best in informing 
broad social movements, poststructuralist approaches offer “exciting opportunities for 
understanding people’s participation in power relations at the most micro level in the 
deployment, reproduction and transformation of power” (Raby, 2005, p. 168). It is this micro 
level of power relations that is the focus of this project.  
Theoretically, I draw on concepts of negotiating discourse, recognition and intelligibility, and 
resignification. Because my project is about the ways that LGBTQ bodies and subjectivities both 
assume and disrupt subject positions in their interactions with AHR systems, I do not assume a 
straightforward relationship to the concepts of “resistance” or “agency.” The concept of subjects 
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that negotiate discourse is central to my framework. Henriques and colleagues (1984) address 
these concerns about the nature of subjectivity and discourse, questioning  
both a rational, choosing agent and an over-determined, subjectified, trapped 
subject, instead suggesting a new vocabulary to try to understand how subjects 
negotiate discourse, that is, comply and resist through conscious and 
unconscious psychical processes informed by regimes of power and discursive 
contradictions. (as cited in Ringrose, 2013, p. 74)  
For example, the discourse of queer parenting asserts that “love makes a family,” and at the 
same time, queer parents are sometimes choosing to engage in very complicated medical 
procedures (for example lesbian reciprocal IVF) in order to guarantee a “biological” connection 
to their children. This desire for biological connection disrupts and contradicts the notion that 
love is all you need. And sometimes discourses are negotiated in ways that have contradictory 
effects. For example, as Butler points out, the diagnosis of “gender identity disorder,” applied to 
a person who desires sex reassignment, is demeaning and pathologizing of the ways that 
gendered lives are lived (1994, p. 5). On the other hand, the diagnosis of such a disorder can be 
the path to the desired outcome, an institutional requirement in order to access surgeries and 
hormone treatments. Similarly, a diagnosis of “infertility” implies an inability to get pregnant 
and in most instances cannot be applied to a queer person visiting a fertility clinic or sperm bank 
in order to access the services and/or gametes necessary to have a baby. On the other hand, a 
diagnosis of “infertility” can be helpful in accessing benefits plans and services. These sorts of 
discursive contradictions are, at least in part, the subject of my inquiry.  
What is at stake in the negotiation of discourse is intelligibility, the “terms by which we are 
recognized as human,” terms that are “socially articulated and changeable, ” but which “produce 
a differential between the human and the less-than-human” (Butler, 2004, p. 2). For Butler, 
opportunities for change lie in recognizing the historical and cultural nature of discourse, the 
ways that norms are established discursively and always contain exclusions. When those outside 
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a norm claim a place within it, the category is put into crisis (Butler, 2004, p. 10). It is the 
resignification of categories that builds inclusivity and democracy: 
The “failure” of the signifier to produce the unity it appears to name is not the 
result of an existential void, but the result of that term’s incapacity to include the 
social relations that it provisionally stabilizes through a set of contingent 
exclusions. This incompleteness will be the result of a specific set of social 
exclusions that return to haunt the claims of identity defined through negation; 
these exclusions need to be read and used in the reformulation and expansion of 
a democratizing reiteration of the term. (Butler, 1993, p. 221) 
In an early work (Epstein, 2002), I wrote about the possibilities for resignification through the 
experiences of butch-identified women who get pregnant, give birth, and mother. I suggested 
that butch pregnancy and motherhood, by linking a queer masculinity and sexuality to the 
attachments of the female body, offer possibilities for the reconfiguration of “butch” to include 
new relations to vulnerability, dependence, and attachment, while at the same time working to 
deconstruct the dualisms of sexuality/motherhood (since butch is most often seen as a sexualized 
subject position whereas motherhood is desexualized) thus, at the same time, reconfiguring 
“motherhood.” Finally, I suggested that butch motherhood puts butches in a different relation to 
the social organization of mothering, perhaps shifting their relation to feminist struggles to 
provide social supports to those who mother (p. 55).  
This is an example of the ways that discursive subject positions are unstable and open to 
disruption in unexpected ways (Gomez, 1998), through rearticulating or resignifying not new 
subjectivities or identities, but “those possibilities that already exist within cultural domains 
designed as culturally ‘unintelligible and impossible’” (Butler, 1990, pp. 148-49).  
I draw on these concepts of negotiating discourse, recognition and intelligibility, and 
resignification in my analysis of the narratives of LGBTQ fertility clinic interactions. Which 
identities, families, biologies, reproductive capacities, and desires are intelligible in a fertility 
clinic context, and which are not? What assumptions and discourses about kinship, gender, 
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sexuality, reproduction, and biology are negotiated as LGBTQ people make their way through 
the clinic? What stories are told and not told? What identities, affinities, family configurations, 
or body parts are revealed/not revealed and embodied/disavowed? What strategies do people 
deploy in their presentations of self and kinship configurations? What kinds of subject positions 
and discourses do people occupy in the clinic: client? patient? informed consumer of health 
care? victim? educator? oddity? normal? natural? ally? enemy? woman? man? transgender? 
something else? intended father? intended mother? intended parent? “friend”? My interest is in 
exploring the narratives, identities and discourses people draw on and reconfigure in order to 
make sense of and manage their AHR experiences. In addition to the concepts I have briefly 
outlined, I also turn to some recent theorizing from queer theory and trans studies about the 
negotiation of emerging identities.  
For example, Carla Pfeffer’s (2012) work focuses on the dynamics of relationships composed 
of transgender / transsexual men and cisgender women (similar to at least some of the interview 
participants in our study). Pfeffer theorizes the negotiation of structure and agency in these 
couples/families, using the analytic constructs “normative resistance” and “inventive 
pragmatism.” These concepts are relevant to this project, related to and beyond the particular 
family configuration she describes. LGBTQ negotiations with AHR systems involve both 
challenging the norms that are deeply embedded in the institutional cultures of clinics, and 
strategically deploying these norms (consciously or unconsciously) in order to achieve desired 
outcomes.  
About Terminology 
This project is about people who identify as LGBTQ — lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and 
queer. I recognize that the use and meanings of these terms are historical, political, and 
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contested. As Foucault and others (D’Emilio & Freedman, 1988; Katz, 1976) remind us, the 
concept of “homosexuality” was not a category of personhood until the mid-nineteenth century, 
and then it was viewed as a form of “gender inversion.” In other words, the concepts of sexuality 
and gender were intertwined. Gay men were perceived as “feminine” men, and lesbians as 
“masculine” women.  
There is a long, historic, ongoing, and cross-disciplinary discussion about the definitions and 
relationships between sex, gender, and sexuality. It is now commonly accepted in most LGBTQ 
circles that gender and sexuality are “distinct, if related, areas of human experience, experiences 
which are not reducible to one another, nor which can be explained by the other” (Valentine, 
2007, 15). Certainly in the educational and activist work I and others do in a broad range of 
settings, clear distinctions are made between the categories of biological sex, gender identity, 
gender expression, and sexual orientation. These are commonly defined as separate and distinct 
characteristics of individuals, one not predictive of the other.  
However, in his ethnographic study of the category “transgender,” Valentine (2007) cautions 
against the acceptance of these categories as “self-evident experiences or as natural explanatory 
frameworks” (p. 31). He reminds us that they are categories embedded in discourse, and, like all 
categories, they have complicated histories and politics. The claim that gender and sexuality are 
distinct might, in fact, be productive of the distinction it aims to describe (p. 31), and the 
“categories we live by — must live by — have histories, politics and economies and produce 
effects that can be debilitating for some as they can be liberating for others” (p. 246). His 
analysis focuses particularly on the ways that poor, racialized, trans women in the United States 
negotiate terminology, often by not identifying with the term “transgender.” He argues that by 
assuming we know what is signified by gender and sexuality we can unintentionally erase the 
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complexities of difference, especially considering how the contours of racial or class experiences 
can shape and reshape what gender and sexuality themselves can mean (p. 18). 
However useful and meaningful the distinction between gender and sexuality has come to be, 
it is crucial to recall the historicized and political nature of all language, and in particular, terms 
that signify identity categories. I am currently in the final editorial stages of a manual I was 
contracted to write for a social service agency on working more effectively with LGBTQ-led 
families. In attempting to finalize the mandatory “glossary of terms” I consulted with three trans 
friends, each of whom offered different definitions for key terms and each of whom was 
convinced that different groups of people would be angry with me, depending on how I defined 
the words. Language is never simple and is always changing.  
None of the terms we employ can be viewed as signifying “the real,” but rather they 
“simultaneously carry, enable and restrict meaning” (Valentine, 2007, p. 27). For the purposes of 
this project, some definition of terms is likely necessary, though for the most part I rely on 
participant self-identification on the socio-demographic form and in the interview. (See 
Appendix H for a list of definitions adopted by the research team and appended to project-
related publications.) Perhaps the terms most hotly debated, in both academic and activist 
circles, are “queer” and “trans.” For this project I have borrowed Cavanagh’s (2010) definition 
of “trans” or “transgender,” however I have removed her inclusion of “butches” and “those who 
are masculine and female” and “effeminate men” in the definition because not all of these people 
would identify under the trans umbrella, often now indicated by trans*. Cavanagh defines trans 
or transgender as an  
overarching, and necessarily imprecise way to denote those whose gender 
identities are, in some way, at odds with conventional sex/gender systems and to 
denote those who have transitioned or who are in transition… including those 
who are transsexual along with those who are gender-variant…; trans queer 
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femmes; and genderqueer, two-spirited and transgenderist people. (Cavanagh, 
2010, p. 16)  
Of course, as Cavanagh points out, citing Julia Serano (2007), the danger in using umbrella or 
overarching terms is the disappearance of the range of experiences associated with different 
locations under the term. Similarly, the term queer, another overarching term loosely used to 
signify those who are not heterosexual, can mask the varied locations and experiences of those 
who fall under its umbrella. “Queer” is also a complicated term because it has historically been 
used as a derogatory descriptor of LGBTQ people, and it has been reclaimed or resignified by 
those to whom it refers. Its history as a term of derision means that people, both within LGBTQ 
communities and without, are more or less comfortable with its use. Interestingly, in this study, 
while 48 people identified as “cisgender female,” only 21 identified as “lesbian.” And a total of 
18 of the 66 participants identified as queer. While four of these also identified as something else 
(lesbian, gay, or bisexual), 14 used “queer” as the sole descriptor of their sexual orientation. A 
striking number (11) also identified as bisexual.  
What is most salient here is not so much people’s identifications with regard to gender or 
sexual orientation, but how these categories are negotiated in the fertility clinic context. The 
fertility clinic is a highly gendered and sexed environment, where particular forms of gendered 
and sexed bodies are expected to play very specific biological and social roles in the name of 
“building family.” And, as Boyd (2006) reminds us: “Bodies that inhabit or enact naturalized 
states of being remain culturally intelligible, socially valuable, and as a result, gain and retain the 
privilege of citizenship and its associated rights and protections” (p. 421). So what of the body 
that is not culturally intelligible? The man with a womb? The woman with sperm? The known 
sperm donor who is a “father,” but not a “father”? The co-parenting, but not romantically or 
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sexually involved, queer couple or threesome or foursome? These bodies, identities, and 
interactions will be the subjects of this project.  
Methodology 
Research Context and Role of the Researcher 
 The collaborators on this project conceptualized our work as falling under the rubric of 
community-based research (see Kirby, Greaves, & Reid, 2010; Israel, Schulz, Parker, & Becker, 
1998; Access Alliance Multicultural Health and Community Services, 2011). Following in the 
traditions of participatory and action research, it is a research model that presumes the 
involvement of “those being researched” in project design, data analysis, and knowledge 
dissemination. The level of involvement of community members who are not academics varies 
from project to project (Services to Organizations Community Services Group, 1994), but the 
premise of community-based research is that projects are developed in response to needs or 
problems that communities themselves articulate (however these are defined) and that the aim of 
research is social change. Ginsburg and Rapp (1995) note the tensions inherent in the dual 
identities of scholar and activist, “in the pull to listen carefully to what people say about their 
reproductive lives and in our commitment to advocacy and the championing of reproductive 
rights” (p. 9). For them, the at-least-partial solution to their double identities lies in collaborative 
methods in which the “concerns and aspirations of the people with whom we work guide both 
research and action” (p. 10). I think it is fair to say that this project holds at its heart the 
reproductive concerns and aspirations of LGBTQ people, though of course it is impossible to 
fully represent or account for the full range of meanings ascribed to these.  
I myself was a client of AHR services in 1991, as was Dr. Ross in the early 2000s. Dr. Steele 
has been both a client of AHR services and an AHR practitioner within her family medicine 
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practice. Since 1997 I have been assisting LGBTQ people interested in becoming parents. In my 
role as developer and facilitator of LGBTQ family planning courses, through interaction and 
dialogue with fertility clinic staff, participation in several committees of Assisted Human 
Reproduction Canada, and facilitation of scores of educational workshops on LGBTQ parenting 
issues, I have heard hundreds of accounts of people’s interactions with fertility clinics. Although 
the stories were multiply layered and varied in both their descriptions and conclusions, it was 
clear that people were expressing a lot of frustration, anger, and disappointment about their 
interactions with AHR systems. 
In addition to the studies I mentioned earlier, Drs. Ross and Steele and I had also conducted a 
SSHRC-funded study of LGBT experience with adoption systems in Ontario in which we 
surveyed all adoption licensees in Ontario about their policies and practices related to LGBT 
adoption, and conducted 43 interviews with LGBT people who had been through the adoption 
process. This project resulted in academic publications (see Ross et al., 2008, 2009a, 2009b), 
community publications (see www.lgbtqparentingconnection.ca/socialchange) and training 
workshops around the province for adoption and foster care workers. Collectively we decided 
that AHR systems were the next frontier. We responded to a special call from CIHR and 
received a $100,000 research grant to conduct a pilot study of LGBT experience with AHR 
systems in Ontario. 
In line with community-based research principles, we included academic and community 
partners in the investigator team, and we collaborated with an advisory committee of LGBTQ 
parenting educators, AHR service providers, and service users. This committee included fertility 
endocrinologists from most of the larger clinics in Toronto and Ottawa, several AHR counsellors 
and lab technicians, LGBTQ people who had used donor insemination, IVF, and surrogacy in 
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their routes to parenthood, and several LGBTQ parenting activists. Our intent in involving this 
range of people was both to expand the inclusivity of our research approach and questions, and 
to achieve a level of buy-in from those working in the fertility industry. We wanted their support 
and input in the hope that they would act as conduits for the knowledge dissemination generated 
by the research. (See Appendix B for a list of advisory committee members.)  
In a discussion of narrative inquiry and social change, Riessman (2008) notes that issues of 
validity can shift in a project that is community-based and community-driven:  
genuinely collaborative projects that serve the participant group’s aims at every 
stage — in study design, methods of data collection and interpretation, and 
modes of dissemination — can reposition the validity question. In these 
instances, the research is subject to validation and judgment by participant 
communities, rather than academic audiences alone (p. 199).  
While it is difficult to argue that one’s project is “genuinely collaborative” or that participants 
groups’ aims are served “at every stage,” the knowledge dissemination projects stemming from 
this project reflect a commitment to LGBTQ people and communities. These include: a 
guidebook for LGBTQ people on negotiating interactions with AHR services (Green, Tarasoff, 
& Epstein, 2012a), a fact sheet for AHR service providers on working with LGBTQ people 
(Green, Tarasoff, & Epstein (2012b); an interactive theatre production that has been performed 
both within LGBTQ communities and for AHR service providers, and which is now being 
transformed into an on-line video education project (with funding from individual fertility 
clinics); and several academic journal articles and book chapters.
3
  
 These projects and publications aim to shift the cis and heteronormative framework that 
LGBTQ people encounter in AHR services and to improve the quality of care they receive. As 
such, the project is advocacy-based and thus its validity is perhaps best judged not by academic 
                                                 
3
 James-Abra et al, n.d.; Epstein, 2014; Marvel et al., 2013a, 2013b, forthcoming; Ross et al., 2014; Tarasoff et al., 
n.d. 
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audiences, but by LGBTQ communities and by any shifts that take place within AHR services. 
That said, questions of methodology are significant and I endeavour here to outline the 
approaches taken in participant recruitment and screening, interviewing, and data analysis.  
Participant Recruitment and Screening 
 Interview participants were recruited between July 2010 and March 2011 through on-line 
networks (i.e., LGBTQ and health listservs), by mail (flyers) to over 200 service providers and 
organizations (i.e., fertility clinics, HIV/AIDS service organizations, midwifery practices, etc.), 
and in person at Pride celebrations across Ontario. Interested individuals contacted the study 
office by telephone or e-mail, and were subsequently screened by telephone to determine their 
eligibility. Participants were eligible for an interview based on whether they: were 18 years or 
older, had used or considered using AHR services since 2007, and lived in and/or used health 
services in Ontario. The “considered using” was important criteria because we wanted to capture 
something about the processes by which people made the choice not to pursue AHR services, 
whether for financial or other reasons. Purposeful sampling was used to identify 40 
individuals/families from across Ontario who reflected the diversity of experiences with AHR 
services identified among the individuals screened. Interview participants were also selected 
based on demographic information (i.e., sexual orientation, gender identity, racial/ethnic 
identity, income, and geographic location), in an effort to represent the diversity of the LGBTQ 
population in Ontario. Decisions about who was to be interviewed were not easy. A total of 118 
individuals responded to the call, and from these a total of 66 were interviewed. Because prior 
research on LGBTQ parenting has, for the most part, reflected white, middle-class, urban 
experience, we were concerned to include a broader range of racialized and class identities in our 
sample. LGBTQ parenting research has also historically been primarily focused on lesbian 
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identities, with a small but growing body of research on GBQ men as parents, but very little 
written about GBQ men’s involvement in surrogacy arrangements. For these reasons, we were 
also concerned to prioritize trans and bisexual-identified people, and GBQ men involved in 
surrogacy, as subjects. In addition, it was critical, as a provincial study, that we conduct 
interviews with people outside of urban centres, and we also wanted to interview people who 
had used the range of AHR services available, from very low to very high levels of medical 
intervention (cycle monitoring, insemination, IVF, surrogacy, gamete freezing, etc.) Thus, our 
decisions about who to interview became a juggling act of all of these different factors. Ideally, 
we would have interviewed everybody who expressed interest, but financial constraints made 
that impossible. In the end, although no accurate statistics are available on LGBTQ AHR service 
use, my unverifiable assumption is that our numbers likely come close to reflecting the 
percentages of groupings across the LGBTQ spectrum that actually make use of AHR services: 
13 percent of participants identified as cisgender and male, 10.6 percent as trans man/FTM 
spectrum, and 3.0 percent as trans woman/MTF spectrum (72.7% identifying as cisgender and 
female). However, in the need to screen for a number of factors (race, class, sex, gender, 
geography, services used) we lost an opportunity to increase the numbers of people of colour 
included as participants because we were unable to interview all of the people of colour who 
expressed interest in participating. Given the lack of focus on LGBTQ racialized identities 
within LGBTQ parenting research, this is an unfortunate loss. However close to 30 percent of 
COF participants identified their cultural/racial background as other than white. (For final socio-
demographic characteristics of interview participants, see Appendix C.) 
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Interviews 
 Between December 2010 and August 2011, we conducted 40 interviews that were between 
60 and 90 minutes each with a total of 66 individuals. I conducted only one interview myself, as 
a training exercise with a research assistant who subsequently, with investigators Lori Ross and 
Stu Marvel, conducted the rest of the interviews. Interviewers for this project followed a semi-
structured guide (see Appendix D), with room to follow up on the stories participants told and to 
ask questions of curiosity or interest. The goal was to encourage detailed accounts of people’s 
decisions to use, or not use, AHR services, and of their experiences as fertility clinic clients. 
Prior to the interview, each participant provided written informed consent (see Appendix E) and 
completed a socio-demographic questionnaire (see Appendix F). The project received ethics 
approval from the Research Ethics Board of the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health 
(protocol # 048/2010) and the Office of Research Ethics at York University (certificate # STU 
2010-154). (See Appendix G.)  
Interviewing in the social sciences, which was once viewed as an act of individual 
storytelling, is now more widely acknowledged, in line with a move away from structuralist 
assumptions, to be a co-constructed activity. As Salmon and Riessman put it:  
The audience [or interviewer], whether physically present or not, exerts a crucial 
influence on what can and cannot be said, how things should be expressed, what 
can be taken for granted, what needs explaining, and so on. We now recognize 
that the personal account, in research interviews... is in fact always a co-
construction. (2008, p. 78) 
Riessman (2008), in her book on narrative methods, stresses the importance of the interviewer’s 
emotional attentiveness and engagement — the willingness to enter into a dialogic relationship 
with research participants, and to embrace the uncertainty of stepping away from a rigid 
question-answer format to follow the trails of participant narratives (p. 24). Mainstream social 
science interviewing, in her view, is about a “facilitating” interviewer asking either discrete open 
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questions and/or closed (fixed response) questions of a vessel-like “respondent” who provides 
answers. Narrative interviewing, in contrast, is about two active participants jointly constructing 
narrative and meaning, and generating detailed accounts of complex experience (p. 23). 
Riessman also emphasizes the importance of the researcher’s role conducting the interviews (and 
ideally the transcription) because the interpretive process begins in conversation. 
For this project I am at the disadvantage of being neither the interviewer nor the transcriber. 
Though I was actively involved in the project’s conception and in the development of the 
interview guide, I conducted only one interview and did none of the transcribing. What was 
available to me were the electronically taped interviews and the verbatim written transcripts, 
both of which I have accessed in order to deeply familiarize myself with the content, tone, and 
texture of each interview.  
Thematic Narrative Analysis 
 My analysis is primarily based on the tapes and transcripts of the Creating Our Families 
project and the approach I adopt is, loosely speaking, one of narrative analysis. Narrative 
analysis typically distinguishes itself from other forms of qualitative analysis by its case-based 
as opposed to cross-case analysis, its emphasis on providing context to written or verbal 
narratives, and its use of prior theory to guide analysis. Some overarching principles of narrative 
analysis distinguish it from other methods.  
 Riessman (2008) outlines what she sees as some key features of narrative analysis, the 
primary one being the recognition of the historical and social locatedness of the narratives or 
stories that people produce. When people tell stories, whether in an interview or another 
situation, the narratives they compose are always strategic, functional, and purposeful (though I 
would add, not always consciously so). In other words, narratives accomplish things. They are 
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composed or performed for particular audiences at particular times and, like all language, they 
“draw on taken-for-granted discourses and values circulating in a particular culture. 
Consequently, narratives don’t speak for themselves, offering a window into an ‘essential self’” 
(Riessman, 2008, p. 3), but rather stories become our ways of producing a “self,” with a coherent 
and meaningful history of events and identifications. As Riessman says,  
people construct identities through narrative…who they are and who they are 
not. People use the narrative form to remember, argue, justify, persuade, engage, 
entertain and even mislead an audience… Narratives do political work, they 
provide ways for people to make sense of the past. Storytelling occurs at a 
historical moment with its circulating discourses and power relations. (2008, p. 
8)  
Therefore, narrative analysis of data stresses the importance of questions such as: What does 
this narrative accomplish? How does the storyteller position themselves in the story? What 
subjectivities and discourses are claimed, utilized, and/or resisted? Stories are a function of all of 
the circumstances and conditions of their making. Interviews then, are co-created by the 
interviewer and the participant, or storyteller, under the conditions of that historical moment. 
One can never assume that the same narrator, under different circumstances, will tell the same 
story.  
For example, consider my own AHR story. I got pregnant with the use of an anonymous 
sperm bank donor and the services of a fertility clinic. The stories I tell about it vary depending 
on audience and purpose. If I was being interviewed for a project run by LGBTQ parenting 
activists with the goal of improving clinical services, I might tell a story of victimization, 
stressing the inappropriate letter we were sent, the pressure to take drugs, the medicalized 
environment, and the insensitive and uninformed nurse who kept insisting that “Jews marry 
Jews” (referring, I think, to the fact that Jews are at higher risk for Tay Sachs Disease) as the 
reason I should not select a Jewish donor. Or, if I was interested in producing a more “grateful-
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for-all-in-my-life Buddhist self,” I might tell a story stressing the exhilarating nature of the bike 
ride to the clinic each morning, the fabulous reading I did in the waiting room, the very useful 
information I obtained from the clinic’s cycle monitoring program, and, perhaps most 
significantly, the positive outcome: pregnancy.  
All this is to say that the stories told by participants in this project are not the reflection of a 
unitary, stable self or an untroubled telling of a factual set of events. Narratives are always 
articulated from a point of view that is attempts to do or achieve something in relation to its 
audience. As Joan Scott has so persuasively argued, there is no easy correspondence between life 
and experience; discourse produces experience as much as experience produces discourse (Scott, 
1991). Analysis of interview transcripts, then, is not about revealing the truth of experience, but 
rather is about how people make meaning of their experience. What do people choose to say and 
not say? What discourses do they draw on to tell stories? What subjectivities do they occupy 
and/or reject?  
 Riessman (2008) suggests that thematic narrative analysis, as distinct from other forms of 
narrative analysis, is a method of interpretation of spoken or written narratives that is content 
focused— it is more about what is said, rather than how, to whom, or for what purposes it is 
said. She contends that thematic narrative analysis holds much in common with, and is often 
confused with, grounded theory, but that there are important differences between the two 
methods. They differ in terms of a focus on case-based (narrative) versus cross-case (grounded 
theory) analysis, and, related to this, on the context provided to stories; and on the role of prior 
theory in analysis. 
Generally speaking, thematic narrative analysis retains a commitment to case-based analysis, 
while grounded theory pools cases in order to make general statements. Riessman cites Mishler 
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who believes that keeping stories intact honours individual agency and intention and grants 
individuals “unity and coherence through time, respecting them as subjects with both histories 
and intentions” (Mishler, 1996 as cited in Riessman, 2008, p. 12). When interview transcripts are 
coded thematically, bits and pieces of accounts are grouped together according to themes or 
categories, allowing for cross-case comparison and thematic analysis. However, the subject of 
the interview becomes separated from the context of their life, and the particularities of a story, 
the details of how and why the story comes to be told in a particular way, are potentially lost. 
Direct quotations from interviews, when taken out of context, as Molly Andrews reminds us, 
“often assume a sense of authenticity which eludes other forms of data… people may appear as 
if they are ‘speaking for themselves,’ rather than as people whose words were spoken in 
response to specific questions, and who have little input into how their thoughts are represented 
in the write-up of the research” (2007, p. 41). Dorothy Smith (1990) also makes a strong case for 
the value of the “case study” or the particular instance, arguing that any story bears traces of the 
social relations in which it is embedded. Riessman and Smith would likely concur that any 
narrative is potentially a way in to a complex network of social processes and dynamics.  
While narrative methodologies generally stress the importance of keeping stories intact and 
retaining both historical and individual context, that is, the details of the “telling,” how a 
narrative is spoken — its audience, structures of speech, and local context (Riessman, 2008, p. 
54) — thematic analysis tends to emphasize the “told,” and to favour macro context over local. 
Rather than attending to time, place, and circumstances of narration, the emphasis is on 
connections between “the life worlds depicted in personal narratives and larger social structures 
— power relations, hidden inequalities, and historical contingencies” (Riessman, 2008, p. 76).  
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Grounded theory eschews prior concepts or theoretical frameworks, aiming instead to 
“generate inductively a set of stable concepts that can be used to theorize across cases,” whereas 
thematic narrative analysis tends to be guided by prior theory, while at the same time “searching 
for novel theoretical insights” (Riessman, 2008, p. 74). In other words, grounded theory aims to 
use qualitative data as the basis of “new” theory, while thematic narrative analysis begins with 
theoretical concepts in mind, aiming to expand, hone, or further develop them.  
While Riessman makes careful distinctions between these analytical approaches, she also 
acknowledges that they are not mutually exclusive, and that in practice they can be adapted and 
combined. She encourages innovation and border crossing when it comes to methodologies, 
urging researchers to interrogate their projects with regards to method, as opposed to “applying” 
a particular analytic approach (Riessman, 2008, p. 18). She recognizes the usefulness of both 
theme or category-based analysis and a case-based approach: 
I believe, however, that category-centred models of research (such as inductive 
thematic coding, grounded theory, ethnography, and other qualitative strategies) 
can be combined with close analysis of individual cases. Each approach provides 
a different way of knowing a phenomenon, and each leads to unique insights. (p. 
12). 
 
Methodological Approach and Process 
 I began the data analysis process by listening to the tapes of the COF interviews, taking 
detailed notes, and writing a summary for each that included emergent themes, points of interest, 
and things that struck me. Of course these observations and decisions about what is of greater 
and lesser importance, about what stands out and what recedes, about what is gone back to and 
what left unnoticed, were the beginnings of my interpretation of these data. In this process, I 
became particularly interested in the narratives of those whose identities and family 
configurations lie outside of societal and fertility clinic norms, that is, trans and queer masculine 
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identities and those who are involving known sperm donors in their families, as well as the 
narrative of a lesbian couple who used reciprocal IVF (i.e., implanted the fertilized egg from one 
woman in the uterus of her partner).  
As I listened to and read the interview transcripts, I also read theory that I thought would 
assist with this analysis. The approaches and theories I found most relevant are detailed here and 
in subsequent chapters, including Thompson’s “ontological choreography” (2005), Ward’s 
“gender labour” (2010), Pfeffer’s notion of “normative resistance and inventive pragmatism” 
(2012), Ahmed’s “diversity work” (2012), Spade’s idea of “administrative blockages” (2011), 
Strathern (1992) and Franklin’s work on kinship (1997, 2010/11), Todd (2003) on ethical 
possibilities in education, and, of course, Butler’s contributions to understandings of sex and 
gender (1990, 2004) and Foucault’s understandings of power (1980).  
 With these theoretical concepts in mind I began to shape the dissertation, choosing to 
centre chapter 3 on concepts of sex and gender and the experiences of those with trans and queer 
masculine identities. Chapter 4, on kinship, draws on the experiences of queer women and trans 
men who are involving known sperm donors, as well as a lesbian couple who did reciprocal IVF. 
Chapter 5 addresses issues of ethics and pedagogy, with the inclusion of the narrative of one 
additional COF participant. In total, I draw on 10 of the 40 interviews conducted for the COF 
study, and 17 of the 66 people interviewed. In chapter 3, I also refer to a non-fiction account 
written by a butch-identified lesbian about her journey to pregnancy (Jimenez, 2011).  
I did not include in my analysis interviews with lesbian/bi/queer female couples who were 
utilizing AHR services in order to access anonymous donor insemination because, though these 
narratives are rich, varied, and illuminating, they have been the focus of previous studies (e.g., 
Luce, 2010; Mamo, 2007, Ross, Steele et al., 2006a, 2006b). Nor did I focus on the interviews 
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with gay and bisexual men who were accessing AHR services as part of surrogacy arrangements. 
This decision was due partly to the complexities of issues surrounding surrogacy, including 
legal, policy, and ethical questions which are beyond the focus of this project. Many of these 
participants were primarily concerned with the implications of the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act’s prohibition on paying surrogates, and the resulting grey area of the law, due 
to lack of regulation, regarding the definition of “legitimate receiptable expenses.” I also 
continue to be part of a research team that is analyzing these data, and others were more 
interested in exploring these narratives and the issues they raise. 
The approach I take in this project blurs the boundaries between case and theme-based 
analysis, and, in line with Riessman, recognizes the value of both. My analysis draws on a 
relatively small number of the COF interviews, including a description of each participant near 
the beginning of each chapter. In so doing, I aim to present participants as complex and situated 
subjects, with particular relations to the process of becoming parents and with unique stories 
about their interactions with AHR services. At the same time, I explore particular themes or 
issues across case, using multiple stories to illustrate or elucidate a theoretical point. However, 
rather than pooling participants’ comments, based on theme-based coding, as would be common 
in a grounded theory approach, I use excerpts from interviews to both substantiate prior theory 
and to generate new theoretical insights and ways of thinking. For example, in chapter 3 I draw 
on Thompson’s conceptualization of objectification to explore LGBTQ experience with AHR 
services, but then, based on participant narratives, suggest, counterintuitively, that one of the 
things that might improve LGBTQ experience in fertility clinics is more objectification—a 
separation of body parts and gametes from social identities. I also am careful to recognize those 
instances where participants themselves provide theoretical insight into their own experience. 
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Aside from general information about how participants were recruited and when the 
interviews took place, I do not emphasize the details of the interview context — though the 
majority of interviews took place in participants’ homes, with frequent interruptions from babies 
and small children. However, I do stress the significance of historical, social, and legal contexts 
such as: the historical experiences of LGBTQ people being denied the right to have children (in 
particular, denial of access to AHR services) and having children taken away from them; legal 
and policy frameworks that are exclusionary, for example, the Canadian semen regulations; the 
history, culture, and power relations embodied in institutionalized medicine and the experiences 
of particular groups of people in this context, for example, the impact of trans medical history on 
subsequent interactions with medical institutions. Participant narratives, rather than being 
separated from their particularities, are, whenever possible, linked back both to their specific 
histories and to the larger, macro context. 
If narratives accomplish things and storytellers position themselves in particular ways 
according to circumstances, it is worthwhile to consider the implications of this project’s 
context. Although the COF project was designed to explore the experiences of LGBTQ people 
with AHR services, it was probably apparent, given the researchers’ organizational, institutional, 
and community involvements, that an underlying aim was to improve the quality of services. 
Many participants likely participated because they believed that the telling of their stories would 
potentially contribute to this goal. While we did hear accounts of positive interactions with 
individual service providers and with clinics as a whole, for the most part, participants 
emphasized the experiences that were difficult and the areas they felt required improvement. As 
Thompson (2005) suggests, fertility and reproductive narratives can also be influenced by 
outcomes — those who had successfully achieved pregnancy (which included the majority of 
44 
 
participants) might tell a different story, or remember or forget certain aspects of a story, 
depending on when and if they, their partner or co-parent got pregnant. The choices of which 
stories, and which components of stories, are highlighted here are mine. My hope is that the 
choices I have made and the theoretical frameworks within which I have placed them prove to be 
useful in the ongoing work of improving health care to LGBTQ communities.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review: Reproductive Technologies, Kinship, and Queer 
and Trans Families  
In this chapter I review feminist scholarship on RTs, delineating earlier writings, which 
tended to represent a dichotomized view of the technologies as either good or bad, from later 
work which recognizes the complexities and contradictions embedded in the development and 
use of RTS. I look at the impact RTs have had on kinship studies, contributing to a major 
theoretical shift and a broadening and revitalization of the field, and explore the continuing 
tensions in both straight and queer kinship studies regarding the meanings and significance of 
narratives of biology and normalized family structures. Since this project is focused on non-
normative queer kinship structures (i.e., trans identities, queer masculinities, known sperm 
donors), I review the literature related to these and, finally, look at two ethnographic studies of 
AHR services, one of heterosexual experience in fertility clinics, and the other an ethnography of 
“lesbian reproduction.” 
Feminist Scholarship on RTs: A Dichotomized View 
Questions related to the possibilities and limitations embodied in reproductive technologies 
have a long and fiery history of debate. As Sarah Franklin (2010/11) notes, “New Reproductive 
Technology (NRT) is one of the major themes of post-war twentieth-century feminist 
scholarship… It is no exaggeration to say that thousands of books and articles have been written 
by feminists on reproductive technologies—old and new” (p. 1). Early writings in the 1980s tend 
to fall into one of two categories: those that view the technologies as increasing women’s 
freedom and control of their bodies and reproductive lives, allowing women to fulfill their 
“natural” role as mothers, and those that view reproductive technologies as ultimately 
exploitative and “bad” for women, putting control of women’s bodies and reproduction in the 
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hands of male science. Dion Farquhar (1996) names these seemingly opposing discourses as 
“liberal medical discourse” and “fundamentalist discourse,” though she argues that ultimately 
they are complicit, one depending on the other, with both emphasizing the so-called naturalness 
of the maternal-fetal bond, “treating it as a natural fact and not as a historically and contingently 
determined relation” (p. 20). These discourses, according to Farquhar, “represent the 
technologies’ capabilities and the practices they have spawned as either salvation or damnation, 
but only rarely as complex, elusive, and indefinable” (p. 14). As she, and others, point out, 
neither side of this dichotomized view adequately represents the complexities of the potential 
impacts of reproductive technologies.  
Most early feminist writing on RTs came from radical feminists whose views would fall 
under Farquhar’s fundamentalist category, a view characterized by an anti-technology, anti-
patriarchy stance that advocated complete refusal of the technologies. This “just say no” 
discourse was represented in a number of key volumes (Corea, 1985; Klein, 1989; Raymond, 
1993; Rowland, 1992; Scutt, 1990), the first of which was Gena Corea’s The Mother Machine: 
Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs (1985). Most of the 
authors and editors of these texts were also members of FINRRAGE — the Feminist 
International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering, founded in 1986. 
In Canada, this view was well-illustrated in a 1993 anthology called Misconceptions. This 
volume, exemplifying the stance of many radical feminists at the time, angrily indicts the new 
technologies. Drawing on analogies with Nazism, fascism, and the horrors of “Frankenstein,” the 
authors warn women of the eugenisist, male-dominated, experimental manipulation of the 
human body and psyche that is to come. In their view the development of reproductive 
technologies is a move by masculinist science to control reproduction, and therefore women’s 
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bodies. Specific concerns include: low success rates of procedures (i.e., IVF); the experimental 
nature of the technologies and the subsequent risks to women’s bodies and health (for example, 
the dangers of egg donation); the focus away from the preventable causes of infertility (including 
environmental factors and sexually transmitted infections, sometimes as a result of sexual 
abuse); the stress and health risks of multiple births, and overall, the violation of women’s 
integrity and the privatization, industrialization, and medical/technical control of reproduction 
(Corea, 1993, pp. 18-19).  
Embedded in these arguments is a critique of the dangers inherent in a separation of sex from 
procreation and a portrayal of this separation as a denial of nature itself. Basen (1993), in her 
piece equating the story of Frankenstein with the development of reproductive technologies, 
worries about “the monsters we risk becoming when creation becomes a laboratory act, 
separated from sex and love, this essential human experience that is at once a physical encounter 
with another person and a loss of control (p. 36). She imagines the worst of infant fantasies and 
nightmares come true: “My parents aren’t my parents. My mother is a virgin. My father is a 
powerful magician. You can buy babies from a store. I am not the results of anyone else’s sexual 
act” (p. 37), suggesting that children conceived with the assistance of reproductive technologies 
will be burdened with unbearable confusion. In particular, it is the separation of sex from 
reproduction that is at the root of this so-called crime against women. As Franklin (2010/11) 
comments, the feminist writings at this time, with their “NRT = patriarchy” position, “did not 
always show feminist radicalism, scholarship, or politics at their very best” (p. 2).  
However, Franklin also points out that it is misleading to represent the feminist views at the 
time as having only one version (2010/11, p. 2). Even within FINRRAGE, women were 
theorizing differently about mothering, about infertility, and about the potential impact of the 
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new technologies. Approaches more sympathetic to the plight of women struggling with 
infertility began to emerge, as did writings about the potential advantages of reproductive 
technologies for women (see for example, Pfeffer & Woollett, 1983). A Canadian example of 
this more toned-down and complicating approach is Overall’s 1989 anthology, The Future of 
Human Reproduction.  
Franklin’s writings on RTs follow the twists and turns of feminist scholarship, and her 1988 
review of three major feminist works on reproductive technologies raises issues that later 
become central to feminist conceptualizations of NRTs. While acknowledging concerns about 
the impact of NRTs on women’s control of their reproductive lives, she is critical of the 
essentialist, ahistorical stance of much of this work, and instead calls for understandings of lived 
complexity and of the “shifting and contradictory dimensions of control over reproduction” 
(Franklin, 2010/11, p. 550). In 1998 she raised the issue she then echoed more than 10 years 
later in 2011, of what she calls the “signature paradox of feminist debate over new reproductive 
technologies,” (Franklin & Ragone, 1998, p. 3) that is, the question of choice. She argues that 
the concept of individual choice, while having been successfully at the heart of some key 
feminist struggles (e.g., abortion), is problematic because it flows from a form of liberal 
humanism that does not acknowledge the context within which choices are made. Media 
representations of reproductive technologies offer great choice and control, making it difficult to 
challenge the progressive and benevolent image of technological innovation. Franklin draws on 
Petchesky’s highly influential article (1980) in which she urges that choice be viewed in the 
context of a socio-economic analysis and within a larger framework of reproductive justice:  
The right to choose means very little when women are powerless…women 
make their own reproductive choices, but they do not make them just as they 
please; they do not make them under conditions that they themselves create but 
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under social conditions and constraints which they, as mere individuals, are 
powerless to change (p.685). 
Franklin also reminds us that increased choice can solve some problems, while creating others. 
As Rothman (1986) points out in her classic text on amniocentisis, the choice about whether or 
not to do prenatal screening adds new levels of complexities to the lives of pregnant people:  
The new reproductive technology is offered to us in terms of expanding choices. 
But it is always true that while new technology opens up some choices, it closes 
down others. The new choice is often greeted with such fanfare that the silent 
closing of the door on the old choice goes unheeded. (p. unknown)  
Similarly, the choices offered by RTs can add complex dilemmas to the lives of those seeking 
assistance. Franklin calls it the “disappearing margin between limited choices and having-no-
choice-but-to-choose-one-of-them (2010/11, p. 3). For those undergoing treatment for infertility 
the “choice” to discontinue treatment in the context of a medicalized environment that continues 
to offer options can be agonizing (Kozolanka, 1989). At the same time, viewing “choice” as 
constructed and contextual can lead to accusations such as those made by early radical feminists 
that women who choose to make use of IVF technologies are “dupes” of male science. These 
arguments assume that women are led astray by ideologies that work against their interests and 
thus become complicit in their own exploitation. Similar debates circulate today in relation to 
surrogacy — some arguing that women need to be “protected” from exploitative practices, and 
others that women are capable of making informed choices in relation to their bodies.  
The discourse of choice is also central to the liberal discourse on RTs because RTS are seen 
to offer women increased choices in childbearing. The liberal discourse relies as well on the 
naturalization of women’s bodies and their connection to reproduction. Often found in popular 
magazines and in the promotion materials of fertility clinics, such discourse extols the wonders 
of the technologies that can offer those whose infertility is impaired a renewed chance at the 
“natural” progression of womanhood, from girl to woman to mother. Liberal medical discourses 
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“portray the heroism of pioneering medical teams who achieve ‘miracle’ pregnancies for 
desperate infertile couples restoring marriages [heterosexual ones, of course] stressed to the 
breaking point by involuntary childlessness” (Farquhar, 1996, pp. 20-21). These medical and 
journalistic narratives “offer their audience multiple identifications akin to those of adventure 
and romance narratives” (Farquhar, 1996, p. 21).  
Both of these discourses, the liberal and the fundamentalist, denies the historicity and 
contructedness of reproduction and parenting and the range of possible experiences of 
conception and pregnancy, posing instead an ahistorical, unified notion of a female (and male) 
reproductive and parenting subject. Neither of these discourses dislodge or subvert the 
assumption of women’s “natural” desire to reproduce within the married heterosexual dyad. As 
well, both discourses, according to Farquhar, obscure the new technologies’ implications: it is 
the disruption of the equation of reproduction with male and female bodies, heterosexuality, and 
the nuclear family that the technologies make possible.  
While male reproduction has always been “distributable,” that is, it has been possible to 
separate the genetic contribution of the male from the social act of parenting, female 
reproduction has come as a package: genetics, gestation, parenting. Reproductive technologies 
allow a move away from this essential unitary maternity (the unity between genetic contribution, 
biological process, and social/legal recognition) to a distributed model of women’s reproductive 
capacity. The implications of this biological and discursive separation of conjugal sex from 
reproduction are vast. As Farquhar importantly points out: “by fetishizing the social criteria of 
‘the [heterosexual] couple,’ medical discourse invokes the heterosexist standard only to disrupt it 
by its asexual and third-party donor interventions” (Farquhar, 1996, p. 183). In other words, the 
use of reproductive technologies to “help” a heterosexual couple to conceive and satisfy their 
51 
 
natural desires to procreate foregrounds the division of reproduction into the genetic, the 
biological, and the social and thereby declares its unnaturalness (Farquhar, 1996, p. 183).  
When reproduction is separated from conjugal sex and the heterosexual married couple, the 
category is historicized, a myriad of transgressive social and political possibilities are opened up, 
and kinship and family structures that fall outside this naturalized schema become potentially 
intelligible. Kinship is potentially transformed.  
Reproductive Technologies and the Broadening of Kinship Studies 
I am sick to death of bonding through kinship and “the family,” and I long for 
models of solidarity and human unity and difference rooted in friendship, work, 
partially shared purposes, intractable collective pain, inescapable mortality, and 
persistent hope. It is time to theorize an “unfamiliar” unconscious, a different 
primal scene, where everything does not stem from the dramas of identity and 
reproduction. Ties through blood — including blood recast in the coin of genes 
and information — have been bloody enough already. I believe there will be no 
racial or sexual peace, no livable nature, until we learn to produce humanity 
through something more and less than kinship. (Haraway as cited in Franklin, 
2001, p. 316) 
The study of kinship in Euro-American cultures has a complex and contested history. Hicks 
defines kinship as “a system that organizes and approves particular forms of human 
relationships” (2011, p. 27.) Freeman (2008), in a recent exploration of possible queer forms of 
kinship, differentiates kinship, “the social policies that recognize some forms of lived 
relationality — those extending from the heterosexual couple and the parent-child unit — with 
financial and other benefits,” as well as accompanying responsibilities, from kinship theory: “the 
body of knowledge emerging from attempts to abstract the governing principles of relationality 
— sometimes across cultures — from the practices of intimacy observed in a given culture” 
(Freeman, 2008, p. 295)  
Freeman’s definition of kinship assumes the heterosexual couple as the foundation upon 
which kinship is built. And indeed, until the 1950s, kinship was seen as a universal attribute of 
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human societies with the “governing principles of relationality” rooted in the biological facts of 
gender bimorphism and heterosexual procreation. As Strathern puts it, “having sex, transmitting 
genes, giving birth: these facts of life were once taken as the basis for those relations between 
spouses, siblings, parents and children which were, in turn, taken as the basis of kin relations” 
(1992, p. 5). In traditional kinship studies two kinds of relations are recognized: those based in 
blood (through reproduction) and those based in affiliation (through love and/or marriage.) In 
these configurations, blood relations are viewed as natural, and relations of affiliation as socially 
constructed, or cultural. As Hicks (2011) points out, the anthropological study of kinship has 
rested on this pre-given analytical opposition between the biological and the social, between 
nature and culture (p. 28).  
David Schneider’s 1984, A Critique of the Study of Kinship, highlighted the two most 
prominent assumptions of this mode of thinking about kinship. First, that “genealogical relations 
are the same in every culture” and second, the assumption that “blood is thicker than water.” He 
argued that these assumptions are shaped by Euro-American (Euro-centric) biologistic 
understandings of kinship that assume as self-evident the “very aspects of social life that need to 
be explained” (Franklin, 2001, p. 305), projecting Eurocentric assumptions about universal 
features of the human condition.  
Embedded in early kinship studies are also assumptions about gender that have been soundly 
addressed by feminist writers, including, early on, MacCormack and Strathern (1980). In 1987, 
Yanagisako and Colier, extending previous feminist arguments, argued that  
much of what is written about the atoms of kinship… the universality of the 
family, and the centrality of the mother-child bond is rooted in assumptions 
about the natural characteristics of women and men and their natural roles in 
sexual procreation… Above all, we take for granted that they represent two 
naturally different categories of people and that the natural difference between 
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them is the basis for human reproduction and, therefore, kinship. (as cited in 
Franklin & McKinnon, 2001, p. 4) 
Strathern’s work (1992) has been hugely influential in challenging both these assumptions 
about gender and the nature/culture split in kinship studies, arguing, among other things, that 
there is always an element of choice in kin relations, and that kinship is created from negotiated, 
relational practices that are historical, performative, and constructed. While twentieth-century 
anthropology would view kinship as the study of the social construction of natural life, Strathern 
suggests that “what are taken as natural facts are themselves social constructions” (1992, p. 17). 
She suggests that “the idea of natural kinship has been biologised” (p. 19) and that “what counts 
as natural has acquired rather specific meanings” (p. 19). To Strathern, the development of 
reproductive technologies, what she calls the “enterprising up” of the process of conception, 
potentially makes visible the social constructedness of nature itself and interrogates the pre-
analytic supposition of a set of original, natural, “facts of life.” Franklin and McKinnon (2001) 
suggest that the new kinship studies are about “how kinship may be conceived of outside of its 
ruling sign of biology” (p. 6).  
In a sense, Strathern, Franklin, and others (Strathern, 1992; Franklin, 1997; Franklin & 
Ragone, 1998; Franklin & McKinnon, 2001) have done for “kinship” and “reproduction” what 
Butler does for “gender.” They suggest that what had previously been conceived as universal, 
timeless, essential, and ahistorical, is in fact embedded in historical social and cultural relations, 
and thus is unstable and open to reconfiguration. Franklin and McKinnon suggest that kinship, 
rather than being “grounded in a singular and fixed idea of ‘natural’ relation… is assembled 
from a multiplicity of possibly bits and pieces,” and is a form of “doing” that is subject to 
ongoing negotiation and transformation (2000, cited in Butler, 2004, p. 126). Butler concurs that 
“kinship is itself a kind of doing, a practice that enacts that assemblage of significations as it 
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takes place… characterized loosely as modes of enduring relationship” (Butler, 2004, p. 126). 
This broadening of what kinship and kinship studies can be about is part of what Franklin and 
McKinnon would describe as the reconfiguration and revitalization of the field, in effect a 
“substantial makeover” of the study of kinship (Franklin & McKinnon, 2001, p. 6). Their 2001 
volume explores the mechanisms by which “possible lines of relations are brought into being or 
erased by foregrounding and backgrounding various substantial connections and cultural codings 
(p. 12).  
What is at stake, according to Franklin and Ragone, “are not only traditional definitions of 
family, disability, parenting, kin connections, and inheritance, but the conventional 
understandings of nature, life, humanity, morality, and the future” (1998, p. 9). Thompson 
(2005) acknowledges the impact of this early feminist work in sparking an anthropology of 
family that “thematized gay parenting, families formed by public, private and transnational 
adoption, ethnically-based and state-sponsored initiatives to remove children from their parents, 
and circumstances under which shared blood did and did not confer kinship” (p. 68).  
Reproductive technologies, technologies that have the effect of separating conjugal sex from 
the act of reproduction, of distributing both maternity and paternity, and of differentiating 
genetic, biological, and social parenthood have been recognized in the field of kinship studies as 
having had a critical impact on the denaturalizing of biological narratives of the “facts of life.” 
Strathern suggests that “the way that changes in (the field of reproductive medicine) are 
formulated will affect thinking about kinship. And the way people think about kinship will affect 
other ideas about relatedness between human beings” (1992, p. 15): “There is little now to be 
taken for granted” (1992, p. 20).  
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Butler also argues that kinship is deeply unsettled by practices like donor insemination and 
international adoption and by the breakdown of the symbolic order of the “mother/father” 
procreational family. She suggests that developments in the formation of kinship ties can break 
down boundaries between kinship and community, since kinship ties “may or may not be based 
on enduring or exclusive sexual relations, and may well consist of ex-lovers, non-lovers, friends, 
and community members” (2004, p. 127; and of course, see also Weston, 1991). When 
biological and sexual relations are displaced as the centrally defining aspects of kinship, it 
allows for “the durable tie to be thought outside of the conjugal frame and thus opens kinship to 
a set of community ties that are irreducible to family” (Butler, 2004, p. 127). Kinship outside of 
heterosexual reproduction can become “a set of representational and practical strategies for 
accommodating all the possible ways one human being’s body can be vulnerable and hence 
dependent upon that of another” (Freeman, 2008, p. 298) or as “the process by which bodies and 
the potential for physical and emotional attachment are created, transformed, and sustained over 
time… how our renewal happens on a microsocial level” (Freeman, 2008, p. 298-99). Freeman 
suggests that reproductive technologies have served to modify kinship terminology so that it 
now includes such terms as donor, birth mother, and surrogate, all of which pivot on the 
distinction between a (physical) progenitor and a (social) parent.  
In fact, RT is a particularly visible and rapidly changing site for the proliferation 
of new terms that can at least theoretically interlock and detach, expand over 
time and space in the ways I have described: donors are linked to recipients and 
genetic offspring; birth mothers can have “blood” grandchildren they may not 
meet; one can imagine a surrogate mother and the adopting parent(s) 
constituting a family of sorts (Freeman, 2008, pp. 299-300).  
This broadening of understandings of kinship, partially influenced by the increased development 
of, access to, and use of RTs, significantly shifted feminist scholarship on RTs.  
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A Shift in Feminist Scholarship: Acknowledging Complexity 
The work of Strathern and Franklin was integral to a gradual shift in the 1990s from the moral 
certainty of early feminist writings on RTs to a “tone of moral ambivalence” (Thompson, 2005, 
p. 69), a move that began to pay attention to the lived experiences of infertility and to 
acknowledge the complexity of the social, legal, cultural, and political implications of RTs. 
Ginsburg and Rapp’s 1995 landmark anthology, Conceiving the New World Order, significantly 
contributed to this shift away from “easy condemnations” (Thompson, 2005, p. 69) and marked 
a turn toward writings on RTs informed by poststructuralism, feminist science and technology 
studies, and feminist anthropology. Ginsburg and Rapp recognize technologies as cultural and 
historical, as neither inherently “good” nor “bad,” but as “cultural objects enmeshed in social, 
political and economic systems” (1995, p. 5), emphasizing the “uneven and contested nature of 
the social terrain on which the politics of reproduction are played out” (p. 15). They stress the 
global nature of RTS and base their book on the concept of stratified reproduction, drawing 
attention to the ways that RTs are embedded in increasingly complex systems of local, national, 
and transnational inequalities, at the same time as they open up new and unpredictable 
possibilities, both locally and globally. They insist on the analytical inclusion of differences 
based in “generation, ethnicity, race, nationality, class, and, of course, gender” (p. 2), arguing 
that RTs can have differential impacts in particular contexts. For example, their volume includes 
explorations of the one-child policy in China, discourses related to the reproductive practices of 
African American mothers, the control of women’s sexuality in India and Pakistan, and 
contraceptive testing on women in Brazil. They move discussions on fertility and infertility from 
a focus on the white, middle-class First World experience of childlessness, to one that includes 
the multiplicity of ways that RTs can have an impact on people globally.  
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Work in the 1990s and 2000s that followed Ginsurg and Rapp (1995) continued to focus on 
the contradictory and unpredictable effects of RTs on the reproductive lies of sexed and 
gendered people—on the possibilities and constraints that are enabled through the technologies. 
As Farquhar puts it:  
reproductive technologies function unevenly and ambiguously. Their effects and 
possible appropriations cannot be specified in advance, out of context, because 
they vary according to their use and contestions… [they] have the potential to 
restabilize disrupted or ambiguated identities and relations as well as challenge 
and transform conventional reproductive assumptions about nature, the body, 
and social relations (1996, p. 14).  
While early radical feminist critiques of RTs constructed “the body” and “nature” as feminine 
and the physician/provider as masculine and therefore situated the development of RTs as an 
extension of male power over women’s bodies, later feminist analyses conceptualize “power” in 
a more Foucauldian-influenced way, as flowing not from a central, sovereign source, but 
“produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one 
point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes 
from everywhere” (Foucault, 1980, p. 93). As Farquhar points out, if power is seen to operate 
productively, then RTs are “neither unequivocally evil nor good (1996, p. 6.) and “bodies can 
both be in control and shape technologies they desire, utilize, adapt or resist at the same time 
they can be controlled and shaped by them” (p. 4). Reproductive technologies can bolster a 
pronatalism that sees women’s “role” as primarily procreative; they can also allow women the 
“freedom” of delayed childbearing, can assist when male or female “fertility” is a problem; and 
they open up procreative possibilities for singles, LGBTQ people, and others. 
Farquhar advocates a “third way,” a discourse of RTs that recognizes the constructedness of 
RTs as “shifting historical practices,” that are “interactive with individuals and groups’ 
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appropriations and contestations (1996, p. 191). She poses a postmodern analysis that 
foregrounds the discursive contradictions of RTs by asking  
whether they recuperate compelling traditional but ultimately historically 
constructed norms of bodily integrity, the nature of maternity, the relation of sex 
to reproduction, the connection of reproduction with biogenetic continuity, and 
the stability and simplicity of kinship and social relations. Or, do they 
interrogate the continued relevance and coherence of these categories? (p. 6) 
Of course, in the move to consider both the possibilities and constraints embodied in these 
technologies, it is a mistake to assume that both the fundamentalist and the liberal discourses do 
not continue to circulate, and that varied and hybrid versions of pronatalism and/or of women as 
victims of patriarchal science are not still relevant or visible in current AHR discourse. Franklin 
(2010/11) reminds us that “the relationship between technology and reproduction can never be 
separated from wider questions of women’s [men’s/trans/genderqueer] status and 
empowerment” (p. 3), and Butler addresses the contradictions that continue to be embedded in 
the use of RTs: 
Feminists who criticize technologies for effectively replacing the maternal body 
with a patriarchal apparatus must nevertheless contend with the enhanced 
autonomy that those technologies have provided for women. Feminists who 
embrace such technologies for the options they have produced nevertheless must 
come to terms with the uses to which those technologies can be put, ones that 
may well involve calculating the perfectibility of the human, sex selection, and 
racial selection. (2004, p. 11).  
RTs themselves are neither “good” nor “evil,” and their use will always be mediated by social, 
legal, political, and cultural relations. A good example of the contradictions and complexities 
embedded in the use of RTS are persistent tensions regarding the meaning and significance of 
“biology” in relation to reproduction. These manifest in queer, as well as straight, texts and 
contexts.  
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Queer Studies of Kinship — Tensions in Biology and Normalization 
Queer studies of kinship (see Freeman, 2008; Hayden, 1995; Lewin, 1993; Luce, 2002; 
Mamo, 2007; Weston, 1991) contribute to a move away from foundational biological arguments, 
suggesting instead that kinship can be about dependence, vulnerability, relationality, futurity, 
sexuality, and, as Weston (1991) so significantly articulated, choice. Weston’s classic text 
suggests that gays and lesbians, sometimes in the context of alienation from biological kin, 
create families of choice that serve to decentre biological ties in favour of “choice” or “love” (or 
affiliation, in anthropological terms) as defining features of kin relationships. Lewin’s (1993) 
ethnography with lesbian mothers offers a different perspective, concluding that “motherhood,” 
as the defining feature of womanhood, overrides distinctively “lesbian” practices of relatedness. 
Hayden uses these two texts as the starting point for a discussion of lesbian kinship, and in 
particular, “biology,” as the “crucial axis around which claims to ‘distinctiveness’ of gay and 
lesbian kinship revolve” (Hayden, 1995, p. 41). Drawing on the anthropological work of 
Schneider (1980) and Strathern (1992), she suggests that lesbians who conceive via donor 
insemination, while drawing on core symbols of kinship (blood and love), reinscribe these 
symbols in both predictable, but sometimes distinct or surprising ways (p. 57). In her view, the 
involvement of the lesbian co-parent in the process of “doing conception,” serves to displace 
biology as the defining feature of parenthood, replacing it with a form of female creativity, a 
kinetic, generative power that “places the substance (sperm) in motion,” challenging “the 
exclusive correlation that is assumed between heterosexual procreation and the production of 
kin” (p. 45). Her articulation of the significance of “biology” in LGBTQ parenting, family, and 
kinship formulations and debates remains key to queer parenting discussions, though of course it 
is complicated by the complexities I’ve discussed related to categories of sex, sexuality, and 
gender. Mamo (2007) uses the term “affinity ties” to describe a “kinship device that lesbians 
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create, in the context of uncertain legal terrain, as they select sperm, assign name and 
significance to relationships that have no place on traditional kinship charts, and invent new 
family rituals” (p. 21).  
As Franklin points out, the study of kinship has shifted from assumptions about kinship as 
rooted in “biological facts,” “toward an examination of the knowledge practices through which 
such claims acquired legitimacy, authority and ‘obviousness’” (2001, p. 308). She goes on, 
however, to suggest that the defamiliarization or denaturalization of “biological facts,” and the 
uncertainty about the meaning and significance of biology in relation to kinship, does not mean 
that she is applauding “some new, more flexible, recombinant biology that is less constraining 
than in the past or is to be welcomed as liberatory” (p. 304). In fact, she argues that “biological 
facts continue to matter very much to how both ‘kinship’ and ‘gender’ are understood, but that 
they do so in ways that require careful attention, and are not as self-evident as they might 
appear” (p. 304).  
Biology, then, can be conceptualized not as fundamental truth, but as denaturalized and 
discursive, but also as productive, and as a significant contributing factor in the ways human 
beings are seen to “relate” to one another. Despite the expansion and revitalization of 
understandings of kinship, biology continues to matter. The burgeoning fertility industry attests 
to the fact that biology still matters very much when it comes to reproduction, both in queer and 
straight worlds. If biology was insignificant to kinship, people would be unwilling to assume 
heavy financial burdens and to undergo more and more invasive medical procedures in order to 
create “biological” connections with their children. And, despite the queer adage that love makes 
a family—the slogan that symbolizes queer rejection of biology as the root of kinship—biology 
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and genetics continue to also figure prominently and in complicated ways in queer reproductive 
decision making.  
For example, biology continues to be central in LGBTQ sperm donor selection practices. 
Mamo’s research (2007) illustrates how, in these decision-making processes, recipients select 
sperm in ways that privilege “nature” over “culture,” relying less “on conceptions of their own 
nurturing as parents than they do on cultural understandings of heredity and genetics” (p. 206). 
Sperm is conceived as “possessing an ethnic origin, a health history, and a range of social and 
personality characteristics… the cultural and physical traits of the donors are rematerialized into 
the imagined offspring” (p. 206). Pelka (2009) discusses the complexities of sperm donor 
decisions, pointing out the contradictions between the love-makes-a-family discourse and the 
great lengths and expense people endure to conceive children to whom they are biologically 
connected (p. 83). Queer woman in the COF study describe very complex decision making about 
donor choice; some choose to use brothers as sperm donors, some use the same donor to 
conceive more than one child, some implant one woman’s fertilized egg in the other woman’s 
uterus — all decisions that belie an underlying belief in the significance of biological and/or 
genetic connection. This tension between nature and culture in queer (and all) kinship mirrors a 
longstanding debate about the radical nature (or not) of LGBTQ people becoming parents (see, 
for example, Polikoff, 1987; Lorde, 1987; Copper, 1987; Weston, 1991; Lewin, 1993, 1995; 
Walters, 2001; Mamo, 2007). How do our families challenge, and how do they recreate, the 
conventional model of the heteronormative nuclear family and dominant constructions of 
gender, sexuality, family, biology, blood, and kinship (Epstein, 2012, p. 382)? It is probably fair 
to say that there is a consensus that queer family configurations and parenting both draw on and 
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disrupt hegemonic norms, and that they are a site within which the relation between nature and 
culture is continually being worked out, or, as Butler puts it,  
These are (kin) relations that are prone to naturalization and disrupted 
repeatedly by the impossibility of settling the relation between nature and 
culture… kinship becomes a site upon which the distinction between nature and 
culture is figured, worked out, repeatedly naturalized and then disrupted (Butler, 
2004, p. 126).  
Mamo (2007) recognizes how queer kinship formations can both challenge heternormativity 
and recreate geneticization narratives (p. 223), and her term “affinity ties” signals queer forms of 
kinship brought about through “assemblages of meanings of blood, genes, and social and 
cultural connection…these forms of sociality lie within and between the family one chooses and 
the family one is given in ‘nature’” (p. 231). Queer families continue to be one site within which 
the nature/culture distinction is continually being worked out.  
But queer family configurations are but one example of the complexity of the connections 
and disconnections that make up twenty-first century kinship. Franklin and McKinnon, in the 
introduction to their 2001 volume on the new kinship studies, consider “how kinship is created 
in ways that coexist with, push against, complement, contradict, erase and make explicit 
divergent means of connection and disconnection” (p.13). They suggest that the lines between 
kinship and other forms of relationality are fluid: 
On the one hand, friends, villagers, religious associates, “racialized” others, and 
strangers can be made into kin, while mothers, grandparents, and patrilineal 
relations can be made into strangers, or “just” friends… 
The same substance (blood, genes, eggs, sperm) that is mobilized to create 
kinship ties in one context, will in different institutional contexts — given 
different historical, political-economic, and religious forces as well as different 
individual perspectives — be made to create other kinds of relations, or no 
relation at all (Franklin & McKinnon, 2001, p. 13).  
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The provision of sperm is a good example of the fluidity of kinship and the importance of 
context. It can create a father, a distant uncle, a provider of nothing more than genetic material, 
or an involved “other.”  
However, within this context of fluidity, negotiation and choice, Franklin and McKinnon also 
recognize the restrictions that make process, negotiation and choice “possible for some people in 
some contexts but not for others” (2001, p. 21), in other words, the continued stratification of 
kinship and reproduction. Certainly, a significant limitation to much of the existing LGBTQ 
parenting research is that it draws primarily on the narratives of white, middle-class, urban 
dwellers. Exceptions include Boggis (2001), who draws attention to issues of class in LGBTQ 
family formation, and Moore (2011) who recently produced one of the first scholarly works to 
address the experiences of queer black women raising children.  
Franklin and McKinnon cite Weston (2001, p. 168) who, suggesting that kinship is something 
that congeals, asks: “congealed how, for whose benefit, and from what?” They draw attention to 
the ways that the breaching of boundaries, “of nations, cultures, species, races, persons, bodies, 
cells,” can also be used “to reestablish and reinforce familiar normative categories” and that 
“categories such as the natural and human continue to be used to signify what is certain, 
essential, and given in the nature of things” (Franklin & McKinnon, 2001, p. 21). Two such 
familiar and normative categories are the heterosexual nuclear family and, embedded in this, 
cultural anxiety about the “need” for a father.  
Normative Families and the Need for a Dad  
I find myself dreading the summer 
The taunts of the teenage boys 
The stares of expectant neighbours waiting for our husbands to come home  
From work from war from far away from overseas from anywhere 
Just come 
How long can two women together make a barbecue mow the lawn  
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Raise children 
Whose baby is it anyways 
I mean who had it, whose is it really  
Who is the real mother? 
 (Lois Fine, “Another Woman’s Baby” in Oikawa, Falconer, Elwin, & 
Dector, 1993, p. 31) 
Schneider identified heterosexual intercourse as the symbol of American kinship. The 
overwhelming identification of heterosexual procreation with legitimized kinship has meant that, 
historically, lesbians and gay men have been excluded from the realm of kinship (Hayden, 1995, 
p. 43), and, due to their supposed inability to reproduce, to “create,” have been portrayed as a 
significant and dangerous threat to “the family.” As Freeman puts it:  
Heterosexual gender norms therefore “make” kin relations, in that they regulate 
human behaviour toward procreation while appearing to be the result of some 
primal need to propagate the species. Meanwhile, whatever the connections 
forged by queer gender performances and other embodied behaviours “make” 
remains unintelligible as kinship (2008, p. 297).  
Butler (2004) suggests that the continued invocation of symbolic, life-giving heterosexuality 
and marriage are, in fact, a compensatory response to “the historical breakdown of marriage as a 
hegemonic institution,” an attempt to sustain an already irreversibly challenged fantasy (p. 125). 
Queer families (and others who do not conform to the conventional North American family 
model) continue to be confronted by, compared to, and assessed in relation to a non-existent 
heterosexual family norm, a norm that is profoundly embedded in social, cultural, and political 
institutions.  
Sadly, this normative model of the heterosexual nuclear family is a social structure that, in 
North America, refuses to die in the collective imagination, and continues to be perceived as part 
of “the nature of things.” As I often put it in training sessions, the most significant thing about 
the construct of the heterosexual nuclear family is that it is deemed “natural,” that is, if you put a 
bunch of human beings out in a field, this is the family they will create. Although kinship 
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scholars are recognizing the complexity and contingency of family structures and kinship 
relations, and despite the fact that the 2011 Canadian census showed a marked decline in the 
two-parent nuclear family structure,
4
 the conventional two-parent heterosexual family model 
continues to reign supreme when it comes to rhetoric and social policy. As sociologist Judith 
Stacey (2002) puts it, there is a “dangerous disjuncture between our family rhetoric and policy, 
on the one hand, and our family and social realities on the other.” She argues that legal and 
social policies “stubbornly deny the complex, pluralist array of contemporary families and 
kinship, atavistically presuming to serve a singular, ‘normal’ family structure — the 
conventional, heterosexual, married-couple, nuclear family (p. 404). Central to the construct (or 
the fantasy) of the heterosexual nuclear family is deep cultural anxiety about the need for a 
father.  
While feminists, and women in general, have advocated for men to take an equal (or more 
substantial) role in the raising of children, the manifestation of the Father Involvement 
movement, and the related, but sometimes differentiated, Father’s Rights movement, have been, 
at best, a mixed blessing. Central to the discourse of “father involvement” are ideas about the 
necessity of father involvement for “healthy child development,” and the citing of a litany of 
negative outcomes for children who grow up without, or with under-involved, fathers (see for 
example, Allen & Daly, 2002). Stacey (2002) differentiates feminist calls for men to be more 
                                                 
4
 The 2011 Canadian census reported increased numbers of one-person, multiple family and “other” households, 
whereas the number of households composed of couples with children declined. “Other” households include 
those living with roommates or other relatives. Canadian household in 2011: Type and growth. Catalogue 
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involved in childrearing, from what she calls “reactionary moves to reify genetic paternity or 
stereotypical masculinity as crucial to the welfare of children and the nation alike” (p. 402). She 
cites research that refutes the belief that “the mere presence of a father in a family confers 
significant benefits on his children” (pp. 402-403) and suggests, as have others (see, for 
example, Silverstein & Auerbach, 1999), that “it is the quality, commitment, and character of 
parents, rather than their gender, that truly matter” (p. 403).  
Fiona Kelly (2011), in her analysis of Canadian family law in relation to the lesbian family, 
analyzes how current legal reforms essentially create a framework for lesbian families that 
mimics the patriarchal, heterosexual, nuclear two-parent family, and that does not allow for 
recognition of a significant, but non-parental, relationship between children and, for example, 
known sperm donors. She describes how a backlash to “non-normative” family practices, 
bolstered by an increasingly powerful fathers’ rights movement, the emergence of a neo-
conservative political agenda, and an unprecedented adherence to gender-neutral formal equality 
in family law, fathers (regardless of the quality of their actual involvement in children’s lives) 
have emerged as critical to both the preservation of “the family” and children’s best interests (p. 
29-30). Citing legal cases in both Canada and other jurisdictions, she portrays a legal landscape 
that views fathers as “good news,” with courts remaining “resolutely resistant to excluding a 
known donor from a lesbian family if it means the child will not have a ‘father’” (p. 37).  
Non-Normative Identities and Family Structures  
The literature on AHR services in relation to trans people is virtually non-existent, though 
some personal accounts are beginning to emerge (Beattie, 2008; Ware, 2009). Ryan (2009) 
conducted a small study on the lives of trans parents, but her study did not include interactions 
with AHR services. Pyne (2010) recently conducted a literature review related to cisnormative 
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assumptions and discrimination in the lives of trans parents, as well as a research project based 
on focus groups with trans parents (Pyne, 2012). His literature review details a history of 
devastating discrimination. For example, Brown and Rounsley  
report that until the 1980s, therapists at gender identity clinics suggested that 
parents undergoing a gender transition should disappear forever from their 
children’s lives to avoid harming them, even telling the children that they had 
died in some cases (Brown & Rounsley, 1996, p. 187). 
While some research and writing on trans parenting is shifting from a deficit model to an 
exploration of the strengths and possible benefits of having trans parents (see, for example, 
Brown & Rounsley, 1996; Hines, 2006; Garner, 2004; Canfield-Lenfest, 2008; Feakins, 2009), 
for the most part trans people continue to be excluded from the social agenda of mainstream 
research and to suffer from both informational and institutional erasure (Namaste, 2000; Bauer et 
al., 2009). For a discussion and references related to trans exclusion from AHR services, see 
pp.8-9 of this dissertation.  
Regarding queer masculinity and parenting, Moraga (1997) and Jimenez (2011) each write 
about their experiences as butch-identified lesbians who chose to get pregnant. Epstein (2004) 
suggests that butch pregnancy can reconfigure the subjectivities of both “butch” and “mother,” 
and Walks (2012), in her doctoral dissertation, addresses the reproductive desires, choices, and 
experiences of butch lesbians, transmen, and genderqueer individuals in British Columbia, using 
an analytic framework of feminine pregnancy as “cultural fetish.”  
Accounts and analysis of lesbian decision making and negotiations with known sperm donors 
are found in Mamo (2007), as well as in short chapters in Agigian (2004) and Sullivan (2004), 
though neither address these negotiations in the context of fertility clinics. The vulnerability of 
the non-biological parent(s) has long been recognized and articulated in writings on lesbian 
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parenting. An early lesbian anthology, in a piece about the stressors facing lesbian families, 
explores the dimensions of this subject position: 
No matter how strong her presence and involvement in the family… it is she 
who disappears, it is she who is disenfranchised—by the school, by both 
families of origin, by the outside world, sometimes (even more painfully) by the 
children or by friends in the lesbian network who do not see her as a parent nor 
understand the unique pressures of her position in the family. (Crawford, 1987, 
p. 205) 
The growing literature about lesbian co-mothering (Abelson, Epstein, & Ross, 2013; 
Crawford, 1987; Gabb, 2005; Hequembourg & Farrell, 1999; Muzio, 1999; Sullivan, 2004; 
Tasker & Golombok, 1998; Wilson, 2000), cites the complexities of this subject position, the 
inequalities in recognition and intelligibility in relation to family, friends, and communities, and 
the vulnerabilities and fears attached to parenting a child one has no biological connection to, 
often with little or no legal recognition or protection. This literature also addresses the strategies 
deployed by lesbian couples to attempt to equalize or “tie in” the “other” mother (Sullivan, 
2004). These include choosing a donor with physical characteristics similar to the non-birth 
parent; arranging for the non-birth parent to be the at-home parent; inducing lactation in the non-
birth parent; and naming practices (for example, including the surname of the non-birth parent in 
the child’s surname, or having the child call both women names that reflect equal parental 
obligations (Hayden, 1995, p. 50).  
The non-biological lesbian parent, like the known sperm donor, is a kinship configuration that 
defies traditional kinship language. Brown and Perlesz, in a study conducted in Australia, found 
45 different terms used to describe the non-birthing lesbian parent (2007, p. 277); they draw 
attention to the processes by which language both reflects and constructs experience (Benkov, 
1994, p. 172), and can be used to both convey and/or conceal relationships.  
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Goldberg and Brushwood-Rose (2010) interrogate discourses of biology in queer 
reproduction in a compelling collection of narratives written from a diversity of locations within 
the queer women/known sperm donor configuration. Questions of “biology” are central as well 
to two volumes that specifically address “non-biological parenting”: Aizley (2006) and Miller 
(2010). Both of these authors raise the significance and power of “resemblance talk,” the ways 
that people both within and outside of queer families look for, comment upon, and make 
meaning from who looks like whom in the queer family. Luce’s 2010 study, based on 
ethnographic work in British Columbia, provides the most detailed account to date of Canadian 
lesbian reproductive practices, and Mamo (2004) provides the American equivalent. Epstein 
(2009) includes narrative and analytical pieces on a wide range of identities and themes, 
including a piece on trans fertility clinic experience (Ware, 2009), the contradictory ways that 
disourses of biology are deployed in lesbian reproductive practices (Pelka, 2009) and an 
interview with three men who donated sperm to lesbians (Epstein, 2009, p. 104).  
Nordqvist (2011) analyzes the dynamics of sperm donation, suggesting that the separation of 
the donor — their ejaculation process and bodily fluids— from the recipients of the sperm is 
achieved in the clinical setting through the anonymity framework but also through the medical 
procedures of analyzing, washing, freezing, and thawing sperm, and through the medical staff’s 
practices. Referring to Thompson’s concept of “agency through objectification,” by which 
“technology enhances subjectivity when body parts, which are objectified through the medical 
gaze in treatment, come to ‘stand in’ for the woman in a synecdochal relation” (Nordqvist, 2011, 
p. 1662), she argues that, in the case of donor insemination, exactly the opposite occurs. The 
donor and his gametes are intentionally disconnected, thereby reducing the anxiety, 
awkwardness, and risk often associated with donor insemination by the recipients of donated 
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gametes. The synecdochal relationship is severed in this case, “transforming the donor and the 
sperm from being person-like to being thing-like” (p. 1667). Of course, she also suggests, this 
separation is never complete, and the “tensions around sexuality, intimacy and personal life 
embedded in the process of retrieving sperm” are managed, but never fully resolved.  
Ethnographies of RTS: Thompson and Mamo 
Thompson’s 2005 ethnographic study of fertility clinics and Mamo’s 2007 ethnography of 
lesbian reproductive practices are two examples of work that takes as its starting point the 
contradictory, historical, and unstable nature of the practices associated with RTs. Charis 
Thompson’s (2005) ethnography of fertility clinics is the result of field work she carried out in 
fertility clinics between 1988 and 2004. Based on hours of observation of all facets of clinic life, 
she explores the complex ways that reproductive technologies can both bolster existing norms 
and transform social relations. Through a concept she names “ontological choreography” she 
explores the “dynamic coordination of the technical, scientific, kinship, gender, emotional, legal, 
political, and financial aspects of ART clinics… a deftly balanced coming together of things that 
are generally considered parts of different ontological orders (part of nature, part of the self, part 
of society)” (Thompson, 2005, p. 8). Within this broad framework, Thompson uses the concepts 
of normalization, naturalization, and agency through objectification to explore the economic, 
social, political, and legal complexities of gender and kinship that are negotiated in the daily 
practices of fertility clinics.  
Briefly, her discussion of normalization explores the processes that govern who is the 
“appropriate” user of AHR services. The norms of the clinic require that patients ideally present 
themselves as heterosexual couples who can pay for services, who act with civility, are 
compliant with diagnostic and treatment protocols — including accepting that the primary focus 
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is the woman’s body, that “natural” cycles give way to “disciplined” cycles, and that length (and 
cost) of treatment, justified by statistics, becomes open-ended. Thompson uses naturalization to 
refer to the ways that kinship and procreative intent are strategically naturalized by patients. For 
example, a heterosexual egg donor IVF cycle (a woman carries a pregnancy conceived from a 
donated egg and her male partner’s sperm) begets different kin relations than a gestational 
surrogacy (a woman carries a pregnancy that is conceived from a donated egg — or the egg of 
the intended mother — and the male partner’s sperm). In the first case “motherhood” is 
determined based on gestation or biology; in the second case “motherhood” is determined based 
on either intention and social/legal grounds, or based on genetics. In each case, the kin 
relationships are naturalized.  
Thompson also recognizes fertility clinics as dynamic cultural sites, wherein women and men 
are constantly negotiating their own subjectivities in the face of objectification — of bodies, 
reproductive parts, and substances. Countering a tradition, particularly visible in early radical 
feminist RT critiques, that views objectification as antithetical to subjectivity and agency, she 
suggests that objectification of one’s body can be part of a strategy to achieve a goal 
(pregnancy), that it may be possible “to discern potential gains for the long-range self within 
different dimensions of objectification” (2005, p. 202).  
One of her most compelling chapters explores the dynamics of masculinity in the clinic. 
Because a diagnosis of male factor infertility can threaten a masculinity that is ordinarily defined 
through virility and paternity, men have to negotiate, achieve, and protect their compromised 
male identity, sometimes through displays of hypermasculinity (pride in the numbers of one’s 
sperm count; jokes about the porn used to produce the sample; performance of the “supported 
and committed husband,” etc.). When a heterosexual couple enters the AHR environment the 
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focus is most often on the woman’s body, which begins to stand in for the couple. Thompson’s 
look at masculinity, then, is an attempt to understand a fuller range of the gender dynamics at 
play.  
Thompson’s ethnography explores the intersections of lives, subjectivities, and technologies, 
and is especially concerned to point out moments, within the often mundane daily operations of 
a clinic, of unexpected agencies and political configurations. She portrays the interactions in the 
clinic as a complex mutual choreography based in sameness and novelty, routine and innovation, 
and reminds us that “change is not sudden, forward looking, always irreversible, but instead is 
iterative, multidirectional, patchy, frequently conservative, and often the result of unintended 
consequences” (Thompson, 2005, p. 14). She is more interested in understanding complexity 
than in producing narratives of unidirectional or static relationships and negotiations.  
Thompson’s work, however, focuses almost exclusively on heterosexual experience. 
Nordqvist (2008) argues, in fact, that virtually all feminist studies of reproductive technologies 
reproduce a heterosexual imaginary of procreation, effectively rendering lesbian reproduction 
inconceivable. By contrast, Laura Mamo’s ethnography, Queering Reproduction (2007), is 
probably the most elaborated analysis to date of North American queer women’s reproduction. 
Based on in-depth interviews with 36 women who identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or queer, 
as well as key interviews with practitioners in the AHR field, Mamo provides a rich analysis of 
the dynamics of lesbian conception and family making. Beginning by tracing the historic shift 
from a self-help, do-it-yourself, turkey-baster model of lesbian conception, to a much greater 
reliance on the services offered by “Fertility Inc.,” she follows the journey of lesbian baby 
making from initial preparation, to decision making regarding sperm donors, to the varied 
trajectories women find themselves on, from low-tech at-home insemination to high-tech 
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intervention at a clinic. She explores the concept of kinship in lesbian parenthood, introducing 
the notion of “affinity ties,” “a kinship device that lesbians create, in the context of uncertain 
legal terrain, as they select sperm, assign name and significance to relationships that have no 
place on traditional kinship charts, and invent new family rituals” (Mamo, 2007, p. 21).  
Throughout this work, Mamo grapples with the contradictions I noted earlier (see p. 61 of this 
dissertation), and that have been addressed by many writers (Polikoff, 1987; Lorde, 1987; 
Copper, 1987; Weston, 1991; Lewin, 1993, 1995; Walters, 2001) on LGBTQ parenting: the 
tensions between resistance and accommodation; agency and objectification; conformity and 
transgression. Mamo describes the doubled nature of lesbian reproductive practices like this:  
The ways that lesbian insemination denaturalizes the assumed link between 
heterosexuality and parenthood casts doubt on hegemonic foundational 
assumptions, and opens new possibilities for gender, sexual expression, 
intimacy and family forms… at the same time as reflecting and reinforcing 
regulatory ideals of how to make sense of reproduction, biology, family, and 
social life, etc. (Mamo, 2007, p. 22).  
The participants in our study reflected an enormous range of such sex/gender and family 
configurations. Many lesbian couples included known sperm donors in their family lives with a 
range of levels of involvement; trans men partnered with other trans men went to clinics to get 
pregnant via donor sperm; cisgendered women partnered with trans women went to clinics to get 
pregnant via sperm from their partners; trans men and women accessed (or attempted to access) 
clinic services to freeze gametes; single people across the LGBTQ spectrum also used AHR 
services to build families.  
While many of these family configurations significantly destabilize the highly sexed and 
gendered model of the conventional heterosexual nuclear family, on the other hand, their 
narratives of donor selection reveal sometimes surprisingly traditionalist conceptions of the 
desirability of various traits (i.e., race, intelligence, health, physical characteristics, and 
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emotional make-up) and how these are “carried” in gametes — many couples chose anonymous 
sperm donors as a way to protect the integrity of the two-parent family. As Mamo reiterates, 
queer reproductive practices are embedded in contradictory discourses and practices and have 
the “power to extend kinship… but also the potential to re-entrench the nuclear family by 
tightening the two-parent hold on normative family tropes” (p. 92). Queer reproductive practices 
both rely on and destabilize foundational social and cultural assumptions.  
Mamo ends by summarizing some of the issues and dilemmas raised by the constantly 
developing, shifting, and vastly complex terrain of reproductive biomedicine. She raises 
questions about the future:  
Who will be deemed legitimate users of these technologies? Will these users 
continue, transform, or reduce current forms of stratified reproduction? Will old 
variants of social control persist? Through what means will new variants of 
social control emerge and in what places? Similarly the question is not whether 
possibilities will emerge for social transformations, but for whom? Gaining an 
“accurate” version of social relations requires interrogations of material cultures 
in practice. Such interrogations must explore the forms of particular forms of 
negotiations and trajectories employed to achieve pregnancy; the ways that 
kinship is enforced and altered symbolically and materially; the ways that sex, 
gender and sexuality are reworked or maintained; and the ways that 
reproduction is raced, classed, and gendered. (Mamo, 2007, p. 243)  
Mamo gestures here toward my own work, Although her ethnographic project includes 
interviews with lesbians who chose to use known sperm donors, her analysis is specifically of 
“lesbian” reproduction, and focuses particularly on the reproductive journeys of lesbian couples. 
She does not explore the dynamics and negotiations that take place when other queer and trans-
identified people bring their biologies, sexualities, gender identities, family configurations, and 
reproductive desires to the clinic. This dissertation therefore carries on where Mamo left off, 
contributing to feminist, queer, and trans scholarship on kinship, reproductive technologies, and 
institutional pedagogy by exploring a broader range of identities and kinship configurations in 
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interactions with AHR services, and by raising important questions regarding ethics and 
education.  
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Chapter 3: Space Invaders 
The ontological choreography (Thompson, 2005) of the fertility clinic is a process by which 
things come together to facilitate a (heterosexual, cisgender) patient’s flow through the clinic. 
This flow is supported by gender work (Ward, 2010), that is, the work the clinic does to repair 
and bolster damaged heterosexual cisgender identities, as well as the various processes by which 
patients, their body parts, and gametes are objectified in the service of a long-range self — the 
self that wants to be pregnant. These processes of objectification can enhance agency when there 
is no metaphysical rupture to a patient’s sense of personhood or subjectivity. But when LGBTQ 
people (who are like space invaders) (Ahmed, p. 38, citing Puwar, 2004) enter the site of the 
fertility clinic the flow of the patient through the clinic is disrupted by the stickiness of the 
heterosexual matrix’s assumptions (Butler, 1990)— disrupted by the inability of administrative 
procedures and clinic staff to disentangled the assumptive links made between body parts, 
gametes, bodies, gender, sex, sexual orientation, sexual practice, and family configuration. As a 
result, the gender work typically carried out in clinic settings works against LGBTQ clients’ 
subjectivities, and processes of objectification that might otherwise enhance flow through the 
clinic serve to further the misrecognition and lack of intelligibility of LGBTQ clients. Ruptures 
to personhood also occur as a result of administrative misclassification (Spade, 2011). LGBTQ 
clients sometimes adopt strategies to negotiate their lack of recognition in the clinic which, while 
adopted in service of the goals of a long-term self, can also create ruptures to personhood. These 
processes by which the flow of queer and trans bodies through the clinic get stopped by ruptures 
to personhood or subjectivity, are what Ahmed (2012) refers to as “blockages,” suggesting that 
the experience of blockages is also a source of knowledge. If, as Thompson suggests (2005, p. 
201), ethicality is evaluated by the presence or lack of violations to personhood, this chapter 
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points to the failure of clinics to recognize the personhood of those whose subjectivities lie 
outside of normative cisgender heterosexuality and to the need for clinics to examine their 
ethical practices in relation to LGBTQ clients.  
Ontological Choreography 
Thompson characterizes the goings on in fertility clinics as an “ontological choreography,” by 
which she means the  
dynamic coordination of the technical, scientific, kinship, gender, emotional, 
legal, political and financial aspects of ART clinics. What might appear to be an 
undifferentiated hybrid mess is actually a deftly balanced coming together of 
things that are generally considered parts of different ontological orders (part of 
nature, part of the self, part of society). These elements have to be coordinated 
in highly staged ways so as to get on with the task at hand: producing parents, 
children, and everything that is needed for their recognition as such (2005, p. 8).  
She argues that this kind of choreography between different kinds of things is particularly 
striking in fertility clinics because of the overlap and intertwining of matters of technology with 
matters that are intensely personal and political. In the fertility clinic bodies, body parts, parents, 
families, instruments, equipment, doctors, nurses, technicians, drugs, medical procedures, 
bureaucratic procedures, counsellors, etc. are all part of a dance of “ontologically heterogeneous 
things and people in the service of a long-range self” (p. 204). The long-range self is the self that 
wants to get pregnant (or have a partner or co-parent get pregnant) and become a parent. The 
process of making one’s way through a fertility clinic involves ontological heterogeneity:  
A patient who is going through a cycle of treatment is sometimes a person who 
juggles her work schedule to be at the clinic, sometimes a generic patient who 
sits in the waiting room, sometimes ovaries and follicles that appear on an 
ultrasound screen, sometimes an anesthetized body that lies on a surgical table, 
sometimes a patient with blocked tubes, and so on. The genius of the setting — 
its techniques — allows these ontological variations to be realized, to multiply 
and to be coordinated. By passing through them, a patient embodies new options 
for her long-term self (p. 182). 
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For Thompson it is this choreography that enhances the “flow” of the patient through the 
clinic. She uses language of mobility and movement to characterize the patient’s passage 
through the clinic, referring to “trails of activity” that can either peter out if there is no successful 
pregnancy, or can lead back to and transform the long-range subject if there is a successful cycle 
culminating in a pregnancy (p. 203). 
Gender Work  
Of course it is not obvious how to interact with queer bodies and genders, just as 
we do not naturally or automatically know how to engage normative genders 
and their accoutrement. Successfully recognizing and affirming the gender of 
the other — whether the normative or transgressive other — involves a 
significant amount of training, study and practice — which, like all forms of 
work, can be very pleasurable, theatrical, and dynamic, or it can be tedious, 
failure-ridden, and compulsory.” (Ward, 2010, p. 237)  
Judith Butler shifted theorizing about sex and gender by suggesting that the categories of both 
sex and gender are discursively produced as cultural norms through reiterative performativity. 
She explores the “fundamental unnaturalness” of cultural configurations of sex and gender 
(1990, p. 149) arguing that sex, gender identity, and sexuality are constituted through a repetition 
of acts with no origin, robbing compulsory heterosexuality of its claims to naturalness and 
originality (p. 124). 
Butler uses the term heterosexual matrix to “designate that grid of cultural intelligibility 
through which bodies, genders, and desires are naturalized” (1990, p. 151). The heterosexual 
matrix is:  
a hegemonic discursive/epistemic model of gender intelligibility that assumes 
that for bodies to cohere and make sense there must be a stable sex expressed 
through a stable gender (masculine expresses male, feminine expresses female) 
that is oppositionally and hierarchically defined through the compulsory practice 
of heterosexuality. (p. 151) 
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In Butler’s conception of the heterosexual matrix, biological sex, gender identity, and sexual 
practice are produced through reiterative performativity as normalized and naturalized 
components of identity, with the appearance of being linked to and stabilized by the other. 
Biological sex is expressed by gender, both of which are expressed in heterosexual practice. 
In the fertility clinic the heterosexual matrix is the norm, and the assumptions embedded in 
this configuration become so naturalized that they go unnoticed. Bodily secretions, bodily 
productions, and body parts are routinely linked to sexed and gendered bodies, normative sexual 
orientations, and predictable (heterosexual) sexual practices. Gendered body parts (ovaries, 
uterus, testicles, penis) produce gendered gametes (sperm, eggs), and are tied to sexed bodies 
(male / female) with binary gender identities (man / woman), normative gender expression 
(femininity / masculinity), normative sexual orientation (heterosexual), and normative sexual 
practice (heterosexual intercourse — which is called “sex”). The desire to have children in a 
heterosexual context is taken to be “natural” (Thompson, 2005, p. 92) as are a set of feelings, 
attitudes, and behaviours associated with womanhood and manhood, femininity and masculinity, 
and maternity and paternity. 
Using a less philosophical and more sociological framework, West and Zimmerman argue 
that gender is a “routine accomplishment embedded in everyday interaction” (1987, p.125), 
suggesting that gender is something we do more than something we are. Like Butler, they 
critique the taken for grantedness of binary models of sex and gender that are perceived as both 
natural and essential: “We do not think, ‘Most persons with penises are men, but some may not 
be’, or ‘Most persons who dress as men have penises.’ Rather, we take it for granted that sex and 
sex category are congruent — that knowing the latter, we can deduce the rest” (p. 132). Citing 
Garfinkel, whose case study of Agnes has become infamous, they emphasize the ways that a 
80 
 
binary view of sex, gender, and sexuality (Butler’s heterosexual matrix) has a profound moral 
status, “in that we include ourselves and others in it as ‘essentially, originally, in the first place, 
always have been, always will be, once and for all, in the final analysis, either ‘male’ or 
‘female’” (Garfinkel, 1967 as cited in West & Zimmerman, 1987, p. 133). They suggest that 
gender is accomplished through the production of “required identificatory displays” (p. 127) that 
include appropriate gendered markers (clothes, hair, behaviour), and through deeply embedded 
social practices that create seemingly natural and essential differences between girls and boys 
and woman and men (p.137). The sex segregation of North American public bathrooms is a 
good example of how gender is accomplished through the assumption of innate, essential, and 
biological differences between the sexes, even though both “are somewhat similar in the 
question of waste products and their elimination” (Goffman 1977 as cited in West & 
Zimmerman, p. 137). Cavanagh (2010) provides an in-depth analysis of the gendered nature of 
public bathrooms and how they demarcate masculinity and femininity and condition ideas of 
gender and sexuality.  
Despite the differences in the theoretical underpinnings of their work, both Butler and West 
and Zimmerman offer analyses that interrogate the essential character of gender (and sex and 
sexuality), an essentialism typically rooted in biology and what is deemed “natural.” They 
understand gender as performative and as produced/accomplished through interaction and 
institutional practices, though by no means voluntary and always constrained by what Foucault 
would call “regimes of power.” Gender is deeply rooted in the regime of hegemonic 
heterosexuality and stabilized by material, discursive, and institutional practices that recognize, 
in a myriad of ways, some expressions of gender and sexuality as intelligible, and others as not. 
Human beings are brought into gendered subjectivities through parodic repetition of acts that 
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have no original. As such, there is a vulnerability to the categories of gender, sex, and 
sexuality—a fragility and instability within identity categories. Though we live in a world that 
sees gender as fixed, certain, and real, in fact, gender identity is fragile, contingent, and often in 
need of shoring up.  
In her article, “Gender Labour: Transmen, Femmes, and Collective Work of Transgression,” 
Ward also addresses this process by which gendered subjectivities are brought into being, made 
coherent, and stabilized. She too assumes the inherent instability of gender categories and 
suggests that gendered subjectivities are constituted in an individual not only by their own 
performativities and interactions in the world, but also, at least partially, by the labour of others, 
that “gender itself is a form of labour” (2010, p. 236). Countering what she sees as queer 
theory’s emphasis on the individual and on individual forms of gender transgression and “defiant 
self-making,” for example, the “gender outlaw,” she suggests that queer/trans relationality, or 
what Halberstam (2005) describes as “a relation between people, within a community, or within 
intimate bonds” (p. 49), has been too little explored. She brings attention to “how queerness 
takes form in and through the more micro-sphere of relationality — particularly the feminized 
realms of caring and witnessing which literally nurture gender subjectivities into possibility” (p. 
238).  
Ward’s particular interest is the labour that femme-identified women do to assist in the 
production of gender coherence in their trans (FTM) partners. However, she suggests that all 
genders demand work, and therefore that all people both give and require gender labour (p. 239). 
This is true not only for queer or trans gender identities, but “also for understanding the 
collective work that produces masculinities and femininities in all of their various iterations (p. 
239). Butler, West and Zimmerman, and Ward concur that gender is produced through a 
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proliferation of individual, interactive, and institutional practices. Both the repetition and 
potential failure of repetition of parodic gender performance elucidate the fragility and 
contingency of all gendered subjectivities.  
If we take this analysis of the production or achievement of gendered subjectivities back to 
the fertility clinic, one might assume at first glance that the highly gendered environment of the 
clinic, an environment steeped in the assumptions of normative cisgender heterosexuality and 
traditional masculinity and femininity, might, as Thompson puts it, “provide a counterexample 
to the idea of gender as ontologically and experientially performative” (2005, p. 118). While the 
gendered responses to infertility one finds in a fertility clinic might appear to bolster structuralist 
or essentialist notions of gender (woman as relational and nurturing; man as positional and 
individualistic), Thompson argues that it is precisely within the gendered dynamics in clinic 
settings that the performativity and fragility of gender become apparent. Drawing on Butler’s 
early notions of gender performativity (Butler, 1990) as well as her subsequent clarifications 
regarding the non-existence of a “voluntaristic subject who exists quite apart from the regulatory 
norms which she/he opposes” (Butler, 1993, p. 15), Thompson acknowledges that the gender 
dynamics in clinics are framed by the deeply constraining historicity of “heterosexual 
hegemony” (Butler, 1993, 15). However, she goes on to suggest that the performativity of 
gender is as easily apparent in normative heterosexuality as it is in the queer forms of gender 
addressed by queer writers and theory and, in fact, that “identities that seek to achieve authentic 
heteronormativity by parody, enforcement, or substitution of one kind or another show the 
constructedness of gender just as strongly [as those that are disruptive of heternormativity]” 
(Thompson, 2005, p. 119).  
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In particular, the parodic performances of masculinity she observed in fertility clinics 
reinforce the notion of gender as performative and highlight the “constructedness, situatedness, 
multiplicity, and fragility” of all gender identities (Thompson, 2005, p. 138). As she puts it, “In 
fertility clinics, the ontology of gender is also destabilized by the possibility of failure to perform 
hegemonic gender by those who precisely in this site must try harder than ever to perform and 
norm gender” (p. 118). In the context of fertility clinics, all gender identities are fragile, 
contingent, and performative and their coherence is enabled by what Ward calls “gender labour” 
— routinized forms of care work that serve to bolster or repair an individual’s gendered 
subjectivity (Ward, 2010, p. 237).  
In a fertility clinic the most prevalent gender work bolsters and repairs damaged or failed 
cisgender heterosexuality. The practices of clinicians, as well as those of patients themselves, 
work to stabilize normative discourses of heterosexual reproduction — to naturalize what is 
often an “unnatural” flow of body parts, gametes, sex, gender, sexuality, and sexual practice to 
produce something resembling the natural trope of heterosexual reproduction and to repair and 
stabilize the normative masculinities and femininities that go along with it.  
Of course, men and women are not synonymous in the clinic. While both women and men 
struggling with infertility are faced with challenges to normative gender identities, the meanings 
they attach to their experience typically differ, or at least are assumed to differ. When a 
heterosexual couple is being treated for infertility the goal becomes a successful pregnancy in 
the woman’s body; her body parts become the focus of treatment. Men, whether they are dealing 
with “male factor” infertility or are simply providing sperm to impregnate their female partners, 
are reduced to an ejaculatory role (Thompson, 2005, p. 121) (though they are also expected to be 
committed and supportive partners.) The man’s main job in the fertility clinic is to supply sperm, 
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in an act that is linked to sexuality, manliness, virility, and his ability to impregnate a woman. 
He is the one sent off to the donation room, cup in hand, the one who must use the provided 
pornography to produce a sexual response and a sperm sample, and the one who must then 
return the sample to a clinic staff member, while everyone knows where he’s been. For his 
female partner, getting pregnant in a clinic setting is not tied to her sexuality (though Jimenez, 
2011 makes the connection between sex and the vaginal ultrasound). And for women, the stigma 
and loss of childlessness is often much more significant than the stigma of not being able to get 
pregnant. In other words, Thompson found that, among cisgender heterosexual couples 
accessing fertility clinics, the woman’s identity often seemed more attached to becoming a 
mother whereas the man’s identity was involved in fathering a child. For women, childlessness 
is often linked to a questioning of or challenge to their womanliness (you can’t really call 
yourself a woman until you are a mother); for men, the inability to father a child challenges their 
virility, sexual prowess, and manliness. (If you can’t father a child, then you are not really a 
man) (Thompson, 2005, p. 136).  
Because the gender work that goes on in the clinic is about repairing threatened masculinities 
and femininities, it relies on and evokes hyper-gendered subjects who are striving to meet the 
benchmarks of normative gender—the ability of women to become mothers and men’s ability to 
sire children and be worthy fathers. In fact, Thompson suggests that exaggerated versions of the 
hyper-conventional gender roles typical of the normative nuclear family are deployed in the 
fertility clinic just at the moment when reproductive technologies and the “novel sociotechnical 
settings” they produce, threaten to show up the fragility of these categories. The newness and 
innovation of the technologies are normalized by, as Thompson puts it, interpreting them as 
“new examples of old things” (p. 141). Innovative forms of reproduction and family building are 
85 
 
made less scary by linking them back to conventional gender roles and familial configurations 
that are familiar. I return to this point later, arguing that, in fact, the innovative possibilities 
contained in RTs, if separated from the need to normalize, actually lay the ground work for new 
forms of “gender work” and “objectification” that could serve to recognize a broader range of 
genders, sexualities, and family/kinship configurations.  
Thompson’s work on gender in the clinic focuses particularly on clinic practices that work to 
bolster or repair damaged masculinity. She suggests that for men, gender identity in the clinic 
has two components: being “good patients,” that is, supported and committed husbands and, 
therefore, worthy fathers; and virility—the ability to produce sperm and sire a child. The “good” 
male patient in the fertility clinic is expected to get along with his partner and accompany her to 
appointments, do a bit of male bonding with the physician, and comply with recommended 
treatment procedures.  
Virility and sperm production are recognized in a variety of ways. Men are boastful and self-
congratulatory and are congratulated by others on their “very good numbers” when their sperm 
count results are revealed. Women patients applaud when a man visits the donation room and 
returns with his sample in record time. Stereotypical heterosexual male fantasy is normalized 
and even mandated in the sperm donation room — women endorse and support their partner’s 
use of pornography to produce sperm, and, as Thompson puts it, “displaying ease with the world 
of commercial male fantasy was a sign of knowledge of and compliance with the treatment 
culture and regime” (p. 128). As one COF participant remarks: “this is one particular instance 
where porn has a place in society that’s completely… defensible.” Any critique of the content of 
normative heterosexual porn is displaced by its usefulness in restoring damaged masculinity.  
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The practices and discourses brought into play in fertility clinics to bolster masculinity in 
need of repair fall under the rubric of what Ward (2010) calls “gender work” or “gender labour.” 
The gender labour inscribed in the fertility clinics’ practices is designed to bolster and repair 
damaged heterosexual, cisgender identities, and families. One can imagine then, that the bodies, 
gender identities, and sexualities of queer and trans people might be unintelligible within a 
system so steeped in repairing and sustaining cisgender heterosexuality. When these forms of 
gender work meet LGBTQ people and identities there is a clash of assumptions and a resulting 
deep misrecognition. LGBTQ people arrive at the doors of fertility clinics having experienced a 
history of denial of parenthood, contested relations with medical institutions, and sometimes 
living with difficult tensions regarding transitioning and parenthood. At a moment when 
appropriate and specific “gender labour” might be in order, they often encounter practices and 
assumptions that serve to alienate and undermine social identities. Ward’s concept of gender 
work, and Thompson’s ethnographic work on gender repair in the clinic prove useful, both in 
identifying the faulty gender work that LGBTQ people confront, as well as to reflect on what 
gender work outside the assumptions of the heterosexual matrix might look like.  
Objectification 
Central to her articulation of the ontological choreography of the clinic is Thompson’s 
analysis of the process by which patients negotiate their own subjectivities in the face of 
objectification — of their bodies, reproductive parts, and bodily substances. Countering a 
convention, particularly visible in early radical feminist critiques of RTs, that views 
objectification as always antithetical to subjectivity and agency, and the fertility clinic patient as 
either helpless and saved by the technologies or victimized by them, she suggests that, in the 
fertility clinic context, objectification of one’s body can be part of a strategy to achieve a goal 
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(pregnancy) and that it may be possible “to discern potential gains for the long-range self within 
different dimensions of objectification” (p. 202)—dimensions that involve being neither helpless 
nor a victim. She calls this process “agency through objectification,” suggesting that women 
patients (whose bodies are typically the primary focus of AHR medicine), at various points in 
their treatment, manage their own objectification, and “willingly accept the role of being the 
object of the medical gaze and in fact actively participate in it” (p. 191). Patient agency is not 
only compatible with objectification but sometimes requires periods of objectification (p. 185).  
Processes of Objectification 
 Thompson details the following forms of objectification that structure a patient’s agency in 
her passage through the clinic. She does not suggest that “agency through objectification” is 
straight-forwardly simple, always present, or never threatened, but that in the flow through the 
clinic each patient features under many ontological descriptions during the course of treatment. 
Patients exercise agency in their active participation in a number of different kinds of 
objectification (p. 199). 
UnBlack-Boxing of the Body. Typically, patients of fertility clinics have spent at least a year 
trying to get pregnant and in this time have amassed a huge amount of information about what 
may previously have been only vague understandings of their reproductive bodies. Often those 
seeking assistance from fertility clinics already possess detailed, scientific information about 
eggs, ovaries, hormones, temperatures, sperm counts, cervical mucous, luteal phases, etc. (p. 
193). Thompson calls this accumulation of knowledge “anticipatory socionaturalization,” or the 
“unblack-boxing” of the body. The medicine practised in clinics “allows new access to these 
processes and body parts. It renders the body parts visible and manipulable and subjects them to 
all sorts of tests so that they yield facts on which to base diagnoses and treatment” (p. 193). The 
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process of objectification by which a woman “takes an active interest in her own presentation as 
an object of study” (p. 191), can work to the benefit of her long-term self for whom pregnancy is 
the goal.  
Generic Bureaucratization. The ontological choreography that manages the flow of bodies 
through the clinic means that at times an individual is highly bureaucratically generic, at other 
times highly specific and uniquely individualized, and at still other times somewhere in between. 
In the waiting room, Thompson suggests, the patient is objectified in a nonspecific, bureaucratic 
sense as they are assimilated into the normal routine of the clinic. Only generic properties are 
relevant at this stage: the patient needs to arrive on time, come when she’s [sic] called or 
fetched, and behave within the normal parameters for the clinic. This process of generic 
bureaucratization can potentially threaten a patient’s individuality but it also enhances her flow 
through the clinic.  
Body Parts. The patient is rendered into multiple body parts many times during a treatment 
cycle. During the pelvic exam or the vaginal ultrasound the patient’s body parts are rendered 
visible (unblack-boxed). The character of the conversation between the patient and the physician 
changes so that the patient’s internal reproductive organs become the focus of attention, the goal 
being to draw out and classify some of the contents of the Pandora’s box that is now the patient’s 
body. The cold metal speculum (often loathed) (p. 193) becomes part of the trail along which the 
patient’s parts are brought into contact with possible treatment. This change is choreographed 
through coordinated positioning of gloved medical staff, as well as by swabbing the patient and 
inserting the speculum. These mundane steps render the body and the instruments compatible 
and are at the heart of objectification (Thompson, 2005, p. 193). 
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During the pelvic exam, the patient herself moves in and out of various forms of 
objectification, subjectivity, and social identity. She begins as someone who carries the usual 
identificational weight in the waiting room, moves to a place where it is appropriate to undress 
and wear a gown, becomes an object of study with instruments, and ends as someone who gets 
dressed and interacts face-to-face. Multiple social roles are temporarily irrelevant while she is 
being examined. The temporary loss of social identity makes it possible to “offer up” her body 
parts for intervention (p. 199). 
Gametes and Embryos in the Lab. The andrology and embryology laboratories are where 
semen is washed, spun, and separated before inseminations, and where embryos are created. In 
the lab gametes and embryos become “temporarily independent genetic emissaries,” in a space 
that enables human gametes and embryos to exist outside patients’ bodies. The lab maintains an 
ontology of connectedness between patients and body parts during the time when the two are 
separated, and the gametes and embryos are tied back into trails leading to the woman, 
structuring the use of lab equipment, lab procedures, and the behaviour of lab technicians 
(Thompson, 2005, pp. 197-98).  
These forms of objectification, generic bureaucratization, and the separation of body parts 
and gametes from patients’ bodies, when not at odds with a patient’s subjectivity, can enable 
flow through the clinic. Thompson links these processes to questions of medical ethics.  
Ethics: Personhood and Technology 
Without denying the subjugating and disciplining effects of many technologies, including 
RTs, Thompson raises questions about why sometimes “personhood and technology stand in 
opposition and why sometimes they stand as partners” (p. 201). She argues that whether or not a 
patient experiences processes of objectification as enhancing or depriving of agency can depend 
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on whether or not the practices of objectification maintain a synecdochal relationship to the 
patient’s long-term self. In other words, objectification enhances agency when it is possible to 
discern potential gains for the long-range self; it deprives agency when the synechdocal relation 
fails and the “objectification stands in opposition to aspects of personhood that are cared about 
deeply and guarded carefully” (Thompson, 2005, p. 201).  
For example, the ultrasound (or pelvic exam) consists of a trail of instruments and technicians 
and an objectified patient. The procedure provides the patient (and medical staff) with important 
and often new information about her body and/or body parts, information that connects back to 
her long-term goal of achieving pregnancy.  
As long as these trails of actants-in-the-setting flow back to the patient, the 
synecdochal relation between the body parts and the patient is maintained. This 
material maintenance of synecdoche ensures that the objectification of the 
patient that consists in the education and itinerizing of her body parts is not 
opposed to her subjectivity (Thompson, 2005, p. 195). 
Thompson finds that patients’ descriptions of procedures in the clinic are often contradictory, 
and change over time, seemingly based on whether or not a rupture with the long-range self has 
occurred. A patient might talk about feeling alienated, dehumanized, or objectified if a 
metaphysical rupture has occurred between the long-range self and the entities that are deployed 
in objectifying the patient (administrative and medical procedures, instruments, language, etc.) 
Whether or not a patient experiences such a rupture often depends on the outcomes of treatment. 
The simplest example is the difference between an experience of objectification that leads to a 
successful cycle and pregnancy, versus one whose outcome is a failed cycle.  
When the patient talks about a failed treatment cycle that she doesn’t assimilate 
to any ongoing treatment, she often expresses herself as having been alienated 
or dehumanized. In this case, the trails of activity have petered out without 
reclaiming the long-range subject, leaving a dualistic metaphysics in which 
objectification and agency are oppositional. When speaking about a successful 
cycle, the trails of activity have led back to and transformed the long-range 
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subject, and the heterogeneous or hybrid ontology of the treatment zone 
becomes irrelevant. (Thompson, 2005, p. 203) 
If the patient is unable to stay identified with the goals of the long-range self, she experiences a 
rupture between the forms of objectification and the long-term self.  
Thompson suggests that questions of medical ethics might be informed by a framework that 
evaluates ethicality based on the conditions for the maintenance of synecdoche. Medical 
procedures, technologies, and practices might be evaluated based on whether patients experience 
them as strategies in service of the long-term self and thus as enhancing of agency, or whether 
they are in some way rupturing of personhood or subjectivity, and therefore depriving of agency 
(p. 201).  
For LGBTQ people, processes of objectification in the fertility clinic are often unsuccessful 
because of the ways that LGBTQ identities, body parts, bodies, genders, sexualities, etc., are 
misrecognized and unintelligible within the clinic setting. This can result in ruptures to “aspects 
of personhood that are cared about deeply and guarded carefully” (Thompson, 2005, p. 201), and 
therefore to experiences of alienation, anger, and frustration. Objectification is often 
unsuccessful because the assumptions of the heterosexual matrix are so deeply engrained and so 
difficult to disentangle that, for example, it is very unlikely that the body parts of a trans man 
undergoing an ultrasound or pelvic exam can be disentangled or viewed separately from other 
aspects of identity, or that a trans woman who is providing sperm can be separated from her 
gametes.  
Enter Space Invaders  
To find that you are fundamentally unintelligible (indeed, that the laws of 
culture and of language find you to be an impossibility) is to find that you have 
not yet achieved access to the human, to find yourself speaking only and always 
as if you were human, but with the sense that you are not, to find that your 
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language is hollow, that no recognition is forthcoming because the norms by 
which recognition takes place are not in your favor. (Butler, 2004, p. 30) 
For Butler (and Foucault), every discourse is based in relations of power that create the 
possibilities for some human identities, activities, and ways of being, while simultaneously 
limiting, constraining, or making others impossible. The stabilizing concepts of sex, gender, and 
sexuality produce “identity” and cultural intelligibility. But of course intelligibility for some 
implies lack of intelligibility for others, and much of Butler’s work focuses on the social 
dynamics of exclusion, and the recognition that every inclusion, of necessity, creates exclusions.  
When queer and trans people enter the world of AHR, they enter a world that builds inclusion 
based on normative cisgender heterosexuality. In the framework of a fertility clinic, a butch-
identified masculine woman who is trying to get pregnant, a female-bodied person who has no 
desire to get pregnant, a man with ovaries, a uterus, and the capacity to get pregnant, or a woman 
with a penis and sperm are unintelligible. These bodies are not the bodies that are expected. And, 
as Sara Ahmed (2012) puts it, when those who are not expected arrive, they are “noticed (p. 
35)In her book based on interviews with “diversity” workers, Ahmed explores the work involved 
in the institutionalization of whiteness and the ways that “institutional spaces are shaped by the 
proximity of some bodies and not others” (p. 35). For people of colour, entering a space that is 
shaped by whiteness can feel like “walking into a sea of whiteness” (p. 35). As Sam, a black 
trans man, puts it: 
A lot of times at the clinic we’ve been the only ones of African descent, the only 
black people. I mean, very rare you would see someone else and you’re like 
Oh… wow!... right? …like we never really saw ourselves reflected there. And 
then they have these walls of photos, you know, tons of babies. And 
occasionally there’s...black children. But out of three hundred photos, there 
might be two. And so, it’s like who...how are...how could we end up here, you 
know? 
Ahmed borrows Nirmal Puwar’s (2004) expression, “space invaders” to evoke the experience 
of entering a space in which you are not expected. Puwar describes how “white bodies become 
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somatic norms within spaces and how nonwhite bodies can feel ‘out of place’ within those 
spaces” (Puwar as cited in Ahmed, 2012, p. 38). Ahmed says that  
If we think of institutional norms as somatic, then we can show how by 
assuming a body, institutions can generate an idea of appropriate conduct 
without making this idea explicit…If institutional whiteness describes an 
institutional habit, then whiteness itself recedes into the background. (2012, p. 
38)  
Without presuming simplistic symmetry between race and other categories of identity, I 
would argue that in a fertility clinic, cisgender heterosexualilty, whiteness, and economic 
privilege are the “habit.” Those who fall outside these categories are “space invaders,” walking 
into a sea of white, privileged, cisgender heterosexuality. When one enters a space in which one 
is not expected, simply walking into the room can be discomfiting (Ahmed, 2012, p. 40). Sam 
goes on to describe the discomfort he experiences when he enters a space that, on several fronts, 
does not expect him. In addition to feeling out of place racially, he is aware of the ways that he 
and his partner do not fit the clinic’s expectations of financial privilege, and of how their trans 
identities cause a blockage in the system:  
Sam: At [clinic name] the assumption is that you have...$2000 for your 
insemination that at any time of the month you could just get out. And if you 
don’t have it in cash, you would have credit of course…because of course 
everybody has credit cards and everybody is in good standing and everybody has 
money. And then, the clinic is set up is to provide creature comforts for busy 
executives who have to take time out of their day to come here. So they have a 
computer for you to check your mail…CP24 on TV with the stock exchange, the 
fancy stress-reliever chair, the $3000 aquarium tank so that you can be soothed 
and relaxed…and you know...some actually really expensive prints on the 
wall…Well, clearly they’re not hurting for change at all, because this is big 
bucks here. So people who don’t work or people like me who are part-time, and 
then people like us who don’t have, um, what do they call it...disposable 
income...that’s not who the clinic is for. So they were always surprised when we 
didn’t have money in just like [snaps fingers] this for things. Like we were 
somehow not…prepared.  
Well, they flagged our application...they called back our family doctor…to 
question the referral— because why would two men be in need of insemination?  
He is left uncertain about the root of the discomfort he senses in the medical staff he encounters:  
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Sometimes it’s hard to distinguish when people treat you differently. I always 
go through the list— Hmm...is it because I’m black? Is it the trans thing? Is it 
because I’m fat? Is it because I got my head shaved? You know? And so, I think 
there’s a couple of times we had some strange interactions with some of the 
technicians, ultrasound people. And I was like “What is that about?” 
These feelings of discomfort and uncertainty are common to those who enter an institution but 
are outside its norms.  
Institutional Plumbers: Identifying Blockages 
 Ahmed (2012) identifies the metaphor of “coming up against a brick wall” as a recurring 
theme among those who, like Sam, enter an institution but are outside its norms. It is only in 
coming up against these norms that the norms become visible.  
When you don’t quite inhabit the norms, or you aim to transform them, you 
notice them as you come up against them. The wall is what we come up against: 
the sedimentation of history into a barrier that is solid and tangible in the 
present, a barrier to change as well as to the mobility of some, a barrier that 
remains invisible to those who can flow into the spaces created by institutions. 
(Ahmed, 2012, p. 175) 
Like Thompson, Ahmed uses language of mobility and flow to describe processes by which 
some people “flow” through institutions, while others are seen to block, get in the way of, or go 
against the flow. “The flow, in other words, is a fantasy that is protected by blocking the 
exposure of the blockage (Ahmed, 2012, p. 186).” Countering the emphasis in much current 
social theory on fluidity, mobility, and liquidity, Ahmed’s explains that her work on diversity 
has taught her about solidity, “about how what appears as mobile and changing can hold its 
shape,” and about the intransigence of institutions and the difficulty of social transformation (p. 
186). Diversity workers, she suggests, are “institutional plumbers,” who point out blockages—
the places where things are “stopped.” In so doing, they produce significant knowledge about the 
blockages, restrictions, and stoppages within institutional worlds (p. 181). The practical work of 
coming up against blockages, of noticing where “the flow” becomes stuck or solidified, the 
95 
 
places where one cannot reside, allows “the wall” to become apparent. To those who do not 
come up against it, the wall does not appear — the institution is lived and experienced as being 
open, committed, and diverse (p. 174). Things might appear as fluid if you are going the way 
things are flowing. But when you’re not going that way, you experience a flow as solidity, as 
what you come up against. In turn, those who are not going the way things flow are experienced 
as obstructing the flow (p. 187).  
Administrative Blockages 
 Dean Spade’s book Normal Life (2011) examines in detail how modes of administrative 
governance can work to make trans people’s lives administratively impossible. He argues that 
administrative policies and practices work to shape the world “into categories that, ultimately, 
are taken for granted by most and thus appear ahistorical and apolitical. Indeed, many such 
categorizations are assumed as basic truths” (Spade, 2011, p. 141). Like Ahmed (2012), he 
suggests that it is only when one hits a blockage, a place where one does not fit, that the 
construction of the categories themselves becomes apparent.  
These decisions about what constitutes a proper data element/matter of 
classification and what does not rarely appear as controversial political 
decisions because people who find the commonly evoked societal norms used in 
classification familiar and comfortable tend to take these classification systems 
as neutral givens in their lives. We are used to filling out forms with certain 
questions. We rarely question how we came to be asked for those particular 
pieces of information and not others except in moments when we personally 
have a hard time figuring out which box to check off. Because certain 
classifications become common and standard, there is often an implied shared 
understanding that certain things, like gender, are just necessary information for 
administering government programs (Spade, 2011, p. 141).  
He identifies three general administrative realms that interact to create complex difficulties for 
trans people, with far-reaching, long-term ramifications (p. 144). These are: gender classification 
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on I.D. documentation, sex-segregated spaces (for example, bathrooms, vaginal ultrasound 
rooms, andrology labs), and access to gender-conforming health care.  
Below I draw on queer and trans people’s narratives about their experiences in fertility 
clinics, as well as on a nonfictional account of a butch-identified woman’s journey to pregnancy 
(Jimenez, 2011), to explore how practices of “gender work,” “objectification,” and 
“administrative classification” (Spade, 2011), which might enhance flow through the clinic when 
situated within the assumptions of the heterosexual matrix, can work against the subjectivities of 
LGBTQ clients and serve to further their misrecognition and lack of intelligibility. The flow of 
LGBTQ people through the fertility clinic is “stopped” or “blocked” by violations of personhood 
that occur as a result of staff’s inability to disentangle the assumptions of the heterosexual 
matrix.
5
  
I use the concept of “flow through the clinic” to narrate a typical experience in a fertility 
clinic, using the following order of events: waiting room, pelvic exam/ultrasound, meeting with 
the doctor, andrology lab. Of course there are elements left out, and this is not always the 
sequence of things, there can be back and forth between these settings and procedures, and 
people use fertility clinics for other procedures, such as freezing gametes, IVF, etc. My aim is to 
create a sense of how “flow through the clinic,” for LGBTQ clients, is often blocked both by 
deep misrecognition on the part of clinic staff, and also sometimes by the range of strategies 
LGBTQ people themselves adopt in order to negotiate their way through the clinic. I define 
blockages as those places where a sense of personhood, identity or subjectivity is violated or 
ruptured in some way.  
                                                 
5
 As I mentioned earlier, the strategies LGBTQ clients adopt in negotiating their lack of recognition in the clinic, 
while adopted in service of the goals of a long-term self, can also create ruptures to personhood.  
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The People  
Sam and Rob 
 Sam and Rob both identify as black, trans men. Because Sam has decided to get pregnant, he 
has not been taking testosterone for several years. This has slowed down his transition process, a 
fact he is not happy about, and he has found it somewhat challenging that his partner has been 
able to continue his transition process uninterrupted. Sam and Rob went to a fertility clinic 
because Sam’s periods were irregular and they wanted assistance with diagnosis, cycle 
monitoring, and insemination. Sam was diagnosed with polycystic ovarian syndrome and 
prescribed a drug, Metformin, which also is used to assist with diabetes. He was also given a 
hysterosalpingogram (a procedure that involves injecting dye into the fallopian tubes to check 
that they are clear), and prescribed Clomid and injectable fertility drugs.  
Both Sam and Rob were unhappy about the many drugs Sam was put on, and expressed 
dissatisfaction with the process by which consent was solicited. They also expressed concern 
that Rob was subjected to blood testing (the clinic did not realize he was not providing sperm), 
which included a mandatory HIV test that was carried out with no offer of counselling, or even 
awareness that the test was being done. Overall, they found their experiences in the clinic to be 
stressful and traumatic. They felt that Rob was ignored when they realized he wasn’t part of the 
process, and he eventually stopped coming to appointments.  
Sam got pregnant, then miscarried, and they were offered little or no support in this process. 
The clinic lost the results of the miscarriage which might have given them some information 
about why it happened. After the first pregnancy they decided to do home insemination with a 
known donor, but were afraid to tell the doctor at the clinic about this decision, leaving him to 
think that they were using sperm from a bank at home. They were told to “have sex today, have 
sex tomorrow, have sex the day after, and then come back and see us.”  
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Stacey and Nina 
 Stacey and Nina identify as a white, lesbian couple. Stacey is a trans woman and Nina is her 
cisgender female partner. They have decided that they want to conceive using Stacey’s sperm 
and Nina’s egg. Nina will get pregnant and carry the child. She is subjected to many tests for 
infertility, though she has no reason to think she will have difficult conceiving. The story they 
tell of their fertility clinic experience is one of profound misrecognition and lack of 
intelligibility. They are interpellated into the clinic as “a straight couple with male factor 
infertility.” Stacey feels that her transsexuality is misunderstood, is distressed by the clinic 
staff’s (mis)use of pronouns, and has an awkward and “bizarre” experience in the andrology lab 
when she is sent to collect sperm. They refer to her sperm as “the boys,” and to Nina as a “good 
girl” when she ovulates. Nina’s view of herself does not match the “hyper-feminine patient of a 
fertility clinic.” Overall, they are both left unhappy about the experience in the clinic, though 
differently so.  
Dan 
 Dan is a white, trans man, partnered with another trans man who is not present for the 
interview. Having children is something he has always looked forward to, expected and planned 
for. He has not yet achieved pregnancy and is still actively involved in the process. He has 
recently changed doctors because he found that the first doctor did not listen well and did not 
answer his questions. Because he is determined to get pregnant, he is grateful for access to the 
clinic and prepared to put up with whatever name, pronoun, or gender they wish to confer on 
him. He is using a known sperm donor who he is presenting to the clinic as his sexual partner, 
which causes a lot of anxiety, fear, and worry. Because Dan is appreciative that he can use the 
donor of his choice, he tolerates the doctor he does not like for longer than he is ultimately 
comfortable with. His “real-life” partner’s name is taken off his medical chart, which includes 
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only his name and the name of his donor (who is presenting at the clinic as his sexual partner), 
The so-called sexual partner signs forms that assign decision-making rights about what happens 
with existing embryos in the case of Dan’s death. 
Andrea 
 Andrea is a white trans woman who would like to freeze sperm before her gender transition. 
She is not sure if she is already too far along in the process to successfully do this, and is also 
stalled because she has been found to be a carrier of CMV, and is required to pay an additional 
$2,000 to have her sperm stored separately. She has so far not chosen to do this, and is conflicted 
about her desire to transition versus her desire to have a child in the future. She is handed a form 
that asks her to identify herself as “married, single, or gay.” The pornography she is given to 
assist with sperm donation is all about women’s bodies (which does not work for her) and the 
close friend accompanying her for support is ignored by health care providers, who insist on 
asking Andrea about her (non-existent) spouse and what she wants to do with her gametes in 
case something happens to her.  
Jimenez  
Although Jimenez (2011) was not a COF participant, her account of her journey to pregnancy 
is valuable to include in this discussion. She is a butch-identified Chicana woman, partnered 
with a white woman whose two children, born in a prior heterosexual relationship, they are 
parenting together. Her memoir documents her process of trying to conceive, including many 
attempts at locating a man, known to her and her partner, who will act as a sperm donor, as well 
as her two years as a patient in a fertility clinic, undergoing cycle monitoring and insemination.  
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Generic Bureaucratization: The Waiting Room 
 Thompson (2005), in her analysis of objectification processes in the fertility clinic, suggests 
that generic bureaucratization is one mechanism by which fertility patients make their way 
through the clinic. Only generic properties are relevant at this stage: the patient needs to arrive 
on time, come when she’s [sic] called or fetched, and behave within the normal parameters for 
the clinic.  
It seems simple — arrive on time, come when you’re called, and behave normally. Typically, 
you arrive at the clinic, introduce yourself to the person at the reception desk, and are handed a 
form to fill out. You take your place in the waiting room, fill out the form, and you are called by 
your name for your visit with the doctor or other clinic staff. However, what if the form you are 
handed makes a series of assumptions that exclude you and your family? What if the name you 
give them at reception is not the one they call you by when you are summoned? What does it 
mean to behave “normally” in the face of these potential ruptures to your sense of your own 
personhood?  
Almost every participant in the COF study spoke about the forms they were asked to fill out 
at the clinic. Forms are important, as I reiterate in workshop after workshop, echoing Spade 
(2011). Often they are the first thing you are handed when you enter an institutional setting. If 
you do not fit on the form you are asked to fill out, it can create anxiety, fear, and mistrust and 
can speak volumes to issues of inclusion/exclusion. It can make you wonder if the clinic staff 
have ever met someone like you before; if you are the person they expected to come through the 
door; or if they even have an idea that people like you exist. If you don’t fit on the form, it is as 
if, on some level, you and your particular family configuration do not exist as a possibility.  
The forms in a fertility clinic typically ask about the “female partner” and the “male partner” 
and assume, in their format and questions, the heterosexual couple as the unit of treatment 
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(though the focus quickly becomes the woman’s body), and heterosexual intercourse as the 
preferred mode of conception. Andrea, a trans woman interested in freezing sperm before her 
transition, describes showing up for an appointment at a fertility clinic and being handed a form:  
Finally, once I’d explained my situation… they gave me forms to fill out. And 
the first question on the form was “Are you married, single, or gay?” And I’m 
like, “I don’t really know how to answer that question.”…I was really alienated 
by the fact that the forms don’t seem to have been updated since 1980. And I 
said to him “Do you understand that it’s not appropriate to ask, in 2008 or 2009 
or whatever it was, “if you’re married, single, or gay. Those are not three 
independent categories!” 
Married, single, or gay — where to start? The question assumes “married” or “single” are the 
only options when it comes to relationship status: either you are married or you are single, (and 
undoubtedly the assumption is that if you are single you wish you were married). The form 
excludes those who are with a partner but not married, those who have one or more partners and 
are not married to any of them, those who are married and have other partners as well, or those 
who live in other sorts of kinship or familial arrangements. “Gay” as a separate category implies 
that gay people are neither married nor single; perhaps they exist outside of recognized 
relationship all together.  
In her account of her and her partner’s foray into the clinic, Jimenez (2011) describes the 
forms they are asked to fill out, and the questions they are asked as part of the intake process. 
The process starts with Hilary (her partner) having been sent a male questionnaire — a 
questionnaire sent to men who are suffering from what, in fertility clinic lingo, is known as male 
factor infertility, that is, as the name implies, the male is contributing to the couple’s infertility. 
In the questionnaire Hilary is asked, among other things, about the frequency of her ejaculation. 
And the doctor, in an in-person, face-to-face interview, asks Jimenez how often she and Hilary 
have intercourse.  
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Dr. Meredith looks over the forms Hilary and I have filled out. She apologizes 
once more for having sent Hilary a male questionnaire. We had amused 
ourselves with it, answering probing questions about Hilary’s male factor 
infertility. How many times during the week does she ejaculate on average? And 
STDs? Any unfortunately located varicose veins? …  
 
Dr. Meredith asks me everything about my life: alcohol consumption, cigarettes, 
the age of my first period, the number of days in my cycle, how my mother died, 
the intensity of pain of period cramps, vaccinations, family birth defects, how 
often I have intercourse (pp. 64-65, my italics).  
The assumptions of the heterosexual matrix are so commonplace, so taken for granted in this 
setting, that even when a clearly lesbian couple, who lack the body parts necessary for traditional 
heterosexual intercourse, are sitting in front of them, these medical professionals continue to ask 
questions about ejaculation and intercourse.  
“Coming when you are called,” a generic act that seems simple enough, can become 
complicated and potentially distressing when you are called by a name that is not yours, or by 
use of the wrong pronoun and/or assumption of the wrong gender. Hailing a subject in the 
waiting room works to recruit some bodies more than others. Sam describes being consistently 
called by the wrong name: “Even though on my chart it would say ‘Sam’ and then my legal 
name beside it in brackets, and they had highlighted ‘Sam’ and put it in bold, people would still 
call me by my legal name.” 
Ahmed describes how sometimes doing diversity work involves having to “insist” on 
belonging to the categories that give residence to others. “If you point out the failure to be given 
the proper title, or if you ask to be referred to by the proper name, then you have to insist on 
what is simply given to others” (2012, p. 177). For example, Sam tells of how, even after he has 
“insisted” that his chart be corrected to list only the name he wants to be called, staff continue to 
call him by the wrong name: 
I spoke to them about it like so many times. And it was only this year that finally 
I was like “Can you print new labels, with my legal name not on it at all? 
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Because when you need to do an OHIP billing, you can open the file and then 
you can find out what my legal name is… so then my name on the chart was 
what they have to read out, because it’s the only name on there. So then they 
would feminize it and call me [incorrect pronunciations of his name]...like 
anything other than Sam…because it couldn’t be Sam…which was sort of 
bizarre.  
Being called by the wrong name usually implies being assumed to be the wrong gender. Sam is 
consistently assumed to be, and treated as if he is a female subject, a cisgender woman trying to 
get pregnant:  
The head nurse there— she’s really nice. She’s so friendly. But she didn’t get it. 
She just could not get my gender... no matter how many times I spoke to her 
about it. And I can remember her saying, “oh you know, this cycle isn’t that 
good. You know, if it was my daughter, I’d tell her don’t do it this cycle” or, you 
know, “You’re going to be a mom! That’s fantastic!” Like, she just couldn’t get 
it. 
I.D. documentation can cause complicated difficulties for trans people, especially when 
documents from different agencies, institutions, or organizations that keep data about people or 
produce identity documents conflict with one another. As Spade (2011) points out, this happens 
often because of inconsistent criteria for changing the gender marker on documents. “As a result 
people rarely have a consistent set of documents that correlates to their current gender” (Spade, 
2011, p. 144-45). Stacey’s experience highlights this: 
It’s possible that at the time my documentation was being changed over, and, 
you know, some of my documentation might have been one, some might have 
been the other, because documents have different criteria in Ontario.  
Spade (2011) reiterates the difficulties created by the gendered assumptions embedded in 
forms, the fact that “from birth to death, the ‘M’ and ‘F’ boxes are present on nearly every form 
we fill out,” and “the consequences of misclassification or the inability to fit into the existing 
classification system are extremely high (p. 142). For Stacey and Nina, the consequence of 
Stacey’s inconsistent I.D. is a fundamental misrecognition in the fertility clinic:  
Stacey: Well, I mean, there were tons of factual inaccuracies in all our 
documentation and everything. I had a health card that lists me as female 
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correctly and on their charts they always had me listed as male. So we told them 
that actually that’s not correct, according to my documentation and everything. 
And instead of apologizing or trying to remedy the situation, they were 
defensive about how difficult it would be for them to do that... to change their 
records and so on. So they wrote down, basically, that [my partner] was a 
heterosexual woman — which she’s not— and that I was...uh…“the father”...the 
potential father who has, you know, sperm problems or something. 
Interviewer: So they refused to change it over for the whole course of your 
treatment? 
Stacey: Exactly. And so whereas we expected to be “the moms,” instead it 
became Nina as “the patient” — who was privy to all the information — and me 
as the well… I wasn’t allowed to have any information… because they only 
could conceive of there being one mother, I think…The idea was that there was 
the mother, not a mother. They didn’t want to refer to me as the “father” but 
they just didn’t have a term for me. So it was always “the mother” and my legal 
name.  
Nina: Yeah, they wanted to treat us as a straight couple with male-factor 
infertility. 
Stacey and Nina are interpellated in the clinic as “a straight couple with male factor 
infertility.” Their presumed body parts lead to their categorization as “straight,” and because 
insemination (not intercourse) is their chosen method of conception, they are categorized as 
having “male factor infertility.” In fact, they are not straight, have no problem with sperm 
quality (the reason for a diagnosis of male-factor infertility), and are not dealing with “fertility 
issues” at all. Because they are identified as “straight” and not as two women in a lesbian 
relationship (which is how they view themselves), Stacey is not recognized as a “mother.” In 
fact, the clinic staff can find no language to describe her parental role.  
Because they are treated as heterosexual subjects, they are presumed to engage in normative 
sexual practice, that is, heterosexual intercourse, and they are told to go home and have “sex”:  
Stacey: They were very also interested in us making an effort to get pregnant at 
home... which wasn’t anything that we expressed an interest in. She wanted us to 
have sex and get pregnant… and we were like, then why are we at a fertility 
clinic, you know? But they really consistently perceived of us as a straight 
couple with male-factor infertility... because that’s how their system is set up.  
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Sam, a trans man, whose partner is a trans man, is also advised by a doctor filling in for his 
regular physician to go home and have “sex”:  
He just assumed that my partner was a non-trans guy... and that I was a woman. 
And so he said “Have sex today, have sex tomorrow, have sex the day after. And 
then come back and see us.” Like, it was...nothing.  
Sam also notes that, particularly when he showed up at the clinic without his partner, he was 
“100 hundred percent ‘mommy’ to them.” 
So, Stacey, a trans woman who sees herself and her female partner as both “moms,” in the 
clinic is “not mommy,” Sam, a trans man, is “mommy.” Sam and his partner Rob are not 
recognized as gay men (even though they are two men in a relationship); Stacey and Nina are 
not recognized as lesbians (even though they are two women in a relationship). And yet lesbian 
and gay couples are fairly common place at most downtown Toronto fertility clinics (estimates 
run from 15 to 30 percent of clients). The lesbian couple, in particular, is certainly not an 
unrecognizable relationship configuration. Stacey and Nina muse about why, as Nina’s partner, 
Stacey was not given access to information about the process they were going through, and why 
their lesbianism was so unrecognizable:  
Nina: I think it’s partly because you weren’t the body that they’re getting 
pregnant… and that’s sort of how the model works... the body that’s getting 
pregnant is the patient. 
Stacey: I think their idea is that in a heterosexual context they want to safeguard 
the woman’s privacy, make any domestic issues the purview of the woman — 
but that didn’t apply to a lesbian context, which they weren’t really ready to 
think about. I think me being trans made it harder for them to see this as a 
lesbian context.  
Through this quagmire of misrecognition it becomes clear that part of the problem, for both 
couples, is the conflation of body parts and gender. Gender, in this case trans genders, trans 
femaleness and maleness, cannot be recognized separate from body parts. Body parts = gametes 
= sex = gender = sexual orientation = sexual practice. Because Stacey is providing sperm, her 
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femaleness is unrecognizable. Because Sam is getting pregnant, his maleness is unrecognizable. 
Practitioners in the clinic are unable to separate body parts from gender identity from sexual 
orientation and sexual practice. Two people who both possess female body parts can be lesbians; 
a trans woman and her female partner, cannot. A trans man who is trying to get pregnant, despite 
the fact that he has insisted over and over that he be addressed by his name and gender, is still 
seen as female and as “mommy,” and he and his male partner are not recognized as being in a 
same-sex relationship. Both as couples and as individuals, people are misread in terms of sex, 
gender identity, sexual orientation, sexual practice, parental status, and family configuration. The 
fact that this is not surprising, given a social context of conventional gender norms and trans 
erasure, invisibility, and discrimination does not make it any less painful or violating of the 
people who are misrecognized. The gender work that might validate and bolster the gender (and 
other) identities of Sam and Rob, and Nina and Stacey, is markedly absent, and within the 
heterosexual matrix all of them are subject to ruptures or fissures in “aspects of personhood that 
are cared about deeply and guarded carefully” (Thompson, 2005, p. 201). 
Hyper-conventional Gender in the Clinic 
 Ward (2010) argues that all genders require work, and as I summarized earlier, Thompson 
(2005) suggests that the gender work in fertility clinics relies on hyper-conventional 
understandings of sex, gender, and kinship in order to help secure damaged or threatened 
masculinities and femininities. Conservative, stereotypical, and, Thompson suggests, parodic 
displays of masculinity and femininity, and motherliness and fatherliness, work to stabilize 
gender in the face of innovative, potentially scary, and denaturalizing technologies and the 
related destabilizing of biological sex and social gender (pp. 142-43).  
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Nina, a cisgender woman in a lesbian relationship with her partner, Stacey, describes feeling 
that she does not fit what she observes to be the expectation of the “hyper-feminine patient of a 
fertility clinic.” In particular, she comments on the expectations that a female body should be 
accompanied by a particular set of feelings about that body, as well as feelings about pregnancy 
and motherhood. She suggests that all clients suffer from these expectations, and would be better 
served by an unpacking of the assumptions about the relationship between body parts, gender, 
and feelings:  
I feel like they produce appropriate feminine subjects, right? Through what they 
expect to encounter and I think that some women don’t push back against that at 
all and just, like, give in to it. But it made me really uncomfortable… 
A lot of what went wrong for me was the collapse of what my biology could do 
reproductively with how I felt about it… Like I’m not trans-identified at all and 
I still have a tremendous amount of difference from what the models are of how 
a woman’s supposed to feel about her body.  
Underlying these expectations of conventional femininity, one is likely to find the devaluing 
of women that typically accompanies them. Jenny Horsman (1991) in a short piece about her 
journey through the fertility clinic as a cisgender woman with a male partner, describes lying in 
the stirrups during an uncomfortable procedure and having the doctor tell her partner “that he 
should take me out to buy me a silk blouse as I have been through a lot to give him a son” (p. 
23). The use of hyper-conventional notions of gender can mean a related belittling of women. At 
one point a nurse tells Nina that she is a “good girl” after she ovulates. In all likelihood the intent 
of this remark is to congratulate and affirm Nina’s gender and her being one step closer to 
motherhood; her body has performed the womanly act of ovulation, has produced an egg, and is 
cooperating with treatment and with expectations of womanliness. In Nina’s case, however, this 
“gender work” is not effective and it certainly does not work as an affirmation. She feels 
belittled in being referred to as a “girl” and unrecognized in her own gender identity, sexual 
orientation, and relationship status.  
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Stacey echoes Nina’s sentiments about the problems that arise when you do not look like 
what a mother is expected to look like:  
I have to guess here, because I don’t know what’s in people’s minds but I think 
for the way I’ve been received in all these various institutions, I think it has to 
do with generally not looking like what they expect a mother to look like… it 
happens to be located around transsexuality for me, but it could be located 
around other kinds of identity markers too. And when there’s that lack of 
recognition, then there is suspicion that follows it, you know. And that’s just 
always made the experiences really uncomfortable for me.  
Jimenez, a butch-identified woman, also describes a sense of not belonging, a feeling of 
illegitimacy, of not being the one who is expected. For her this is partly due to entering the 
fertility clinic context without a diagnosis of “infertility,” but much of it is also related to gender 
and the sense that someone of her gender does not belong:  
I don’t want to be part of this group. I’m hoping for this to be nothing more than 
a brief visit into their land. Before they make any assumptions about me, I think 
I should confess that I don’t necessarily have fertility problems. I may or may 
not. I have virtually no fertility history whatsoever. I’m not exactly like them. 
I’m not like them at all. I’m not really a woman even. I’m a lesbian. I’m a butch. 
I’m an imposter. Nothing more. (2011, p. 64) 
Jimenez, Nina, and Stacey are all at the receiving end of what I would call “gender work gone 
wrong.” The reliance in the clinic on notions of hyper-conventional femininity leave them 
feeling uncomfortable, deeply misrecognized, and, I would argue, block the flow of their 
movement through the clinic.  
Body Parts: The Pelvic Exam/Ultrasound 
 According to Thompson’s analysis the pelvic exam, vaginal ultrasound, and other forms of 
diagnostic procedures are examples of clinic practices that involve an objectification of a 
patient’s body parts in service of a long-range self. Patients cooperate in their own 
objectification, in the separation of their body parts from their social identities, in order to gain 
valuable information about the workings of their bodies and in service of the long-range goal of 
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achieving pregnancy. Thompson suggests that objectification can involve agency as long as 
there is no rupture to personhood — no violation of subjectivity.  
This is how Sam, a trans man, describes his experience during a hysterosalpingogram (a test 
now carried out routinely in most clinics to assess the state of the fallopian tubes):  
At our first appointment he suggested that I get a hysterosalpingogram where 
they inject dye in your uterus and flush it through your fallopian tubes and see if 
there’s blockage. My partner couldn’t come that day, and I was like “this is not a 
trans-friendly environment.” …So he (the doctor) was really struggling to get at 
my cervix. And it was painful. And when he finally was able to grab it—right 
when he started doing the spreader, he said, “So, have you heard anything about 
this trans guy in the States who’s pregnant? You guys don’t want that kind of 
publicity, do you?” 
And I was like “First of all, you’re... you’re actually inside my body at this 
moment and, you know, I’m actually not here to…um…be on TV. We want to 
have a baby and that’s why we’re here... that’s why we came to you”… And I’m 
alone. And let’s say that, hypothetically speaking, I did want to be on TV — 
which I didn’t — is now the time to have a conversation about what we could 
negotiate? Like, this is so inappropriate in a million ways. He was inside my 
uterus, like a thing that usually is only for pushing out… something was going 
in. And then like two seconds after, he said “Look there’s your uterus on the 
screen.” And then I left and I called Rob, and I was like “Holy Christ!”  
Sam’s description suggests that, in this instance, the “objectification” of Sam’s body parts is 
not working — the doctor is unable to separate Sam’s body parts from his gender identity. 
Unable to focus solely on the information to be gained from the procedure at hand and the body 
parts in question, the doctor is hyper-aware that he is performing the hysterosalpingogram on a 
“trans” person, a person whose gender identity does not fit the normal parameters of the clinic. 
As a result, the procedure does not primarily assist Sam to gain access to useful information 
about his body (though he might gain such information), but serves also or instead to mark him 
as “other,” as the one not expected, the one whose presence violates the norms of the clinic.  
In a sense, Sam’s complaint might be that he is not being objectified “enough.” That is, the 
doctor is unable to see only his body parts — he cannot fail to be aware of the trans body and 
identity attached to them. His questions about their desire for media attention serve to categorize 
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the couple’s presence in the clinic as something of a spectacle, an event so out of the ordinary 
that the media might want to spread the word. His question, “You guys don’t want that kind of 
publicity, do you?” on the one hand, might be read as acknowledgement of their gender (i.e., 
“you guys”). But it could also be read as a questioning of their motives for pursuing pregnancy. 
(Are they doing it for the publicity? As a novelty?) What seems front and centre in the doctor’s 
mind is the novelty and unusualness of the situation and of the body/gender of the person in 
front of him. Sam, who is enduring a painful and uncomfortable procedure, has no desire to 
think about publicity. In his mind he reminds the doctor that “We want to have a baby and that’s 
why we’re here...that’s why we came to you.” The doctor, however, is unable to see this body as 
just one more in the line of bodies wanting to get pregnant; this body is attached to a trans 
identity, and one might imagine that this leads him to think about what he knows about trans 
men and pregnancy, which largely comes from the news coverage of Thomas Beattie and his 
pregnancies. What results might be called “failed objectification” or the tenacity of the 
heterosexual matrix’s assumptions. Because Sam’s gender does not “match” his body parts, his 
body parts cannot be separated from his gender, as they would be for a cisgender person having 
a hysterosalpingogram. The rupture to the doctor’s assumptions about which body parts match 
which gender results in a magnifying of Sam’s “difference” at the moment where he probably 
just wants to get through the test and continue his flow through the clinic.  
Jimenez (2011) also has an uncomfortable time when she goes for the routine vaginal 
ultrasound. The waiting room for a vaginal ultrasound could be classified a “sex-segregated 
space,” one of the areas Spade (2011) identifies as potentially difficult for those who are outside 
conventional gender. Jimenez describes her ultrasound experience like this:  
I am terrified of the ultrasound. I know it involves taking off my clothes, and 
letting them stick some plastic contraption inside me. A friend of mine told me 
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that it’s not as bad as a speculum, that it’s not as big, that it’s smooth, that 
there’s lube. An info sheet advises that it is a painless procedure. The physical 
aspects of the exam are not what worry me. I would be reassured if I wasn’t so 
neurotic. I will do anything to make this baby, and this urgency will allow me to 
overcome the ultrasound procedure, but that doesn’t mean it will be okay.  
The woman at the sign-in finally calls my name…she leads me back to a small 
office with an examining table and computer screen. She directs me inside, but 
she herself stands at the door. I am a trapped, scared animal in this tiny medical 
room, looking back at her… “Take down your pants and your panties,” she 
commands, “and I will return.”… I cringe. I hate the word “panties.” It makes 
me think of being a young, vulnerable girl, with some tiny, pink piece of cotton 
covering me up. I don’t wear “panties.” I wear boxers, thank you very much. 
I’m not about to talk back to her though. (Her) tone is clear and certain. She has 
directed me and I am to comply (pp. 67-68.)  
A contraption made for women used to dicks inside them. And I think, oh man, 
I’m an anomaly as a butch. I have a small hole. There aren’t enough of us to 
mold a tool just for us. I’m not saying this makes sense. I’m sure a lot of women 
could benefit from something smaller. But I forget that, because I feel queer in 
this office with feminine women, real women. I feel like another kind of animal 
(2011, p. 72, my italics). 
Jimenez understands that being a “good” patient at the fertility clinic means complying with 
instructions, and she is willing to “do anything to make this baby.” She wants to cooperate with 
this process of objectification — the ultrasound, which, though she is afraid of it, will potentially 
provide her with important information about her body. But the reference to “panties” implies a 
kind of femininity with which she does not identify; it ruptures her sense of herself and blocks 
her movement through the clinic. She feels like an anomaly, something “queer,” “another kind 
of animal.” Clearly she is a gender outsider in the clinic, not the hyper-feminine woman of 
conventional gender, the woman whose femininity is welcomed in the clinic—another example 
of failed gender work. Nothing in her clinic experience affirms her gender identity; instead her 
outsider status is exaggerated and she, like Sam, due to the misrecognition of her gender, is not 
able to benefit, in a simple way, from the “objectification” of her body parts.  
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Nina, a cisgender woman, is very aware of the ways that her body is objectified in the clinic, 
but goes on, interestingly, to suggest that it would be ideal if she could have been just treated as 
a uterus:  
I would say that there was a complete objectification of my body. Like, the only 
reason I needed to be there was that my body needed to get pregnant. I don’t 
even think that they were dealing with me, it’s that they were dealing with my 
uterus. And I was carrying my uterus, so I had to be there, Stacey didn’t. 
Actually I would have been fine if they were looking at my uterus-as-a-uterus as 
long as it wasn’t a uterus that had to be attached to a woman who felt a certain 
way about having a uterus. Like that actually would have been ideal… if I was 
just treated as a uterus.  
Nina, in a sense, echoes my own argument. In order for all patients in the fertility clinic to have 
access to processes of objectification that might assist in their flow through the clinic, the linked 
and deeply embedded assumptions of the heterosexual matrix — the assumptive links between 
body parts, sex, gender, sexuality, sexual practice, etc. — need to be disentangled and separated. 
Nina wants to be treated “just as a uterus,” separate from ideas about what a person with a uterus 
feels about their body, about parenthood, or where they sit in relation to femininity or 
masculinity.  
Meeting with the Doctor 
 While the numbers of female physicians in Ontario fertility clinics is rapidly increasing, the 
field of reproductive medicine has historically been extremely male, and many clinics continue 
to be headed by male physicians with predominantly female staff. As a result, the sites 
themselves are highly gender differentiated and stratified (Thompson, 2005, p. 122). Part of 
being the “good patient” in the site is managing one’s relationship with the doctor. As Thompson 
notes, civility is a huge part of appropriate patient comportment; inappropriate behavior includes 
arguing with the doctor or with one’s partner (2005, p. 91). Thompson describes how female 
patients, in relation to the doctor, “willingly accept the role of being the object of the medical 
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gaze and in fact actively participate in it.” She quotes a clinic nurse who comments that almost 
all women patients flirt with the doctor, want to be thought of as attractive and womanly, and to 
be compliant with and special to the doctor. For men, “a certain amount of male bonding 
between the usually male physician and the male patients was considered appropriate too” (p. 
134).  
Horsman (1991) describes her and her male partner’s visit with the fertility doctor: 
The doctor shook my partner’s hand. He didn’t seem to think there was any need 
to shake mine. After we had given our history, while I went to undress to be 
examined, the doctor chatted to my partner about the causes of our infertility — 
not to me. At the end of the appointment, again shaking my partner’s hand, he 
said we were kind of a nice couple and deserved to have children and he was 
sure he could help us. I wanted to ask him what factors made us “kind of a nice 
couple?” Our heterosexuality, our white skin, our middle-class backgrounds, our 
education level? There was a clear implication that this was a process only for 
those he considered “nice.” (Horsman, 1991, 24) 
In this heterosexual context, the doctor bonds with the male partner, provides him with medical 
information about their case, and deems them a “nice” couple — which, as we know, as his 
female partner knows, and as Thompson puts it, “nice” stands in for “appropriate” patients, the 
ones who can pay and whose civility stands “in proxy for the baby-centered heterosexual nuclear 
family” (Thompson, 2005, p. 92).  
Sam, a trans man, describes his fear of making the doctor mad: 
We had seen our doctor yell at another couple when he was leaving their room, 
rushing to the next room. They were, I guess, having the gall to want more than 
four and a half minutes with him, and we don’t know what their question was, 
because we didn’t hear that part, but we heard him say “Look, just relax! Okay? 
Just relax!” And then he stormed out of the room. So, to be honest, a lot of my 
time there was really trying to just run away from ever having that experience 
with the doctor. I never wanted him to talk to me that way because you’re so 
vulnerable in that moment. And then I would most likely cry — which I did not 
want to do in front of him.  
Sam is describing a vulnerability clearly shared by many fertility patients in relation to the 
doctor. The doctor holds the key to the knowledge, instruments, and procedures which may lead 
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to pregnancy and/or parenthood, and negotiating the clinic environment includes negotiating 
one’s relationship to the doctor. However, for queer and trans people there is added vulnerability 
produced by the processes by which they and their family members are misrecognized and 
disregarded. For example, Stacey describes how she feels negated by the doctor’s reference to 
her “transgender stuff”:  
The doctor was really not educated about what it was to deal with trans clients. 
For example, when we were going over our medical history... this is a verbatim 
quote: “your transgender stuff”… was basically my medical history. First of all I 
don’t identify as transgender, I more identify as transsexual, so she kind of 
invented that term. And you know the idea of “stuff” just kind of negates the 
experiences.  
Trans clients can be additionally vulnerable due to tensions I noted earlier related to 
complicated decisions to continue or postpone a transition process in order to freeze gametes or 
get pregnant. For some, part of a decision to pursue parenthood means stopping or forestalling 
desired hormone treatments. And sometimes doctors are not aware of the medical implications 
(or lack of them) of such decisions, but make recommendations regardless. Stacey refers to a 
doctor’s recommended line of treatment like this:  
So regarding my hormone regimen, she recommended that I stop taking any 
hormones, specifically Finasteride, which is a very specific anti-androgen that 
some trans women take and it basically prevents hair loss. It doesn’t affect 
sperm quality and a lot of non-trans men would use Finasteride. It only blocks a 
very specific part of testosterone receptors in the body. But she wanted me to 
discontinue this… and so she wanted to make the calls about how we were going 
to get pregnant… and wanted to, I guess, instruct us on what sort of lifestyle 
choices we should be making, in terms of stopping HRT, basically.  
While Stacey is addressing an ill-informed recommendation from a doctor, Rob and Sam 
contemplate the complicated decisions Sam had to make about stopping hormones in order to get 
pregnant:  
Rob: I know for you [Sam] to have kids would mean going off testosterone and 
stopping that whole transition process…in some ways it was a little bit 
complicated… 
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Sam: Yeah, and I had started transitioning really early…most people I know 
started transitioning six or seven years after me — but they pass completely 
whereas I don’t at all because I’ve been off hormones for so long now. So, it was 
a hard decision…you know. Now I’m pregnant and it’s wonderful, but there are 
times where it has been frustrating — because he [Rob] has been able to 
continue his transition. 
Stopping hormones makes it more difficult for Sam to pass as male and probably contributes 
to his frustrations with clinic staff who resist using the correct name and pronoun to address him. 
Once again, a different kind of gender work that took care to affirm and bolster his gender 
identity might have an enormous impact on his experience in the clinic. Sometimes gender work 
involves micro-actions, small gestures that affirm or deny gender, and that have come to be 
associated with gender difference. Horsman describes how the doctor shakes her (male) 
partner’s hand, but not hers. When Sam and Rob are ready to leave the clinic, with Sam 
successfully pregnant, the doctor gives Sam a hug, and shakes Rob’s hand.  
Sam: And then at the end, he shook my partner’s hand and gave me a hug. And 
it’s not that I don’t mind getting a hug, but I was like “You could’ve given us 
both a hug. But what you’re doing here is you shake the man’s hand and you 
hug or kiss a woman.” And because I’m pregnant, then I’m a woman. Because 
he’s not pregnant, then he’s a man. So that was a bit annoying. 
It is perhaps a small thing, and understandable given the hyper-conventional gender norms that 
swirl about in fertility clinics. But for Sam, the hug from the doctor is one more small denial of 
his gender.  
Sex-Segregated Space (Invaders): The Andrology Lab 
 As Spade sees it, sex-segregated spaces can present extreme difficulty for trans-identified 
people. The sex-segregated bathroom is probably the space most commonly cited as a source of 
misrecognition and even violence. As Cavanagh puts it, “Those who are recognizably trans are 
subject to persecution for using the ‘wrong bathroom’ in ways that are not only callous and cruel 
but compulsive and curious” (2010, p. 7). She argues that the heteronormativity governing the 
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gender of urinary designs in North America reproduces the heterosexual matrix…a means of 
sorting bodies into two divergent and mutually exclusive gender locales (p. 7). Of course it is not 
just trans people who have difficulty in sex-segregated bathrooms. Anyone who can be read as 
other than cisgender and heterosexual can be at risk. Cavanagh cites an example from Nashville, 
Tennessee, where a straight man using a men’s bathroom, holding his fiancée’s purse and 
guiding a blind male friend, ended up shot to death by a man hurling anti-gay insults (2010, p. 
9). Clearly, being the wrong sex, gender or sexual orientation in a space designated for the other 
can have grave consequences. In the highly gendered environment of the fertility clinic, sex-
segregated spaces include bathrooms, the waiting room for vaginal ultrasounds, and, of course, 
the andrology lab (where sperm samples are collected).  
In an early account of fertility clinic experience, a heterosexual man describes how much 
more attention is paid to his potential contribution to infertility, than to that of his wife:  
And he (the doctor) is far more sensitive to me in some ways than to Emma. He 
was very matter of fact about her endometriosis and irregular menstruation, but 
turned on all his most sensitive charm in breaking the sad news that on one 
occasion I had a low sperm count. It’s so silly, but I responded in exactly the 
same way Sylvester Stallone would. I wanted to say, “Let me do it again, I’ll 
show you!” (Basen, Eichler, Lippman, 1993, p. 41).  
In contrast, Stacey, a trans woman, describes her visit to the andrology lab as a “bizarre 
experience,” and as a place of misrecognition and awkwardness:  
They sent me to the andrology lab and they were kind of confused to see me 
there because I’m not usually who shows up in their department... and then when 
she did see the sperm samples I remember her congratulating me on my genetic 
material... as though I would identify with it in any way… which just felt odd. 
They referred to the sperm as “the boys” every time, and congratulated me on 
“the boys.” 
Once again, what is most likely intended as a gender affirmation, a congratulations to Stacey for 
the production of her “genetic material,” goes sideways when her sperm sample is referred to as 
117 
 
“the boys,” a reference that furthers the alienation she is already feeling (“as though I would 
identify with it in any way”). 
Andrea, a trans woman interested in freezing sperm before her transition, talks about the 
problems with the pornography:  
The pornography that they have for, um, inspiration? Yeah, well 25 magazines if 
you’re into the objectification of women. But pretty much nothing else. And I 
came out of the room laughing after like ten minutes…even just having them on 
the table is distracting… And I go up to the reception and I’m like, “Do you 
have anything that doesn’t have women in it?” And, of course, they did not.  
The andrology lab becomes a site of both failed objectification and failed gender work. The 
separation between Stacey and her gametes, a separation that ordinarily “makes possible events 
that would not otherwise occur” (Thompson, 2005, p. 197), is not able to occur in this instance 
without a rupture to her personhood. And the gender work performed in the andrology lab, 
ordinarily designed to bolster, affirm, and enhance heterosexual masculinity, does not work for 
those whose genders and sexualities fall outside of it. Instead, individuals are deeply 
misrecognized and their subjectivities violated. Processes are not in place that might, in the 
service of a long-term self, facilitate the objectification of gametes, body parts, etc. outside of 
the heterosexual matrix’s assumptions. Such processes, in combination with the appropriate 
gender work, might create a space that offers legitimacy and recognition to a broader range of 
gender and sexual identities, thereby facilitating their flow through the clinic.  
Strategies to Benefit the Long-Term Self  
While my focus has been on the processes by which queer and trans people are misrecognized 
and violated in their interactions with fertility clinics, I recognize, of course, that these 
interactions are multifaceted and involve complex negotiations at every stage. The interviews 
with the people included in this chapter suggest that, beside or in addition to objectification (that 
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might benefit a later self), people adopt a range of strategies in negotiating their way through the 
clinic. If we accept Thompson’s suggestion that ethicality be evaluated based on rupture (or not) 
of personhood, then exploring the impact of some of these strategies can reveal another 
dimension to queer and trans experience in clinics. My aim is not to undertake a full exploration 
of this subject (i.e. all the strategies COF interview participants adopted), but to suggest that, 
besides objectification, there are other strategies that people adopt, in service of a long-term self, 
that may contribute to violations of their subjectivities.  
In an earlier example, Nina gestures toward the desire to disentangle the assumptions of the 
heterosexual matrix from objectification of her body parts — she would prefer to be seen “just as 
a uterus,” rather than as a person with a uterus who is supposed to feel a particular way about 
that body, about womanhood, motherhood, or gender. She and Stacey acknowledge that 
on a technical level things went smoothly. They have tons of toys that they 
know how to use. But on the interpersonal level, it was so frustrating…on 
multiple occasions we really wanted to abandon the clinic and start again 
somewhere else. But we didn’t want to go back to square one.  
They make a distinction between the technical and the interpersonal, and, in the end, they chose 
to put up with the interpersonal, with the layers of misrecognition, and to persist with the clinic 
in order to achieve their long-term goal of pregnancy.  
Dan, a trans man still trying to get pregnant, describes how, on some level, he wants to think 
about the process as just being about “sperm and egg.” He does not want to think about the ways 
he may be being treated poorly, he “blocks that out” because he wants to think he is getting the 
best possible treatment:  
The friend that lent me the money, she was saying “Well, of course you’re going 
to get lousy treatment...because you’re trans, because you’re queer, because 
you’re not following the rules, because your partner isn’t your sperm donor. Of 
course you’re getting bad treatment.”… And I feel foolish to think there isn’t 
more to it, but my brain always goes to “There’s sperm and egg and either they 
work or they don’t work. And what else is there?” But it is possible that I’m 
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getting poor treatment because I’m queer and trans and not following the rules, 
and my partner isn’t my sperm donor. But I… I don’t know. Again, self-
preservation…I block all that out and I just think “Hey, sperm, egg, it’s not their 
fault it’s not working. They did what they could.”  
Of course there is no way to evaluate the “truth” of Dan’s experience in the clinic; what seems 
important is his description of how he is “blocking out” thoughts about how is being treated and 
choosing instead to focus on the technical aspects of things, the “sperm and egg,” as a “self-
preservation” strategy in benefit of the long-term self.  
Sam also adopts the strategy of “tuning out” the ways he is being misrecognized in the clinic. 
After some events they experience as “traumatic,” including the clinic’s losing the results of 
their miscarriage, his partner, Rob, decides not to come to the clinic anymore. Sam goes by 
himself, but describes himself as only “half there”:  
You know, it’s so early in the morning, you’re going every single day— by the 
end, I just brought a book and just tried to tune it out because it was easier than 
fighting every single time that I went there.  
There’s so much trauma — my partner didn’t want to go back to the clinic ever 
again. So when I decided to go back, I knew I was going in there by myself — 
not by myself because my partner was with me — but not physically there…So I 
brought a book. I got Monopoly on my phone and I just went in there with a 
very different attitude. And I tried not to get involved in all of the stuff that was 
happening around. I brought stuff for my own entertainment. So then I was sort 
of like only half there anyways.  
When you are hailed by a name or pronoun that is not the one you identify with, or assumed 
to be a gender or a sexual orientation that does not fit, the process of generic bureaucratization, 
of assimilation into the normal routine of the clinic, is interrupted. Once this flow is interrupted, 
it becomes more complicated to “behave within the normal parameters” for the clinic. When you 
are a body that is “diverse,” a body that is not expected, or that causes “blockages” in the flow of 
systems, you face many moments of decision and/or indecision in your encounters with 
institutions. Or, as Ahmed puts it, you face hesitation:  
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There is a labor in having to respond to a situation that others are protected from, 
a situation that does not come up for those whose residence is assumed. Do you 
point it out? Do you say anything? Will you cause a problem by describing a 
problem? Past experience tells you that to make such a point is to become a sore 
point. Sometimes you let the moment pass because the consequences of not 
letting it pass are too difficult. (2012, pp. 176-177) 
In pointing out a problem, in making a point or asking to be treated differently, one runs the risk 
of becoming the problem, of confirming that one does not really belong:  
Not only that, you are heard as insistent, or even as self-promotional, as insisting 
on your dues. If you have to become insistent to receive what is automatically 
given to others, your insistence confirms the improper nature of your residence. 
(Ahmed, 2012, p. 177) 
Sam describes this tension between speaking up and keeping quiet, between being vocal 
about his concerns and his dependence on clinic staff and procedures to achieve his long-term 
goals:  
I was very careful. I could have been way more vocal about them getting my 
gender right, getting my name right. I could have been way more vocal about a 
lot of things, but I needed them. At the end of the day, every single day, they’re 
going to stick a needle in my one vein. And they’re also going to probe me, for 
the vaginal ultrasounds. So, you know, I was as outspoken as I could be, without 
making things too much more difficult for myself. 
For Dan, his long-term goal of having a child takes precedence over how he is recognized or 
misrecognized in the clinic:  
For queer-trans reasons, I wasn’t very concerned. I thought... whatever they call 
me, I just want their help. And if they want me to be female, I don’t think I’m 
going to say anything. And if they want to call me the wrong name… the 
priority was having the kid and if they treated me respectfully... or took my 
concerns seriously...I was less worried. 
Each of these examples involves a decision to “put up with,” “ignore,” or “tune out” moments 
of rupture to personhood. In each instance, the people involved choose to “ignore” in order to 
benefit their long-term self, the self who desires to be pregnant. If ethics in these situations is 
evaluated based on rupture to personhood, one could say that some of the strategies deployed by 
queer and trans people as they make their way through the clinic involve a breach of ethics — 
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that people are put in a position, in a sense, of collaborating in the violation of their own sense of 
personhood in order to benefit their long-term self.  
 Making decisions to “not” speak out on one’s one behalf can have effects. Stacey and Nina 
each recall their experience in the clinic differently. Nina recalls having more of a sense of 
humour about the whole thing, and “wanting to get in and out as quickly as possible, and not 
engage with how they saw us.” Stacey is more confused and surprised by how they are treated, 
and ends up feeling bad about her lack of intervention:  
I just felt confused and, you know surprised each time it happened. And it 
always was a little bit subtle and just kind of in the midst of other treatment and 
so on and we didn’t really want to necessarily stop the treatment. We just 
wanted things to work differently…uh…interpersonally. As so I just wasn’t 
prepared to deal with it, I guess. And so I didn’t...which left me feeling bad 
about that part of the process.  
Dan, after having a bad experience with one doctor, describes his fears about making a request to 
change doctors and his shame in not being more assertive:  
I was nervous to justify why. I didn’t want to be told, “Oh, that’s not good 
enough,” or “Oh, you’re being a difficult patient, we’re kicking you out of the 
clinic.”…Really, she rubbed me wrong for a long time. And just being stubborn, 
I hadn’t changed anything. There was the occasional day where I would go in 
determined that I would get my questions answered. And she’d just start talking 
and talking and talking…I was starting to feel ashamed that I wasn’t asking my 
questions of my doctor.  
Jimenez (2011) talks about how she feels after asserting herself in relation to the clinic by 
letting them know she wants to cut down on her days of cycle monitoring and that she wants 
notice if her doctor is not going to be the one inseminating her: 
I do better when I feel I have some control, and this time I did… I spoke. I acted. 
I imagined myself to hold some role in the medical procedures conducted upon 
my body. It’s only taken me a year to get some balls. (p. 83, my italics) 
Stacey and Nina refer to another couple they know, “two trans guys who are really active,” who 
were very “proactive,” who knew how to self-advocate in relation to birth registration:  
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They came in knowing what they are entitled to, what their rights are and so on. 
So they had a better experience than us… I think they came in knowing a lot 
more how to negotiate things for themselves.  
Each of these people feels that in some sense they have let themselves and/or their partners 
down by not being “better” at self-advocating, at speaking up on their own behalf, and 
challenging sooner the places and moments in which they are misrecognized or disrespected. I 
wonder if there is a culture in some outsider communities that includes a sense that one should 
“stand up for oneself,” know how to self-advocate, and take some control in a situation in which 
you are being treated unjustly. In situations where one does not self-advocate, it can amount to 
another form of violation: not only are you being mistreated, you feel that in some way you are 
violating yourself by not speaking or acting up. Perhaps in moments of mistreatment or lack of 
recognition there is a loss of dignity, or a rupture to one’s identity as someone who does stand up 
for oneself, who knows how to self-advocate and assert oneself. Thompson judges the ethicality 
of objectification based on whether or not an individual is able to maintain synecdoche with the 
goals of a long-term self, to maintain a sense of personhood in the face of objectification.  
People deploy the strategies I described here in order to negotiate a journey through the 
fertility clinic, a journey marked by the long-term goal of achieving pregnancy. It is not possible 
to evaluate the ethicality of these strategies apart from the subjectivities of the individuals 
involved. And, as Thompson notes, people’s feelings about an experience can change over time, 
sometimes influenced by the passage of time and potential outcomes. The question, however, is 
useful. When queer and trans people negotiate their way through the institutional environment of 
fertility clinics, at what points do the ruptures to personhood that they might experience amount 
to a breach of ethics?
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Chapter 4. Queer Kinship in the Fertility Clinic: Policy and Administrative 
Practices that Erase Queer and Trans Families  
Chapter 3 explores the gender work typically performed in fertility clinics, most often in 
service of bolstering and/or repairing conventional masculinities and femininities. This chapter 
explores queer kinship in the fertility clinic, in particular, how fertility clinics also perform 
“kinship work” that serves to recognize some biological facts as more relevant than others, and 
to naturalize those kinship relations determined to be appropriate, while refusing (sometimes 
knowingly, sometimes unintentionally) the naturalization of kin relations that are unfamiliar or 
unintelligible. Two examples from the COF data illustrate how such kinship work operates in the 
fertility clinic and how heterosexual kinship is sometimes naturalized, when queer kinship is not. 
I also examine the impact of a particular administrative blockage experienced by LGBTQ people 
in their interactions with AHR services. Specifically, I first use an example of what is sometimes 
called “lesbian reciprocal IVF” to address issues of kinship naturalization, and second, I explore 
the impact of the Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations 
(Food and Drugs Act, 1996) (which, for ease, I will refer to from here as the semen regulations) 
on the experience of people using known sperm donors and seeking assistance from clinics. I 
also reflect on some of the strategies deployed by LGBTQ people in relation to these regulations.  
In considering these strategies, I return to Thompson’s suggestion that ethicality in fertility 
clinic practices might be evaluated based on whether or not violations or ruptures to the 
personhood of clients take place (2005, p. 201). Pfeffer’s (2012) concepts of “normative 
resistance” and “inventive pragmatism” are helpful here to differentiate strategies that rely on, 
versus those that resist, concepts of normalization. Normalization strategies, or “inventive 
pragmatism,” such as those that involve deception about sexual relations and identity, can be 
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costly and/or violating to the self. The act of lying about one’s sexual orientation and/or family 
configuration and relationships means not just being misrecognized, as is common in LGBTQ 
fertility clinic experiences (See Ross et al., 2014) but being asked to actively participate in one’s 
own misrecognition. At the root of the struggles that participants describe is the fact that “known 
sperm donor” is not intelligible as a kinship category within the institutional framework of 
reproductive services and legislation, or indeed within mainstream social discourses. 
The People 
Heidi and Stephanie 
 Heidi and Stephanie both identify as queer and white, and had been together for over eight 
years when they decided to try and have a child. For personal reasons, it was very important to 
Heidi that she have a biological connection to the child, though she had no desire to be pregnant 
(“just not me,” were her words). Stephanie, on the other hand, wanted very much to experience 
pregnancy, childbirth, and nursing. They found the atmosphere “cold” at the first clinic they 
went to, but had a more positive and supportive experience at the second clinic. Here they 
extracted and fertilized an egg from Heidi and implanted it in Stephanie’s uterus. The process 
was financially costly and involved multiple tests, the synchronization of their cycles through 
birth control pills, and the use of heavy-duty fertility drugs. In the process Heidi discovered she 
had two polyps that required removal as well as a subclinical hyperthyroid that required 
treatment and Stephanie developed migraines from the birth control pills. However, they were 
both extremely committed to the idea of reciprocal IVF, both for the biological implications but 
also because of legal fears. They had decided against using a known sperm donor because of the 
legal uncertainty regarding his status, though it was important to them to use an I.D.-release 
donor so that their potential child could, at a later date, know their biological history. Heidi 
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describes herself as “growing up poor.” She feels funny about spending so much money on the 
IVF process, and alienated from the clinic process which is “something rich people do.”  
Antoinette and Donna 
 Antoinette and Donna are two queer-identified women in a relationship. Antoinette identifies 
as white, and Donna as black. They are particularly focused on issues of race in their decision 
making about a sperm donor and eventually decide that rather than sifting through information 
about “race” on sperm bank websites, they prefer a known donor. They reject their own “cake-
batter race theories,” which assume a certain degree of control over outcomes, in favour of 
choosing a donor who, although he is different racially from what they initially were seeking, 
makes more sense for them. They are angry about the barriers they encounter in relation to 
bringing known donors to the clinic, and articulate several times how much easier and less 
awkward it would be if they could do medical screening and testing of donors, as well as 
insemination, through the clinic. They know other people who have misrepresented their donors 
as sexual partners in the clinic, but are reluctant to do this themselves because of their lack of 
aptitude for lying, as well as concerns about asking the donor to lie on multiple visits. 
Tonya and Jacqueline 
 Tonya and Jacqueline are two women in a relationship. Tonya identifies as white and lesbian 
and Jacqueline as mixed race and bisexual. They have decided to use Tonya’s brother as their 
sperm donor and assumed they could get assistance for this process from a fertility clinic. They 
are surprised to find this is not in fact the case, and that using Tonya’s brother’s sperm is much 
more complicated than they anticipated. They are informed by a student who happens to be left 
alone in a room with them that there is a way around the sperm regulations if they pretend he is 
Jacqueline’s sexual partner. They are extremely uncomfortable at the idea of lying for several 
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reasons, including concern for the donor and legal anxieties with regard to Jacqueline’s 
recognition as a parent. In the end they are put off by the requirements attached to the use of a 
known donor (i.e., sperm testing and quarantining and the attached delays, costs, and freezing 
required), and they successfully inseminate at home.  
Lucy and Clare 
 Lucy and Clare are two white women in a relationship. Lucy identifies as queer, and Clare as 
bisexual. Their doctor has provided a referral to a fertility clinic, but refers to Lucy as a single 
woman, which they find “weird.” They want to use a known sperm donor and make phone calls 
to clinics all over Ontario, asking about assistance. For some calls Lucy tells the truth about their 
relationship, and for others she pretends to have a male sexual partner. When she tells the truth, 
all but one clinic says they “can’t do that.” The person who answers the phone at the one clinic 
who is willing to help advises them to “Just come in with your known donor and tell us he’s your 
sexual partner and we’ll do it.” They too feel discomfort about lying, particularly because, as 
Clare puts it, she has spent years lying about who she is. For these women, the concept of “risk” 
is salient and complicated; they perceive a bigger risk in using an anonymous donor, a person 
they don’t know, than in the potential health risks of using somebody known to them. They want 
the option to sign a waiver that clarifies they are willing to assume these risks.  
Joe and Charlie 
 Joe and Charlie are two white, trans men in a relationship. Charlie wants to get pregnant. 
For reasons related to their experience as trans men in the health care system, as well as their 
preference for a known donor, they ultimately choose to inseminate at home with the sperm from 
a known donor. However, they do utilize the services of a clinic to test Charlie’s fertility, and 
they explore the options open to them for clinic insemination. A clinic in a large urban city 
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suggests that if they want assistance with insemination at the clinic they can present at the clinic 
as a “threesome” with their sperm donor. The clinic also offers to do cycle monitoring and to 
then send them home with the appropriate supplies for home insemination. Another clinic, in a 
smaller city, presents no options for assistance with a known donor, and refuses to offer them 
cycle monitoring if they are inseminating with someone who is not a sexual partner. 
1
 
Naturalization of Kin Relations: Who Are the Real Parents?  
Franklin and McKinnon’s point (see my literature review, p. 62), that the same substance, 
mobilized in one context to create kinship ties, may, in another context, be used very differently, and 
Weston’s (2001) question about how and for whose benefit these processes of “making kin” take 
place, are neatly exemplified in Thompson’s work on the naturalization of kin relations in the context 
of fertility clinics.  
As Thompson (2005) puts it, “certain bases of kin differentiation are foregrounded and 
recrafted while others are minimized to make the couples who seek and pay for infertility 
treatment — the intended parents — come out through legitimate and intact chains of descent as 
the real parents” (p. 145). Thompson uses the example of two technically identical procedures 
that lead to different kinds of kinship configurations to illustrate how kinship and procreative 
intent are naturalized in the fertility clinic. In her analysis, the act of carrying a pregnancy and 
genes are both natural resources in the making of parents and children, but their meaning in 
establishing parenthood is distributed differently, depending on norms governing the family; 
laws regulating reproductive technologies, custody and descent; the medical technologies 
themselves; and, the financial dynamics of third-party, medically assisted reproduction (p.148). 
She differentiates what establishes parenthood, which she calls relational, from what does not 
                                                 
1
 Dan, who we met in chapter 4 (see page 98), also appears in this chapter. 
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sustain a parental claim, which she calls custodial. In other words, procreative intent combined 
with financial considerations (who is paying for services) determines who is a parent; the role 
that third parties might play in this process (i.e., custodial work: providing or caring for gametes 
and embryos), whatever their “biological” relation to the project, is deemed irrelevant to parental 
claims. In this process she suggests that nature and culture are co-produced, but that the relation 
between the two is underdetermined and “eminently revisable.”  
The examples Thompson uses are a heterosexual egg donor IVF cycle (a woman carries a 
pregnancy conceived from a donated egg and her male partner’s sperm) and a gestational 
surrogacy (a woman carries a pregnancy that is conceived from a donated egg — or the egg of 
the intended mother — and the male partner’s sperm). In the first case “motherhood” is 
conferred based on procreative intent, finances (who is paying), and gestation or biology 
(substance) — the woman who carries the pregnancy, although she is not genetically related to 
the baby, is deemed “the mother.” Her partner, who provided the sperm, is “the father.” The 
woman who provided the egg plays a “custodial” role, not a parental one. In the second case, the 
woman who carries the pregnancy (substance) is in a custodial role, while “motherhood” is 
conferred (if the intended mother did not provide the egg) based on procreative intent, 
social/legal grounds, and finances, or (if she did provide the egg), on all of the above plus 
genetics. And of course, in either scenario if the intended father is unable to provide useable 
sperm, the use of a sperm donor would mean the designation of “the father” based, not on 
substance or genetics, but on procreative intent and finances. In each instance, certain aspects of 
substance/biology/genetics are foregrounded and used to bolster parental claims, while others are 
deemed insignificant in the making of kin. In each case, the kin relationships are naturalized. On 
some level, it seems obvious and “natural” who the “parents” are.  
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Interestingly, this process of naturalization does not work in quite the same way when queer 
people are involved. To begin with, the process of baby making for many queer people requires 
complex decision making about gamete providers and sometimes surrogates, and always in a 
context of legal uncertainty. As Heidi and Stephanie put it:  
Stephanie: You always feel like you just don’t have as many rights as a 
heterosexual couple going into it. 
Heidi: I mean you constantly kind of have this on your mind: Is someone going 
to take my baby away?  
Heidi and Stephanie made the decision to have a child through “lesbian reciprocal IVF,” that is, 
the egg of one woman is fertilized with donor sperm and implanted in the uterus of the other. 
Part of their decision to use this method of conception involved a desire to increase legal 
security. As Heidi puts it, “Given how much we went through to do this, any judge looking at it 
would say that we both intended to be parents.”  
Having made this decision and invested significantly — financially, physically, and 
emotionally — in the process, imagine their surprise, just before the embryo transfer, when they 
were handed paper work that asked Stephanie (whose egg is being used to create an embryo) to 
waive her parental rights: 
Stephanie: There was one thing that was sort of troublesome… the paper work 
that needed to be completed before we went ahead with the egg retrieval and the 
transfer… There were about five sheets, they wanted me to waive my parental 
rights. 
Heidi: …because the way the paper work is set up is as if it is an egg donation… 
the forms were either for me to be the surrogate or for my partner to be the egg 
donor. It just varied depending on which form they gave us.  
Recognizing the implications, Stephanie refused to sign the form waiving her parental rights. 
The nurse told them they had to sign it, then conferred with someone in the hall, who reiterated 
“They just have to sign it. Why don’t they want to sign it?” The two women explained why they 
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were refusing to sign, and eventually the clinic staff allowed them to proceed without signing the 
form. Heidi and Stephanie explained to the clinic staff:  
Listen, the way that your forms are set up don’t work for us. They don’t work 
for other people who are doing this. You need to figure something out, whether 
you make new forms, whether you make these more inclusive. You’ve got to do 
something because you can’t ask somebody to sign away rights that shouldn’t 
even be in here.  
The clinic responded with something like “we’ll take that into consideration.” Later, there was 
confusion about whether Heidi was acting as a surrogate, or Stephanie as an egg donor, some of 
which seems to be based on financial implications:  
I think it was because that was the cheaper way to do it… like some of the forms 
would call Stephanie the mother, other forms would call me the mother. And 
then there were some forms that said “father.” We would just cross that part out 
and write “mother.” We did a lot of adapting.  
Spade’s (2011) analysis of how administrative governance can work to make trans 
people’s lives administratively impossible is relevant here to the experience of these cisgender 
women. While in the heterosexual instances described earlier (egg donor IVF and gestational 
surrogacy) procreative intent, combined with finances, serve to naturalize who the parents are 
(i.e., the heterosexual couple who are paying for services and intend to be parents), in this 
instance the woman who is both providing the egg (genetic material) and is the intended parent, 
is asked to sign a form that waives her parental rights. There is confusion about who the 
“mother” is (in fact, there are two mothers), a “father” is inserted sometimes, and all of this takes 
place in the context of legal fears about one woman’s recognition as a parent As Heidi said it, 
“you constantly kind of have this on your mind: Is someone going to take my baby away?” 
Similarly, gay men involved in surrogacy arrangements that involve an egg donor, a gestational 
surrogate, and the sperm of one of the men (the intended parents), find that the man who is 
providing the sperm gets treated in a clinic setting as if he is a sperm donor (i.e., not the sperm 
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provider and intended parent), and thus subject to regulations regarding the freezing and 
quarantining of his sperm.  
  The contrast between the heterosexual and the queer examples gives meaning to 
Thompson’s (2005) statement about the doubledness of reproductive technologies:  
It is no wonder that progressive cultural critics cannot decide whether the new 
reproductive technologies are best judged as innovative ways of breaking free of 
bondage to old cultural categories of affiliation or whether they are best 
denounced as part of a hegemonic reification of the same old stultifying ways of 
classifying and valuing human beings. The technologies are fundamentally both. 
(p. 177)  
In Thompson’s heterosexual examples, where there is potentially more than one answer to the 
question “who is the mother?” she says that “‘procreative intent’ propelled the sorting and 
classifying of some things and not others as the biological facts of relevance” (p. 177). In the 
queer example, the opposite is true. The biological facts are, at least initially, classified in such a 
way that one woman’s parental claim is denied, within a legal and institutional context in which 
she is already vulnerable to misrecognition, lack of intelligibility, and erasure. Her partner 
expressed fears that “someone will take your baby away,” and the next thing she knew she was 
being asked to sign a form that accomplishes exactly that.  
Thompson suggests that the biological classifications and strategies that enforce 
procreative intent resonate with studies indicating that reproduction is already stratified (2005, p. 
176). Those with financial resources and the heterosexual matrix behind them up are able to 
mobilize biological classifications that recognize intended parenthood. Heidi and Stephanie, 
while ultimately able to proceed with their procreative project, were initially subject to 
administrative practices that not only denied their procreative intent and rendered invisible their 
status as two mothers and their family configuration that does not include a father, but also that 
potentially removed the parental status of one mother.  
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Ehrensaft (2008) recognizes this phenomenon as part of the heteronormativity of fertility 
clinic practices:  
The policies at fertility clinics are typically designed with heterosexual, not 
lesbian, families in mind, as when clinics ask an egg donor to sign away her 
parenting rights and do not take into consideration those lesbian families in 
which the egg donor has every intention of being a mother, along with her womb 
mother partner. (p. 170)  
To say that heterosexual families are the families in mind is to recall again the power of the 
heterosexual matrix, a configuration that is not easily disrupted — the linking of body 
parts/fluids to gender to sex to family configuration. Thompson suggests that it is the newness of 
the innovations enabled by reproductive technologies that require a shoring up of the 
conventional heterosexual nuclear family in order to make “new things seem normal” by 
interpreting them as “new examples of old things” (p. 141). Processes of naturalization such as 
those described here bring the sociotechnical innovations of reproductive technologies into the 
realm of the acceptable. While the meanings of biological relationships are underdetermined and 
all askew, at least the nuclear family is intact. In the heterosexual context, the real (i.e., intended) 
parents are naturalized, despite complex configurations of biology, genetics, and intention. In the 
queer context, parents become not-parents, as in the case of Stephanie and Heidi’s lesbian IVF. 
Even more complex is the kinship category of the “known sperm donor,” a category that does 
not fit heteronormative models of the two-parent, gender-dichotomized family.  
Donor Decisions 
As many have documented (see, for example, Sullivan, 2004; Mamo, 2007; Luce, 2010; 
Kelly, 2011; Leckey, 2011b; Epstein, 2003 and others), when two women who do not have 
sexual access to sperm are planning to have a baby together they typically embark on a complex 
decision-making process regarding the source of sperm. In the Dykes Planning Tykes course, a 
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course designed to assist in this planning process, questions relating to the complexities of sperm 
donor decisions are of primary concern. The most difficult decision involves deciding between 
an anonymous or a known sperm donor. Currently in Canada, anonymous donors are available 
through sperm banks and in two categories: those whose identity will never be known to the 
child, and those, referred to as Identity Release Donors (I.D. Release) or “open” donors, who 
have agreed that when the child turns 18 they can be offered both identifying and non-identifying 
information about the donor. Those who decide on the anonymous route, either completely 
anonymous or I.D. Release, must select a donor from sperm bank catalogues that provide 
increasingly more detailed information about a donor’s medical and social history, education, 
work history, interests, hobbies, and motivations. Donor selection, though not the focus of this 
project, is a complex process, layered with assumptions that rely on the nature/culture divide, 
and on assumptions about the significance of biology, blood, and shared substance. Mamo 
(2007) and Pelka (2009), among others, recognize the complexities of these decisions and the 
ways that, despite the emphasis on love and “chosen family,” queer women continue to rely on 
discourses of genetics and biology in decision making about sperm donors.   
While the 1980s and ‘90s, which marked the beginning of what has come to be called the 
“lesbian baby boom,” were characterized by a DIY approach to insemination influenced by 
feminism, the women’s health movement, and lack of access to clinics, recent years have seen a 
turn toward medicalization and increased use of fertility clinics by queer and trans people. In 
part, people are discouraged from using known sperm donors and home insemination by a 
number of factors. These include the social and legal vulnerability of non-biological parent(s); 
the legal ambiguity of the known sperm donor; the challenge that home insemination poses to 
institutionalized medicine; awkwardness with the intimacies of known sperm donation; legal and 
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administrative barriers such as those embedded in the Canadian semen regulations (Food and 
Drugs Act, 1996), and the lack of social intelligibility of the known sperm donor.  
Barriers to the Use of Known Sperm Donors  
As chapter 2 discusses, queer women (and other LGBTQ parents) who do not have a 
biological connection to their children can experience a particular form of vulnerability. Often at 
the core of this vulnerability are insecurity and fear about legal recognition. Because fathers have 
become “good news” in family court (Kelly, 2011, p. 33), queer women planning children are 
fearful of including known donors in their parenting plans, worried that they will not be 
sufficiently protected from potential parental claims. Of course many lesbian parents are not 
interested in including a sperm donor in their family configuration, and as Leckey (2011a) points 
out, the law and the way it is enacted, has recently resulted in arguments for the “completeness” 
of the two-parent lesbian family. This works for some lesbian families, but not for others. 
Leckey argues that legal discourse, policies, and protections can work to both reflect and 
construct the relations they are established to address. In other words, family law and family law 
reform do not simply reflect pre-existing realities, but also mediate and alter practices. Despite 
the fact that more than three quarters of the women Kelly (2011) interviewed supported the idea 
of a child having three or more parents if that was what the parties had agreed to,(p. 106), many 
lesbians, in their preconception decision making, decide against a known donor because there is 
no intelligible legal category for a known sperm donor who is not a “father.”  
Reviewing family law as it applies to lesbian families in Canada, Kelly concludes that 
significant gaps remain: the legal framework is uneven across the country, non-
biological mothers continue to be treated as second-class parents or even legal 
strangers to their children, and the legal status of known donors remains 
unresolved. (p. 19)  
Clearly, the legal ambiguity of the known sperm donor is a significant deterrent to their  
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inclusion and integration in queer women’s families.  
The use of a known donor is typically coupled with a decision to inseminate at home and 
outside of medical systems. Haimes and Weiner (2000) suggest that home insemination, or what 
they call self-insemination (SI), is fundamentally challenging to institutional medicine because it 
takes place outside a clinical location and does not rely on medical expertise or knowledge. SI is 
analogous to self-help groups in being a “de-medicalised, de-professionalized social practice 
which privileges the lay knowledge and concerns of the women themselves” (Kelleher, 1994, as 
cited in Haimes & Weiner, 2000, p. 496), and does not require compliance to medical authority. 
To the medical profession, SI means that “the donor and the recipient and the location and the 
insemination procedures are all unknown, unregulated and (thus) undesirable” (Haimes & 
Weiner, 2000, p. 496). Tonya describes how the clinic assumed an anonymous donor and was 
less receptive to the idea of a known donor:  
Tonya: They assumed that we were looking for an anonymous donor right off 
the top. That was their main assumption. They were walking us through the 
process of what it would look like to get an anonymous donor. It was very 
clinical and like they’ve done it a million times and I’m sure they have done it a 
million times. And basically the timing and fee schedule that goes along with 
that. When we did tell them that we already had a donor, you know, they 
weren’t as receptive to that.  
Clinics are inconsistent when it comes to support for home insemination. Some will test 
donors and allow patients to access cycle monitoring in order to determine time of ovulation. 
Others will have nothing to do with it. The COF interviewees who were using known sperm 
donors but approached clinics for assistance (e.g., testing or cycle monitoring) were met with 
inconsistent and unreliable response.  
Nordqvist (2011) argues that sperm donation, in a home or clinical setting, raises 
complex issues of intimacy, privacy, and sexuality. In a home insemination context, lesbian 
couples negotiate these issues by attempting to establish, sometimes more or less successfully, 
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boundaries that maintain distance between the couple, the donor, and his sexual practice. She 
suggests that distancing from the donor is achieved through “carefully structured and organized 
social practices which are meticulously choreographed through patterns of movement and 
action” (p. 1662), and designed to create separation between the donor, his sperm, and the 
recipients of the sperm. Several COF participants spoke about the awkwardness of negotiations 
with donors and the process of home insemination. Antoinette and Donna describe their process 
like this:  
Antoinette: We could like barely ask him to come over and donate. 
Donna: I know. It’s so weird. You know, you’re friends with people ten years, 
right, then you’re just like, “Could you just…it’s time to…into…the…It’s time, 
it’s time! Please come over and masturbate in our apartment! Hurry up!” 
Antoinette: You know? It’s hard. It’s really hard.  
Negotiations are sometimes made more uncomfortable, at least initially, when the donor is also a 
family member. Jacqueline and Tonya asked Tonya’s brother to be their sperm donor.  
Jacqueline: It was just trial and error you know. He would come down and at 
first it was horribly awkward because it was not something we ever thought we 
would do.  
Tonya: Oh, gosh you know, oh? It’s just that he’s my brother!... and I’m his 
sister, you know. 
Jacqueline: And he’s handing her a cup and in the beginning it was bizarre. 
Tonya: The first three or four times it was just like, oh man, there’s nothing 
worse than this and he kept saying, “You know, I really hope it works. You guys 
need to get it together”  
 
Of course none of these dynamics are simple or universal. Some of the COF participants 
described an initial awkwardness in negotiations with donors, followed by or coupled with an 
appreciation of the closeness created through the process, including the intimacy of being able to 
inseminate at home — with or without the donor present. Donna and Antoinette strongly suggest 
that clinics could reduce the awkwardness of sperm donor/recipient relations by providing 
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recipients and their donors the opportunity to meet with a skilled professional who could 
facilitate the necessary discussions and negotiations, as well as soliciting medical history and 
appropriate testing. Of course this would require an acceptance of known sperm donors and 
home insemination on the part of the fertility industry. Barriers to this acceptance are both 
administrative and social, embodied in government regulations and in the lack of intelligibility of 
non-normative kinship relations.  
Administrative Blockages: The Canadian Semen Regulations  
The Canadian semen regulations, which came into effect in 1996 under the Food and Drugs 
Act, set out the health and safety requirements for processing and distributing third-party donor 
semen used or intended for use in assisted conception. The semen regulations define assisted 
conception as “a reproductive technique performed on a woman for the purpose of conception, 
using semen from a donor who is not her spouse or sexual partner.” Sperm being used for 
assisted conception is required to be frozen and quarantined for six months, while the donor must 
test negatively for HIV and hepatitis at the start and the end of this time period. 
Meanwhile, those seeking insemination with the semen of their spouse or sexual partner are 
excluded from the freezing and sexually transmitted infection (STI) testing requirements. The 
rationale for this exemption regarding “sexual partners” relates to the risk of contracting STIs. If 
you are having sex with someone, you are assumed to be already taking the risk of contracting 
whatever diseases they might have. Insemination with their fresh, unquarantined sperm is not 
perceived as an additional risk to the health of the person being inseminated.  
What this regulation means in practice is that a heterosexual couple, having tried to conceive 
for a period of time at home through sexual intercourse, can approach a clinic for assistance in 
getting pregnant and can request insemination with fresh sperm from the male partner. Other 
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individuals and couples (including single, queer female, and trans-masculine people) who have 
also tried to conceive for a period of time at home through home insemination with a known 
sperm donor, cannot make the same request. Although sexual intercourse and home insemination 
entail the same health risk, those using a known sperm donor will be required to have the donor 
tested, the sperm frozen, and then wait out the six-month quarantine period before beginning 
inseminations. This involves added medicalization, a hefty financial burden (for testing, freezing, 
and storage of sperm), a significant time delay, and the use of frozen rather than fresh sperm, 
which decreases the chances of conception, The semen regulations were unsuccessfully 
challenged constitutionally in 2007 (Susan Doe v. Canada).  
Lying in Waiting Rooms: Frustrations with the Semen Regulations 
Here I use the experience of COF participants (or participant couples) to explore the impact of 
the semen regulations’ prohibition of the use of fresh sperm from anyone other than a sexual 
partner, and the implications of the strategies deployed by LGBTQ people in relation to this 
prohibition. Normalization strategies, or “inventive pragmatism,” such as those that involve 
deception or lying about sexual relations and identity, can be costly and/or violating to the self. 
The act of lying about one’s sexual orientation and/or family configuration and relationships 
means not just being misrecognized, as is common in LGBTQ fertility clinic experiences (See 
Ross et al., 2014) but being asked to actively participate in one’s own misrecognition. At the root 
of the struggles that participants describe is the fact that “known sperm donor” is not intelligible 
as a kinship category within the institutional framework of reproductive services and legislation, 
or indeed within mainstream social discourses. 
Because AHR services are, in general, becoming more open to LGBTQ clients, there are 
growing expectations among LGBTQ people that they can be assisted by clinics in their 
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reproductive journeys, including assistance with insemination with a known donor. People are 
often surprised when they discover that there are administrative barriers, or blockages to refer 
back to Ahmed’s concept, to receiving assistance. Participants describe the stress and confusion 
this adds to their experience:  
Jacqueline: We thought it was going to be pretty standard. We thought we were 
going to go in and tell them what we wanted to do and they’d tell us the process 
and it would be easy. We figured it was just a money issue that we had to figure 
out—we were never expecting that we would be told that we weren’t able to do 
that.  
• • • 
 
Lucy: Finding out that there were some barriers to fertility-type services was 
really stressful. Like, highly stressful. 
Joe and Charlie summarize their frustrations with the semen regulations and the barriers they 
encountered in using the known donor of their choice. They express concerns about time delays, 
financial burden, the use of frozen (versus fresh) sperm, and legal issues:  
Joe: What they were willing to allow was that we could have our donor come up 
and he could give a sample and they would test it and freeze and test it again six 
months later and he could keep coming up and giving samples which they would 
freeze and store at—you know —a substantial cost and then, once the embargo 
was lifted, they were willing to let us use it but it was going to be a six-month 
wait, it was going to be using frozen sperm, and it was going to be a crap ton of 
money. 
Charlie: And they would have linked the donor and me on the paper work and 
seen the donor and me as the parents… 
Joe: Which then would have been a further crap ton of money because we would 
have had to have a second parent adoption and all three of us would have had to 
have our separate lawyers and la la la.  
In addition to these practical barriers, people encounter a policy that seems contradictory and 
discriminatory:  
Tonya: And I said right there, “Well, hang on a second. People come in here 
every day to become inseminated with their partner’s sperm. Just because we 
know this guy, he’s my brother, he’s a family member, he’s got to qualify to be 
a donor? Do you make these people qualify to be donors?” And they said, “Well, 
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no, but they’re married or they’re in a relationship,” they didn’t even have to be 
married, they just had to be consenting adults in a relationship. And we were 
like, “OK, we’re consenting adults in a relationship—just not an intimate one, so 
how does that differ in definition to you?”  
Participants point out the contradiction in requiring testing, freezing, and quarantining for 
sperm from a known donor, when a sexual partner could just as likely be putting them at risk: 
Antoinette: But what makes the husband so trustworthy?! That’s what I want to 
know. The assumption, you know, that relationships between the two are 
truthful and that no one’s lying to each other and, you know, everyone’s 
monogamous. 
 
• • • 
 
Lucy: As near as I understood it— it was a liability issue for a medical doctor, or 
clinician, or whoever it would be, to do an insemination with a known donor, 
who hadn’t had the sperm banked and frozen for something like six months… 
which seemed like a funny double-standard when really, you could go to any old 
bar on Saturday night and be like “Okay, I’m going to sleep with this person.” 
Versus, you know, our plan was we asked our friend to have STI tests done. And 
he did.  
People also challenged the concept of “risk,” suggesting that the risk of choosing a donor from a 
sperm bank catalogue—choosing someone one does not know based on a list of characteristics 
and reported history—is perhaps greater than the risks involved in using a donor who is known.  
Clare: It [using an anonymous donor] feels like more risk to me… you know, 
this person I know and care about and have chosen to be my kid’s father... I 
mean you have to have a lot of respect for someone to ask them to be the 
biological father of your child. It’s like, that is a huge thing. And so, 
psychologically and emotionally it feels less risky to me to go with a known 
donor than some anonymous guy that, you know, who knows why they donated 
sperm? Like… probably for the most part it’s for good reasons. But, you know, 
it just felt more risky.  
Some AHR practitioners and others working in the field recognize the semen regulations’ 
discriminatory nature and collaborate with patients to find ways to circumvent the restrictions. In 
most instances, this meant practitioners or clinic staff suggested that people misrepresent 
identity(ies) and/or family configurations. Interviewees reported that they had been advised by 
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receptionists, students, and doctors to lie in order to access service. While nobody in the sample 
did present as a threesome and only one person (Dan) actually presented his donor as a “sexual 
partner,” participants’ contemplation of these strategies, as well as their decisions not to deploy 
them, can throw light on the potential costs of having to lie and collaborate in one’s own 
misrecognition in order to access a desired service.  
Inventive Pragmatism / Normative Resistance 
 
 Carla Pfeffer explores the strategies that couples composed of trans men and cisgender 
women deployed in negotiating institutional contexts (2012, pp. 574-602). She suggests that at 
times these couples can and do choose to manipulate existing social structures to their benefit, 
while at other times they might actively resist normative structures and assumptions. She uses 
the analytic constructs “normative resistance” and “inventive pragmatism” to explain such 
choices: 
Normative resistance: conscious and active strategies and actions for making life 
choices distinct from those considered most socially expected, celebrated, and 
sanctioned; 
Inventive pragmatism: active strategies and actions that might be considered 
clever manipulation of an existing social structure in order to access social and 
material resources on behalf of oneself or one’s family. (Pfeffer, 2012, 578)  
 
“Normative resistance” might include resisting traditional marriage, parenthood, and monogamy, 
and insisting on being visibly “queer.” “Inventive pragmatism,” in contrast, involves what one 
might call instrumental work-arounds, such as choosing to access marriage and legal parenthood 
when these can benefit oneself or one’s family. For Pfeffer inventive pragmatism is a process in 
which people make use of identified weaknesses and/or fissures in institutional power in order to 
derive social or economic benefits. One might argue that the decision to misrepresent one’s 
sexual orientation, gender identity, or family configuration in the fertility clinic is an example of 
142 
 
inventive pragmatism, the identification of a way through a barrier, a work-around that involves 
“manipulation of an existing social structure.” I wonder at what cost? What are the consequences 
of actively participating in one’s own misrecognition?  
To lie or not to lie, that is the question.  
 People’s emotional responses to being advised to lie by presenting their sperm donor as a 
sexual partner are complex and multilayered, and include surprise, relief, gratitude, worry, 
anxiety, fear, discomfort, and, often, anger.  
Jacqueline: The medical professional left the room—I can’t remember what they 
were doing. They left and there was only a student in the room with us and she 
said, “Well, if I were you I would just come back with your donor and pretend 
that you’re a couple and there’d be no issue and you’d get it done.”  
Tonya: I just looked at her as if she had two heads. 
Clare called all the reproductive clinics she could find on line and asked about using a known 
donor. All of them except one said “We just can’t do that or “We just don’t do that,” until 
someone from a clinic in a major Ontario city made a suggestion: 
Clare: [She said] “Oh yes. There’s a legal issue. We can’t do that but just come 
in and tell us he’s your sexual partner.” Whoever answered the phone told me 
that. She was super-kind and really nice. And was like, “Oh yes… well, I’ll tell 
you a secret,” kind of thing, you know? 
I wasn’t feeling like, “I can’t believe that you’re telling us to lie!” I was feeling 
like “Thank you, for, you know, telling me how this works.” 
 
Charlie and Joe received similar coaching on how they could circumvent the semen 
regulations, in their case from a doctor. 
Joe: Our meeting with the doctor was also very friendly and warm and I really 
got the sense that he was familiar with the Human Reproduction Act and how it 
is often unfair to queer couples. So he said things like, “if you have a known 
donor, we are willing to do cycle monitoring here, send you home with sample 
jars and syringes. We’ll give you a bag of those things. If that doesn’t work for 
you and you’re looking at inseminating here, you just need to tell me you’re 
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sexually active with the donor as well as with your spouse and we can do that 
here.” Like it really felt like he got it and was willing to work with us. 
Charlie: And [he] cheerfully suggested that threesomes (his language), were, you 
know, a common way for people with no sperm in their relationships to get 
pregnant. So even that conversation felt like, “We know what the law says; he 
knows what the law says; we’ll be able to dance around the law in terms of what 
we need, in terms of our language here and, let’s get going.” And to go home 
with a bag of sample jars and large size syringes also felt like OK, they really 
are going to help as far as they can help us without legally putting us or them at 
risk. 
Although most people express some form of gratitude or relief at being offered a potential 
way through the barrier of the semen regulations, they often also describe anger. Participants 
identify different sources of this anger. For instance, Tonya described feeling angry at the 
assumption that she would put her partner’s health at risk, in addition to anger at the institutional 
barriers they faced as a queer couple:  
Tonya: I was angry. First of all I was upset that we had to go through some 
different kind of process than a couple that’s in a consensual relationship. In this 
case it’s the same thing, you have a consensual relationship. If you think that 
I’m going to let my partner put sperm in her body that hasn’t been tested for 
STDs, you’re wrong. Like, no way. And he (the donor) wouldn’t either! You 
know. And those kinds of test are covered by OHIP, you can get them done and 
we did, for our own purposes, they were done.  
Clare also expressed anger at being put in a position where she was asked to lie about her queer 
identity after many years of being out:  
Clare: Angry that we had to lie again, you know? I spent a couple of years of my 
life lying already about who I was, and, you know, I hadn’t been there in over 
ten...twelve years...I don’t want to be lying anymore. Why do we have to lie? So 
I was angry about that. But also, you know, thankful for this woman and that 
there was an option. But…yeah, I was angry.  
Participants also articulated anxiety, worry, and ethical concerns about lying on an 
official medical record. They worry about the implications for the donor, as well as for 
themselves.  
Clare: I felt relieved, like, we finally figured this out. It took a long time. But I 
also felt like I’m not sure I can do that. I’m not sure I can walk in there. What 
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kind of implications does this have for him and his family...if he lies on a 
medical record and says he’s our sexual partner? …even though his partner 
knew, we didn’t feel comfortable with that scenario. But pleased to have found it 
out. 
 
 In general, LGBTQ people are concerned about what it means to misrepresent who the 
intended parents are on an official record. Again, this occurs in the context of historical 
vulnerability and present-day concerns about parental recognition for LGBTQ people.  
Jacqueline: We don’t want that anywhere on record that we’re coming in 
pretending that… you know what I mean? Like even legally we would never 
want that to be on record that he would be the parent or anything, so… 
The vulnerability of the non-biological parent is particularly salient when the donor’s name, and 
not hers/his, is put on the record. Tonya described the legal vulnerability she experiences as the 
non-biological parent and, ultimately, the fear that she could lose her child.  
Tonya: I’m not going to lie about my relationship to my child, you know what I 
mean? For me to be put on record as ever lying in order to do something for my 
benefit, it’s just not who I am. And…so if it came to a point where something 
fell through with my brother, for example, having an example of a point in time 
where I lie doesn’t work in my best interest and I’m not willing to lose my 
children over it, so that’s where that sits. I was worried legally, I didn’t want 
that.  
Dan described his “husband” (i.e., donor) being asked to sign forms giving him the right to 
decide, in the case of Dan’s death, what would happen to any existing embryos. Having his 
partner’s name on the medical record caused problems when it came time to inseminate: 
Dan: At one point it went badly...my chart had my real-life partner’s name on it, 
which was not the source of the sperm. And the sperm lab looked at the sticker 
and said “This is no good. You must need quarantined sperm. There’s been a 
mistake.” And so we were saying “No, there’s no mistake. We’re inseminating 
today, I’m ovulating today. This is our first time. We’re doing it today.” And 
they said, “No, no, no there’s a problem. We can’t proceed.” So that was bad. 
My partner took care of it and I thought, “Oh, it’s just a misunderstanding, it’ll 
be fine.” I don’t think I really realized that they could’ve just said “No. This is 
against the rules, this is not the procedure. I’m not endangering my own lab-tech 
license or whatever is on the line, I’m not going to do it.”  
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As a result of this near miss, Dan and his partner removed the partner’s name from the medical 
record with the result that his partner’s name is completely absent as an intended parent:  
Dan: I think we peeled the sticker off because it was just too complicated. It was 
sad, because it was nice to have his name there. Because it felt good...because he 
is my partner and this is our child that we’re trying to make together.  
Dan experienced the exclusion of his partner through his erasure on the medical record.  
Clare, the non-genetic, intended parent with her partner Lucy, described an additional, and 
significant, implication of presenting their donor as Lucy’s sexual partner. Clare would be left 
out of the conception process itself.  
Clare: My role, as the other mom, would be not to go. I couldn’t... I wouldn’t 
show up. I remember talking to you [Lucy] about how I would feel about 
that…in the end, you know, sure I’d like to be there. But maybe in the end, you 
would just do it. I remember feeling kind of angry. But relieved. But confused. I 
don’t…I don’t know…And feeling excluded. I remember— actually I did, 
remember I did feel excluded? 
Lucy: You did at the beginning. Now you don’t because there’s just so many 
dirty diapers...there’s more than enough of everything to go around.  
Clare: I did feel excluded. That’s right...I’d forgot. I did feel excluded from it. 
And that was a concern that I had at the time...was feeling part of it…the whole 
thing — part of creating a family and...you know. Yeah. I didn’t have any legal 
worries. Like, that wasn’t it. It was more on an emotional level…not wanting to 
feel excluded.  
Dan is the only person we interviewed who actually misrepresented his donor as a sexual 
partner in the clinic. He talked about how it feels to participate in a process in which he was so 
dramatically misrecognized. Although he identifies as a trans man and is partnered with another 
trans man, in the clinic he presented as a heterosexual woman with a cisgender male sexual 
partner who is providing sperm. However, while the clinic assumed he is a woman, at times they 
also assumed he is a lesbian, and that he was using an anonymous sperm donor. So a gay trans 
man, pretending to be a cisgender heterosexual woman, was misread as a lesbian. His gender 
identity, sexual orientation, and route to parenthood were distorted and misconstrued, and his 
partner was left out of the process.  
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Dan: And the doctor would be saying “Oh, well, father’s sample at this time. 
Don’t worry, we’ll take care of the timing.” And I’d say “No, I’m talking about 
a person. It’s not a…a sample.” And then I’d get all uptight. How do I talk 
about, like… “I mean my husband, I mean my boyfriend.” I didn’t know what to 
say but there were a couple of times that I burst out laughing because it was 
clear that he was assuming that I was a lesbian and I was thawing out a sperm 
sample. And I didn’t know how to say without myself getting in trouble, “No, 
he’s...a...a live person coming to the clinic and ejaculating in a cup.” So there 
were moments where I panicked that I’ve said the wrong thing, but for the most 
part I forgot…I blocked it out.  
 
Another consequence of Dan’s “deception” in the clinic was that he hesitated to complain about 
unsatisfactory treatment he got from the doctor because he was grateful that he was being 
allowed to use the donor of his choice:  
We [the doctor and he] were not a good fit. And I’m stubborn and I didn’t want 
to make changes. Partly because I was so grateful that she was letting me use my 
known donor and pretending he was my partner…I put up with it for a long 
time.  
Finally, although he describes often “blocking out” the fact that he was lying, Dan articulated his 
underlying fears and anxieties about the potential consequences of lying:  
Dan: The doctor did explain that this person would be my partner in the clinic. 
That on my records he’s my partner. On my chart, he’s my partner. When I 
speak of him to the other staff I refer to him as my partner. I think at the moment 
she said it, it all seemed kind of heavy and serious and I worried “What if I slip 
up?” but I definitely completely forgot for most of the time I was at the clinic 
because I used inappropriate language and I was reminded a few times “Who’s 
the partner and who’s the supportive friend?” And then I thought “Are the police 
going to come? Is the Ministry of Labour going to investigate me, the Ministry 
of Health going to investigate me? How serious is it if I say the wrong thing?”  
 
Lying as Violation 
 
If ethicality, as Thompson suggests, can be evaluated by ruptures or violations to personhood, 
these narratives are rife with such violations (Thompson, 2005, pp. 179-204. Consider being put 
in a position of having to actively collaborate in the misrepresentation and misrecognition of 
one’s sexual orientation, gender identity, and/or family configuration; being potentially 
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perceived as an irresponsible or “bad partner” by putting one’s partner’s health at risk; being 
forced to (re)hide an aspect of one’s identity that has been historically challenging to disclose; 
having one’s partner administratively erased from an official medical record and having instead 
an inaccurate record that potentially gives significant decision-making power to someone who 
should not have it. What is it like to have one’s partner or co-parent left out of the process of 
conceiving a child that you intend to parent together? To be reluctant to advocate for good health 
care because one is feeling grateful for having access at all? To experience underlying fears and 
anxiety about the implications of all of these situations, including, whether based in reality or 
not, the fear that one’s child will be taken away. All of these practices constitute violations or 
ruptures to personhood.  
The participants included here were offered two options: the option of presenting one’s sperm 
donor as a sexual partner, and the option of presenting themselves and the sperm donor as a 
threesome. While both strategies fit Pfeffer’s definition of inventive pragmatism, that is, 
“making use of identified weaknesses and/or fissures in institutional power in order to derive 
social and material resources on behalf of oneself or one’s family,” presenting a donor as a 
sexual partner and representing oneself as heterosexual deploys conventional social structures 
and assumptions, while presenting as a threesome that includes the donor overlaps with what 
Pfeffer calls “normative resistance.” In other words, the “threesome” option can be a choice to 
present as a family configuration “distinct from those considered most socially accepted, 
celebrated and sanctioned” (Pfeffer, 2012, p. 578). This hybrid strategy does not necessitate the 
denial of sexual or gender identities, nor does it exclude an intended parent from the conception 
process (as the “sexual partner” scenario often does). But, unless it actually reflects reality, 
presenting as a threesome still involves a deception or a misrepresentation.  
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In both scenarios of misrepresentation, LGBTQ people might find themselves on “shaky legal 
ground” with potentially “frightening and destabilizing consequences” (Pfeffer, 2012, p. 594) 
should anyone be externally challenged after having pragmatically made use of institutional 
conventions —when, for example, donors are put on medical records as intended parents. Dan 
described how “it went badly” when his real-life partner’s name was on the file; Clare and Tonya 
described their fears of the implications of lying on an official record, including their fears of 
somehow losing their children. Central to these fears is the fact that only certain kinship relations 
are legally, socially, and institutionally recognized and supported. 
 
The Relationship That Has No Name 
The decision to conceive by way of a known sperm donor is complex. For some LGBTQ 
people, the decision is purely economical, in that the costs of accessing AHR services and donor 
sperm are prohibitive. Others grapple with the relational and emotional implications of using an 
anonymous donor: 
Dan: I definitely wanted somebody who could answer questions when my kid 
said “Why do I look like this? How did I come to be? Why was he donating his 
sperm?” I very much wanted to say, “There he is, go ask him! Here’s his phone 
number, here’s his e-mail address, go ask him.” I don’t want to speak for him.  
Some struggle with the “eugenics” involved in donor selection, with the ways that donors are 
characterized in sperm catalogues and the complexities of deciding what one is really looking for 
in a donor and how this can be “measured”:  
Lucy: And it was a really weird sense of being, like, “Oh now we have to 
choose, like, from a group of men who have chosen to donate sperm...which is 
great...but it’s like…I just felt, what a bizarre way to make a choice…actually I 
don’t know what it’s like. I’m assuming it’s a catalogue like you see on TV. 
 
• • • 
Charlie: And I would say for me the eugenics side of it felt kind of gross, and 
it’s not that you don’t pick a partner for qualities you like—you certainly do 
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pick a partner for qualities you like —but you don’t have the same sort of totally 
theoretical, totally abstract, no real human being in the room sort of weighing of 
what are my absolute priorities about a person? How do I quantify that and 
compare them? As we talked about it, we eventually came down to, we would 
like a donor that is smart and kind and that those felt like the values we really 
wanted. And “kind” isn’t represented in those catalogues. 
Those who have been historically mistreated by institutionalized medicine might steer away 
from extensive medical involvement in the conception process. Additionally many recognize the 
fertility advantages of “fresh sperm” and a DIY approach.  
Joe: We sort of thought, let’s see if we can go with the formula that we know 
has a high likelihood of success. Fresh sperm, you know really fresh, like thanks 
for the cup, see you in ten minutes. And I think also as trans people who have 
been in a lot of ways kind of at the mercy of the medical system, staying away 
from it to whatever degree possible felt like a good idea.  
 While the use of an anonymous donor assumes and guarantees no involvement of the 
donor in the child’s life or the parenting process, the use of a known donor can involve an 
enormous range of involvement, from absolutely none to full integration as a caregiver or parent. 
The negotiated, flexible, and sometimes ambiguous relations that a known sperm donor might 
have, both with a child and with the child’s parents or primary caregivers, make this a kinship 
configuration that lies outside of convention and, most often, outside of language. Susan 
Goldberg describes struggling with what to call a sperm donor and how to render a family of 
more than two people as parental (or something else) units, intelligible to others: “Is Rob a 
father? A dad? An uncle? A parent? A very good friend? Something in between all of these? Is it 
that we don’t know, or that language fails us when it comes to the words to describe our 
relationship?” (Goldberg, 2010, p. 29). Sometimes donors are “dads,” sometimes they are not, 
and sometimes they are something in between: “Chip was more than a sperm donor, but less than 
a daddy” (Goldberg, 2010, p. 21).  
Robert Leckey attempts to summarize what this looks like in practice:  
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Donors may be known or involved without being considered to be “fathers” or 
co-parents with the mothers. Some lesbians prefer that their child’s donor be 
seen not as a “father” or a “parent” but, rather, as an “uncle” who will not take 
part in decision making…Conversely, referring to the donor as a “father” need 
not imply involvement. (Leckey, 2011b, p. 596).  
 
Fiona Kelly divides donors into three categories:  
 
 A “flexibly defined male figure” with whom their children have a relationship 
but to whom no parental status is imputed 
 Donors as symbolic “fathers” with almost no relationship with their progeny 
 Donor as an active, practicing parent with all the rights and responsibilities 
implied by that status, though without legal custody. (Kelly, 2011, p. 102) 
What becomes clear in this discussion is that, within North American kinship discourse, the 
known sperm donor is a largely unintelligible category. How does one conceive of a person who 
is in some cases a father, in some cases not a father, sometimes sort of a father, sometimes like 
an uncle, and sometimes a complete stranger? Perhaps the known sperm donor is a hybrid 
kinship category that exists as what Butler (2004) might call “the not-yet-subject and the nearly 
recognizable.”  
Indeed, there are middle regions, hybrid regions of legitimacy and illegitimacy 
that have no clear names, and where nomination itself falls into a crisis produced 
by the variable, sometimes violent boundaries of legitimating practices that 
come into uneasy and sometimes conflictual contact with one another. These are 
not precisely places where one can choose to hang out, subject positions one 
might opt to occupy. These are nonplaces in which one finds oneself in spite of 
oneself; indeed, these are nonplaces where recognition, including self-
recognition, proves precarious if not elusive, in spite of one’s best efforts to be a 
subject in some recognizable sense… the claim of the not-yet-subject and the 
nearly recognizable. (Butler, 2004, p. 108) 
 
When we asked the COF participants who had involved a known sperm donor in their 
procreative planning what kind of changes they would like to see in the AHR system, a primary 
concern was the desire to have their ties with their known donor recognized as a relationship. 
People framed their discontent within a framework of discrimination, equity, rights, and/or 
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choice. Many perceive the root of the problem lying in the lack of recognition of the known 
donor and the consensual relationship that is involved: 
Tonya: In the case of known donors they need to acknowledge that…having a 
known donor is a relationship. They need to understand that the people who are 
establishing that relationship are in a consensual relationship and that they are 
taking the risks that are inherent in having a relationship because of that consent. 
 
• • • 
Dan: Straight people choose their partners and have kids and queer people 
should be able to choose their partners…donors...source of donor-
egg…whatever…and accept the risk of what they’re doing.  
 
• • • 
 
Clare: I feel like I have a right to decide who is going to be the father of my 
child. And it seems completely absurd to me that you’re denying me that right. 
And I do understand that it’s for a good reason. But I think there needs to be a 
loophole here. And I always kept thinking to myself “Why can’t we just sign a 
waiver? ...you know...we did an STI check. Why can’t we show you that paper 
with the date that was yesterday and sign a waiver so that you’re no longer 
liable? And it’s our choice. Is this not our choice? Like, this should be our 
choice, you know? … Everyone else seems to have this right. It just seems crazy 
to me…we should be able to sign something. So…that’s what I would say to the 
minister: Create a form. Find some lawyers. Figure this out. 
 
Recognizing LGBTQ People in AHR Services: A Two-Step Process  
In Chapter 3 I suggested that LGBTQ people might benefit from “more” objectification in the 
fertility clinic. I pointed out how Thompson’s idea of “agency through objectification” — an 
objectification than can enhance subjectivity when it remains attached to the goals of the long-
term self — often fails when LGBTQ bodies and kinship configurations are involved because 
practitioners are unable to separate these strange or unfamiliar bodies, identities, and kinship 
structures from the body parts and gametes involved. Nina says it would have been good if she 
could have been treated “just like a uterus,” instead of as a uterus with a particular kind of 
woman attached to it. I suggested that a first step in this process is a dismantling of the 
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assumptions of the heterosexual matrix, the assumptions that gendered body parts (ovaries, 
uterus, testicles, penis) that produce gendered gametes (sperm, eggs) are tied to sexed bodies 
(male/female) with binary gender identities (man/woman), normative gender expression 
(femininity/masculinity), normative sexual orientation (heterosexual), and normative sexual 
practice (heterosexual intercourse — which is called “sex”). Reproductive technologies, by 
separating conjugal sex from reproduction, and by differentiating genetic, biological, and social 
parenthood, create the conditions for dismantling these assumptions. Through the technologies it 
becomes possible to disentangle the heteronormative assumptions detailed here, a disentangling 
that potentially serves LGBTQ users of AHR services.  
However, the narratives from COF participants in this chapter suggest that the dismantling of 
these assumptions does not adequately or fully address the concerns of LGBTQ people. Once the 
assumptive links of the heterosexual matrix have been disentangled or separated, a second step 
involves putting things back together in a way that recognizes LGBTQ kinship relations.  
People need space to define their identities and to create narratives of their reproductive long-
term selves, separate from the heteronormative assumptions currently embedded in clinic 
practice. As the examples illustrate, heteronormative clinic practices administratively erase 
parenthood for a lesbian intended parent doing IVF with her partner (when the identical 
heterosexual parent is recognized), and refuse to recognize known sperm donors as relations of 
kinship. Clinic and sperm bank practices currently serve to separate the sperm donor from his 
gametes, a separation that assists the negotiation of the intimacies of sperm donation (Nordqvist, 
2011, pp. 1661-68). The need for this separation, however, is mediated by the heteronormative 
assumption that sperm = father. Sperm donation requires then, that this relation be severed and 
that the donor and their sperm be viewed as more “object” than person. However, the people 
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quoted in this chapter, all of whom chose known sperm donors, want recognition of the 
relationship with their donor, in most cases not as father, but as something else.  
In a broader sense, the LGBTB participants in this study are asking for the space to define 
their own families and kinship relations, in all their complexities and hybrid forms, and outside 
of a model that assumes “mom and dad.” The dismantling and reconstituting of the heterosexual 
matrix’s pieces might be conceptualized as taking apart and putting back together the pieces of a 
puzzle. However, the puzzle can be reassembled in a multitude of ways. LGBTQ people (and 
others) who are making use of AHR services to have children, require legal, social, and linguistic 
space to allow them to assemble their particular puzzles in the pattern and involving the body 
parts, gametes, identities, and kinship relations they choose.
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 Chapter 5. Towards a Queer Ethics of Care 
I think I would say to them [AHR services] that they need to get their shit 
together around understanding the diversity of people that walk through their 
doors…It’s their responsibility and so they really need to listen and hear it and 
make changes…It’s as if they’re not comfortable with it and I don’t understand 
that. (Rebecca, COF participant) 
The previous two chapters explored the blockages that LGBTQ people encounter in their 
interactions with fertility clinics and how LGBTQ identities and kinship structures are often 
misrecognized and, in many cases, unintelligible in the clinic context. The assumptions of the 
heterosexual matrix, in alliance with the culture of the fertility clinic, can result in violations or 
ruptures to the personhood of queer and trans people as they attempt to make their way through 
the clinic. Furthermore, the strategies that people adopt to enhance their flow through the clinic 
at times contribute to their own violation. I suggested that LGBTQ people might benefit, 
counterintuitively, from more objectification — from the separation of identities from body parts 
and gametes, followed by a second step that allows people to assemble their kinship and family 
narratives as they choose.  
This final chapter explores the possibility of a more ethical relation between fertility clinics 
and LGBTQ people, some institutional barriers to such a relation, and pedagogical questions 
related to educating medical practitioners to bring reflexivity, and change, to their professional 
practice. I explore both clinic practices and pedagogical work designed to improve clinic 
practices, interrogating, in each case, the usefulness of approaches based on “sameness” or 
empathy in creating conditions for openings to “alterity.” I conclude by raising some 
pedagogical questions related to diversity work in professional settings.  
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Ethics and the Other  
Thompson suggests that medical procedures, technologies, and practices might be ethically 
evaluated based on whether patients experience them as strategies in service of the long-term self 
and thus as agency enhancing, or whether they are in some way rupturing of personhood or 
subjectivity, and therefore depriving of agency (Thompson, 2005, p. 201). Todd (2003), drawing 
on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, argues that ethicality in relation to the Other lies in 
recognizing the radical alterity of the Other. The lack of this recognition, which often manifests 
in a desire to make the Other into something familiar and “just like” the Self, is necessarily 
violating of personhood, and therefore, fundamentally, not rooted in ethics. An ethical relation to 
the Other, according to this line of thought, is grounded in a refusal to reduce the Other to the 
Self.  
I find it helpful to view the clinic’s confrontation with the Other, by way of LGBTQ bodies, 
identities, and kinship structures, as an example of Self meeting Other, a meeting which can be 
disruptive and destablilizing to self-identity. As Todd puts it,  
The Other is that which disrupts its coherency, the subject tumbles into 
uncertainty, its past strategies for living challenged by the very strangeness of 
difference itself…one risks altering the very parameters of self-perception and 
one’s place in the world, and risks losing, therefore, one’s bearings and 
conventions (2003, p. 11).  
Taylor (2009) concurs that a confrontation with the Other can be profoundly destabilizing. In a 
piece about religious homophobia in the classroom, she suggests that when students who are 
strongly identified as religious followers are challenged in their homophobia, they can 
experience this as a crisis of identity, the challenge to their homophobia conflicting with deeply 
held discursive investments. She argues that, for those with deeply held homophobic views, the 
challenge to these views can amount to an internal cultural conflict that calls into question “key 
discoursal structures of identity — what one needs to believe and who one needs to be.” While 
156 
 
the “gut-level disgust” people may experience is, in fact, a product of “powerful socially 
constructed discourses such as medicine, law, capitalism, and religion” (p. 227), it can be also 
experienced as a deep internal conflict with the Self. While Taylor uses a primarily sociological 
framework, Todd draws on a psychoanalytic one, framing the encounter with what is outside the 
subject as a kind of trauma that threatens the stability of the ego (Todd, 2003, p. 10). In both 
cases, the encounter with the Other can destabilize deeply held discursive and affective 
investments. The Other creates discomfort and dis-ease and, Todd suggests, we respond to the 
riskiness of the encounter with “dynamics of affect mobilized in order to…define against, 
identify with, or disavow the Other” (2003, p. 11).  
One of the Self’s strategies, when threatened by an encounter with the Other, is to incorporate 
the Other into itself, to make the Other “just like” the Self, “just like” what is familiar and 
known. This desire to make the Other into something familiar characterizes much of what might 
be called the assimilationist focus of recent struggles by LGBTQ people for equal rights and 
recognition, a focus that assumes a “just like you” framework and sees liberation in the 
establishment of rights for LGBTQ people equivalent to those enjoyed by cissexual, heterosexual 
people. A similar framework has characterized queer parenting struggles for recognition, with 
much queer parenting discourse focused on how the children turn out “the same as” children 
growing up in heterosexual families (Epstein, 2009, p. 15). Queer parents, in this discourse, are 
represented as “the same as” other white, middle-class, heterosexual couples who, of course, 
desire babies. Take, for example, the language from a 2003 Globe and Mail weekend edition, 
which featured a front-page photograph of a gay man holding a new-born baby, accompanied by 
a two-page spread on gay men becoming fathers. The article describes and quotes some of the 
men who are considering parenthood:  
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None fits the stereotype of the flamboyant drag queen or promiscuous, muscle-
bound, bar-hopping gadabout… the pair are the image of domestic bliss, as 
traditional as a couple can be… they met, fell in love, proposed marriage on 
bended knee, wear wedding bands on their fingers, bought a house on a leafy 
street in west-end Toronto and now want to settle down and start a family. “I 
can’t tell you how normal we are. Not all gay people are on Church Street 
wearing leather in the parade. We’re in bed at 10:15 after watching the news, 
and we go right to sleep. We do everything that other couples do. So why 
wouldn’t we want to have a child? (Philp, 2003, pp. F4-F5) 
 
As I have noted elsewhere (Epstein, 2005), while anyone who is a parent understands the 
exhaustion that comes with parenting and the need to go to bed early, this quote is disturbing for 
a number of reasons: it disavows certain segments of queer communities (the drag queens, 
promiscuous, and gadabouts), it desexualizes the men involved (they go right to sleep), and it 
brings gay parents into a discourse that is profoundly normalizing (the proposal, wedding bands, 
house on a leafy street, all in the name of domestic bliss). This discourse recognizes gay families 
that resemble the fantasy of the heterosexual nuclear family (a nonexistent norm that continues 
to plague gay and straight alike) and delegitimizes those who look otherwise (one-, three- or 
four-parent families, families with involved donors, parents who don’t own houses or who don’t 
live together, people who co-parent outside of sexual relationships, trans parents, polyamorous 
parents, even parents who have sex before going to sleep).  
Of course neither the development nor the critique of these normalizing discourses is simple. 
In the case of queer parenting, for example, arguments that queer parents are “the same as” 
straight parents were necessitated by the court cases of the 1970s and ’80s in which lesbians and 
gay men stood to lose custody of their children. It is questionable whether arguing for a plurality 
of family forms and sexual and gender identities at this time would have served anyone well 
(except perhaps the homophobic spouses fighting for custody). Although in Canada the struggle 
for same-sex marriage had virtually no impact on parenting rights (the two are separate in 
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Canadian law), in the United States marriage rights and parenting rights are often intertwined 
and there can be clear economic benefits to being married.  
However, it is instructive to recognize the limits of “just like you” arguments. In the political 
and social arena, the strategy of achieving equality for LGBTQ people through assimilation and 
sameness can lead to a narrowing, instead of a broadening, of possible sexual and gender 
identities and behaviours — a restriction of what is intelligible and recognizable. In the arena of 
ethics, the insistence on the search for “common ground” and recognition of the Other through 
familiar and self-referential models, some would argue, is a violation of the Other’s personhood. 
By assuming comprehension of the Other by reducing them to what is like ourselves, we 
potentially limit our ability to allow, and be open to, their alterity. Such are the potential risks of 
an exclusive focus on empathy, a concept central to most pedagogical efforts to improve 
communication, including service-provider training, and often a key element in social justice 
education. 
A Discomfiting Other in the Clinic 
Gender dynamics in clinics are framed by the deeply constraining historicity of heterosexual 
hegemony. LGBTQ people, when they enter AHR spaces, are a discomfiting Other. The COF 
interviewees provide multiple examples of the heterosexual hegemony prevalent in clinic culture 
and of how LGBTQ people are offered inappropriate treatment because their bodies and kinship 
relations do not fit the cisgender heterosexual infertility framework of the clinics.  
Sam and Rob, two trans men planning a baby together, are told to “have sex today, have sex 
tomorrow, have sex the day after, and then come back to see us.” Rob is subjected to blood tests, 
even though he will have no biological or genetic connection to the child they are conceiving. 
Sam is consistently called by the wrong name and assumed to be a cisgender woman. Stacey and 
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Nina, a trans woman and her cisgender female partner, are interpellated into the clinic as “a 
straight couple with male factor infertility,” and Stacey feels that her transsexuality gets in the 
way of her being perceived as a lesbian, and that she is not recognized as a mother. Nina is 
subjected to multiple fertility tests, many of which she finds invasive and unnecessary. Stacey is 
congratulated on “the boys,” while Nina is a “good girl” when she ovulates. Andrea, a trans 
woman, is handed a form that asks if she is “married, single, or gay” and given pornography that 
does not match her sexual interests. Karleen, a butch dyke trying to get pregnant, feels like a 
gender outsider in the clinic, and she and her partner Hilary are asked about ejaculation and 
intercourse. It is assumed that if you have a uterus, you want to use it, that is, women who have 
no desire to get or be pregnant are assumed to be open to this possibility if, for example, it 
proves not possible for their female partners. Women planning babies without the involvement 
of men are asked about “male role models,” known donors are unrecognized as significant, but 
usually non-parental, kinship relations, and anxiety circulates around questions of paternity and 
the need for a father.  
In response to the destabilizing and unsettling confrontation with the strangeness of the Other, 
clinic practices work to incorporate LGBTQ people into an existing framework, into that which 
is familiar. Joe and Charlie, two trans men introduced in chapter 4, describe what they call the 
“normalization theatre” they unintentionally perform in the clinic and with the birth registration 
office:  
Charlie: And it’s interesting, I feel like the phlebotomist’s response to us was 
that we always showed up together, we were always clearly sweet on each other 
and tender with each other and she really likes couples who really want to be 
parents and who like each other become parents.  
And interestingly, she [birth registration administrator] called as Baby and I 
were heading out in the car for whatever reason and we said “Hang on a sec,” 
and she sort of had to listen to us get the baby ready and sort of work through 
things and really sound like a normal, normal family with a new baby doing 
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things that families with new babies do, like “Do you have the diaper bag and 
new hat?” and you know “Can you carry the bucket out to the car?” because I 
had a C section? and like all of that stuff, so by the time we got to telling her the 
story she’d already had this, “Oh you really are a family, doing family things, 
with a baby that I can hear in the background.” And we hadn’t intended that as 
sort of normalization theatre.  
While they are grateful for the treatment they receive in both these instances, they understand the 
good will being sent their way as predicated on their presentation as a normative, happy couple 
who are sweet on each other and want to spread the love by becoming parents, and then as a 
typical and normal couple with a newborn, in both cases something familiar and recognizable to 
those in charge. In other words, an empathic response.  
While I would not argue (and probably neither would they) that this is a negative outcome for 
these two guys, particularly given the extent and depth of transphobia typically encountered in 
health care and government offices, it is disquieting to think that the prerequisite for LGBTQ 
people to be treated well in these settings is a performance of cis and heteronormativity. Joe and 
Charlie describe such interactions as “normalization theatre,” implying that their recognition and 
good treatment in the clinic and at the birth registration office depends on their performance as a 
normal, happy couple and typical new parents, “just like” the familiar heterosexual couples that 
are the configured users of AHR services. Of course not all heterosexual couples are happy, nor 
is new parenthood always sweet, and it could be argued that heterosexual couples also perform 
in the AHR setting, however there is a particular quality to the violation of being recognized only 
through a lens of similarity to a dominant norm, and of having one’s identities and experiences 
that are hugely different from the norm made invisible or ignored. While something works for 
Joe and Charlie in this scenario, what is missing is the recognition of their alterity, which Todd 
would argue is the basis of ethicality.  
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The Limits of Empathy  
Todd’s book called Learning from the Other explores the ethical possibilities in relation to 
learning from others (2003, p. 3). Central to her discussion is the concept of empathy. Typically 
described as the act of “putting oneself in the shoes of the Other,” empathy involves the search 
for common ground, a bringing of the Other into the self, a recognizing of the Other through 
one’s own experience. Empathy is built on the idea that knowledge about the Other is central to 
changing one’s relation to them; social relations can be transformed by acting on the knowledge 
and understanding one acquires of the Other. If we know more about the Other and come to 
understand them better, we will treat them more humanely. Todd argues that while of course we 
do empathize with each other, and empathy can “connect us in profound ways” (Todd, 2003, p. 
51), empathy can also constitute an act of violence, a refusal of the Other’s radical alterity, or 
strangeness, the recognition of which, according to Levinas, is the basis of true ethicality.  
Todd draws on Zygmunt Bauman’s analysis of “forms of togetherness,” and, in particular, she 
differentiates between “being with” and “being for” the Other. She suggests that encounters that 
might be characterized as “being with,” such as the ordinary interactions of students and teachers 
in a classroom, are 
constrained by the parameters of time and place, whereby people may have 
interesting interactions but are not transformed in any way by them. As a 
consequence, aspects of the self are negated in ways that are normative and 
safe… The risk of “losing one’s self,” so to speak, through interactions and 
conversation is simply not possible in the modality of being-with. Moreover, 
concern for the other fails to develop fully (Todd, 2003, p. 47).  
Being with is normative and safe and does not involve the threat to self potentially brought on by 
an encounter with the otherness or “strangeness” of the Other. Being for, on the other hand, 
demands an attentiveness to alterity, to the Other’s “uniqueness” in a gesture of responsibility (p. 
48). Being for involves a passive openness to the Other, an openness accompanied by 
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vulnerability, susceptibility, and a move away from self-interest to a place of responsibility for 
the Other. These moments cannot be planned or predicted; rather they are spontaneous and 
surprising, “a togetherness born out of the immediacy of interaction, a communicative gesture 
that does not have as its end anything except its own communicativeness” (2003, p. 48). Being-
for is a relation to the Other that involves a commitment, but a commitment that cannot be 
planned or called for, but that arises in interaction.  
The call for empathy can be seen as a call for this form of togetherness, a call to break 
through the conventions of daily life and interactions, to involve people in “transformative 
emotional experiences, ones that involve their ‘whole’ selves, their entire being” (p. 47), and that 
lead to greater commitment, concern, and moral responsiveness to people one does not know. 
However, given the unconventionality and unpredictability of empathic feelings, Todd concludes 
that the “call for empathy,” is actually an impossibility; empathic feelings cannot be “called for,” 
or demanded because they are “within no one’s sphere of control” (p. 49). Empathy is 
spontaneous, unpredictable, and surprising; it cannot be planned for or demanded in a 
pedagogical setting or elsewhere.  
But what about empathic feelings that are not demanded but that arise spontaneously in 
interactions with others, or in response to depictions or information about the experiences of 
others? Todd concludes that, although of course empathy plays a role in our emotional lives and 
that, “of course we do empathize…in ways that are already implicated in profoundly ethical 
relations where the alterity of the Other is at stake” (2003, p. 63), empathy is not, fundamentally, 
the best starting point for moral concern. Whether one is bringing the Other into the self through 
identification, or putting the Self into the Other through projection, both involve the search for 
common ground, the making of the Other into the self. Empathy is often linked to “learning 
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about” the Other, the assumption being that the more we know about the Other, the more we will 
understand them and the better we will treat them. It becomes a form of applied morality, our 
moral actions perceived as rooted in knowledge about the Other and a set of ethical principles. 
Todd differentiates “learning about” from “learning from,” the latter implying the kind of 
interaction I described —an interaction that is about a receptive openness to the Other, a respect 
for the alterity of the Other, and a commitment to maintaining this alterity. One does not assume 
one can “know” the Other, but one feels responsible for them outside of knowledge. One 
recognizes the radical alterity of the Other, refusing to reduce them to a common ground with the 
self. 
It is this tendency to reduce the Other to the Self that is at the root of LGBTQ difficulties with 
AHR services. Clinic culture is rooted in “fixing” heterosexual infertility and in repairing 
damaged heterosexual gender. LGBTQ people are brought into, and understood through, this 
already existing framework of cisgender and heterosexual infertility. While this results in access 
and better treatment for some, the end result of the attempt to make LGBTQ people “just like” 
the configured users of AHR services is what I described in chapters 3 and 4 — deep 
misrecognition and violations of personhood. People are refused the opportunity to represent 
their own sex, gender, and kinship identities and narratives.  
Establishing a conceptual framework and clinical practices that do justice to the array of 
bodies and family configurations that turn to fertility clinics for assistance involves a significant 
paradigm shift for clinic staff. In particular, it involves a shift from attempting to incorporate 
LGBTQ people into clinic protocols in a way that renders them recognizable, that is, like 
something we already know, as “just like” other AHR patients, to a stance of “not-knowing,” a 
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stance that recognizes the alterity and unknowability of the Other and that leaves their 
strangeness intact, allowing them to define their reproductive projects on their own terms.  
Adopting such an approach involves understanding what’s at stake in the fertility industry 
when it encounters LGBTQ bodies and identities. An ethics of care that appropriately meets the 
needs of LGBTQ fertility clinic clients requires a cultural shift that the fertility industry may or 
may not be prepared, willing, or able to accomplish. What is at stake for fertility clinics when 
they’re asked to open their doors, hearts, and minds to LGBTQ bodies, bodily fluids, and kinship 
configurations? What aspects of clinic identity are threatened by this request and how possible 
might it be, given the context of fertility medicine’s culture, to expect a significant shift in stance 
and, ultimately, in practice?  
Doctor Knows Best 
In the context of AHR services, doctors hold a particular kind of authority and power. As 
anyone who has been through the fertility clinic process can attest, the assumption that “doctor 
knows best” is central to the clinic’s culture and it is reinforced by the vulnerability of people 
dealing with infertility and their desires to have professional knowledge and expertise “fix” the 
problem. And of course fertility medicine is an example of what Foucault would call bio-power, 
involving institutional regulation of the norms governing bodies. Within institutionalized 
medicine, the doctor is god-like, wielding authority, knowledge, and power. In fertility medicine, 
the doctor holds the key to the knowledge, instruments, and procedures that can lead to 
pregnancy and/or parenthood; negotiating the clinic environment includes negotiating one’s 
relationship to the doctor. As Thompson describes, part of being the “good patient” is managing 
one’s relationship with the doctor. Civility is critical to appropriate patient comportment; 
inappropriate behaviour includes arguing with the doctor or with one’s partner (Thompson, 
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2005, p. 91). Thompson describes how female patients flirt with the doctor, male patients bond 
with the doctor, and everybody works hard to not make the doctor mad. You might recall Sam 
expressing fear about the doctor yelling at him after having overheard him yell at another couple 
in the next room.  
In fertility medicine the doctors know best, even when they don’t, as we heard earlier from 
Stacey whose doctor gave her medical advice based on inaccurate information about the meds 
she was taking. Nina sums up her experience of a medical environment in which it is assumed 
the doctor know what is best for her:  
Nina: It made me really uncomfortable because it’s like this medical space and 
there’s doctors with their lab coats and their clip boards, and this gendered 
ideological framework of this is how people are supposed to proceed through it, 
right? This is best for you.  
Rebecca 
 Rebecca is a COF participant I have not yet introduced. She is a single, bi-racial queer-
identified woman, trying to get pregnant at home with a known donor. Her community 
connections suggest that she see a particular fertility doctor, who despite his “terrible bedside 
manner, can get you pregnant.” Following a negative experience with him, Rebecca goes to 
another clinic where, instead of feeling shamed and disempowered, she feels angry. Although the 
doctor is more open and welcoming, Rebecca expresses frustrations with the class elitism of the 
clinic environment, the unexplained and constantly spiralling fee structures, the lack of 
information she is offered regarding the drugs she ends up taking, and her struggles with the 
clinic regarding HIV testing of her donor with whom she is inseminating at home, separate from 
the clinic. After getting pregnant at home and then miscarrying, she eventually conceives at 
home for a second time, without the use of drugs or medical intervention.  
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Rebecca describes her first visit with a fertility doctor, offering a startling and quintessential 
example of the doctor-knows-best attitude: 
I walked in and I wasn’t really wearing the right outfit to be in a mansion, and I 
remember sitting there on the leather couch, feeling like heat on my face...and 
then I saw the doctor, and he was just so…like I’m sitting in front of this really 
arrogant male, you know. He basically sat down and said, “I’m gonna tell you 
everything about yourself.” Like he barely looked at my forms. He glanced at 
them from the waiting room to his office, and he literally sat there and said, “I 
can tell you what’s wrong with you,” because he looked at my size and he 
assumed I had polycystic ovary syndrome (PCOS). So basically he said, “I know 
what I need to know about you—I’m going to do some tests to confirm it.” And 
I was sitting there and I felt so disempowered and then he started saying, 
“Because the thing is, once we confirm this, there’s a drug I can give you, and 
then you’ll lose like sixty pounds, and then it will be easier to get pregnant.” 
And all of a sudden I’m thinking, oh my god, I just want to be monitored. 
When I went back for the second appointment, he said, “Well, the bad news is 
you don’t have PCOS.” I was like, “How is that bad news?” He said, “Well, 
because the treatment’s not going to work”… So he actually came into that 
appointment with a furrowed brow, like in all seriousness to tell me that it was 
terrible that I didn’t have this syndrome that he could treat so I could get 
pregnant. And I realized in that moment that I wasn’t like a person, I was just 
like a set of complex possible things, right? And I was really mad. Because I felt 
like he really didn’t treat me like a human. And I was like, “No, that’s good 
news. You’ve given me good news.” And so I never saw him again. 
The doctor, in this instance, takes one look at Rebecca and tells her what’s wrong with her and 
how he can fix it. He is eventually proven wrong, but presents it as bad news that she does not 
have a diagnosis that he can fix. Her description of her visit to the clinic also reveals the links 
between medical experts, the pharmaceutical industry, and the big business of fertility.  
“Frosted Glass and Fees Out the Ass” 1 
Laura Mamo, in a follow-up to her 2007 book, reminds us that Fertility Inc. is a multi-billion-
dollar-a-year business, “globally comprised of free-standing and medical center fertility clinics: 
mostly private sperm and egg banks, surrogate broker services, medical specialties, ‘donors‘ 
                                                 
1
 The title of this section comes from one of Rebecca’s descriptions of a clinic. 
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selling their eggs and sperm, and a growing population of consumers seeking services” (2013, p. 
229). She suggests that the increase in access to AHR services by LGBTQ people results 
primarily from the need to increase profits: 
Given the big business of fertility, strong competition exists for consumers 
among doctors, clinics, and gamete banks. Yet, the consumer base, while 
slightly varied and increasing, has not been very elastic. To increase profits, 
these services need to offer additional services, increase “unit” costs, or establish 
new markets. Such expansions are well underway, and queer users constitute a 
part of this market.  
LGBTQ people have been “let in” to AHR services, in part, as a new source of patients, and 
therefore, profit. However, despite increasing access by LGBTQ people, heterosexual couples 
who are having difficulty conceiving continue to be the majority of fertility clinic clientele. An 
IVF procedure (used by the majority of heterosexual couples in a clinic setting) is far more 
costly, and therefore profit-making, than simple donor insemination (more typically used by 
queer and trans people). Clinics compete for business based on statistical success rates 
(Thompson, 2005, p. 104), typically measured in successful IVF pregnancies. Queer and trans 
pregnancies, which do not necessarily involve IVF procedures, fall off the statistical map. Of 
course some LGBTQ people do use IVF as part of surrogacy arrangements or for other reasons 
(e.g., lesbian reciprocal IVF), but the increased profits and contribution to clinic statistics 
stemming from LGBTQ clients is not significant enough to warrant a culture shift in the clinic. 
Fertility clinic culture is embedded in hegemonic heterosexuality, in the repair of damaged 
masculinities and femininities, and the bolstering of hyper-conventional gender norms because 
this is what draws the mainstay of their business. In the context of this culture and the 
investments of the fertility industry, what do LGBTQ people say they want?  
168 
 
Five Minutes with a Change Maker: What People Want  
In March 2014, my colleagues and I published an article in the Journal of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology Canada (Ross et al., 2014) summarizing the recommendations the COF participants 
made in response to the last question they were asked: “If you could have five minutes with 
someone who could really make change in the AHR system, what would you want to say to 
them?” We suggest that one of the barriers to implementing these recommendations may be lack 
of education about LGBTQ health in medical school curriculum, resulting in physicians and 
other health care providers “lacking the basic information necessary to provide competent care to 
LGBTQ people” (p. 151). Interestingly, education is conceived as the provision of information, 
when in fact the most substantive recommendations from participants address quality of care and 
quality of relations between patients and providers. Some of these include: 
 Consider the service user’s wishes and expertise in their own body in 
developing a plan of care. 
 Provide care in a more personal, humanizing, or respectful manner. 
 Actively involve the non-pregnant partner or co-parents in the process (i.e., 
recognize LGBTQ kinship structures). 
 Service providers should be honest about what they do not know about LGBTQ 
people or family creation and ask questions respectfully, including asking 
direct, respectful questions to ascertain the relationships between all involved 
parties. 
This emphasis on quality of relations, not-knowing and attentive listening is echoed in other 
research and substantiated by examples from the COF interviews. Harbin, Beagan, and Goldberg 
(2012), in an article about comfort and discomfort between LGBTQ people and medical 
practitioners, share this participant’s advice to medical practitioners: 
I wouldn’t say don’t even show your surprise but be honest about it and 
inquisitive… Be aware when you’re afraid of who you’re talking to, because 
that’s really I think what ignorance is about. It’s about being threatened by who 
you’re talking to or their experience. (p. 159)  
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This queer woman asks clinicians for honesty and inquisitiveness in the face of fear, even when 
it may mean the discomfort of experiencing discomfort. Other hints of what LGBTQ people 
want in their encounters with medical staff are audible in the words of COF participants. 
Rebecca describes her version of what good patient care should look like, and provides an 
example of an instance when she receives it:  
I guess I sort of thought I’d sit in a room, and someone would be like, “So, tell 
me your story.”…My expectation was that I’d have an opportunity to be like, 
“Look, this is what I want.”  
A month later or something I went to another doctor. She’s a family doctor [who 
works in a fertility clinic] and I had a really different experience. At my first 
appointment, she’s like, “So tell me why you’re here.” And that was great! 
…like they actually really said, “Why are you here? How can we help you? How 
should we work together?”  
Nina, as we recall, articulates how she does not fit with what she perceives to be the clinic’s 
assumptions about how a woman is supposed to feel about her body. She suggests that all clients 
could benefit from the removal of these assumptions and from an inquisitiveness and openness, 
in a sense, a stance of not-knowing, that would allow people to control their own narratives:  
That’s what should happen for all clients: you never know who you’re dealing 
with and how they feel about their body. 
Stacey and Nina suggest that there is value in humility, that it is okay for practitioners to not 
know — to be ignorant, and to be inquisitive with good intent: 
Stacey: And also just, you know, having a bit of humility and deferential 
attitude. To not pretend that “We’ve had a lot of trans people in here before,” 
you know, but to listen.  
Nina: Yeah, like if you’re ignorant, just ask a question with good intention.  
Stacey: Yes, fine, be ignorant, that’s okay.  
People want inquisitiveness, ignorance, humility, a stance of not-knowing, space to self-define 
identities and kinship narratives, and listening from their practitioners.  
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Perhaps we can learn from a Levinas form of listening which, in Todd’s analysis, is perhaps 
the “learning event par excellence” (2003, p. 131). The act of listening, when it does not adopt an 
attitude or a set of how-tos for practice, becomes an ethical response. Instead of seeking 
comprehension of the Other, it attends to the Other’s alterity and allows for the possibility that 
one will be changed by the Other. Listening as receptivity and openness to the Other involves 
risk, uncertainty, and discomfort, potentially transforming the very grounds of one’s self 
understanding (p. 132). As Todd puts it,  
Listening…as an approach to the Other that signifies “I can change,” is a 
responsible mode of relationality in that it is a nonviolent and unpredictable 
response to alterity, even when my passivity results in my own discomfort. The 
one who listens risks nothing less than an alteration of self in responding to 
another’s speech, and it is within this context of risk and alteration that listening 
is required for learning to take place (p. 136).  
It is this quality of listening and of not-knowing that is required in encounters between 
LGBTQ people and fertility clinic staff. In practical terms this might manifest as an initial 
discovery session between new clients and a medical staff or intake person, involving open-
ended questions and attentive listening with receptivity, curiosity, and openness. In such a 
session clients would be offered a space in which to disclose information about identities, 
practices, family configurations, and kinship relations as they chose. Instead of being squeezed 
to fit within a clinic structure and culture designed for somebody else, people would be given 
permission and space to define their own reproductive journeys, issues, and dilemmas. And in 
fact, such a process would be beneficial not only to LGBTQ AHR clients, but to all AHR clients, 
many of whom do not fit within the heteronormative and prescribed gender roles and kinship 
structures embedded in clinic practice.  
The implementation of a session like this requires a significant shift in attitude and practice on 
the part of medical personnel. It means a shift from knowing to non-knowing, and the cultivation 
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of an attitude of receptivity and openness in the face of the Other’s alterity. How do those of us 
involved in social justice and/or diversity training in professional settings set about “teaching” 
medical experts, who are embedded in a multi-billion dollar industry and trained to believe in 
their own authoritative knowledge, to be humble, to adopt a stance of not-knowing, and to be 
open to and surprised by the encounter with the Other? Can “just like” narratives and recognition 
of sameness, or empathy, be useful in working toward LGBTQ intelligibility, or do they always 
work against it? What is required of us as educators to be effective in this work?  
Pedagogical Questions 
Contemplating these questions solely through the lens of institutional power, I am tempted to 
suggest that the stakes are too high, that the cultural, social, and financial investments of the 
fertility industry are such that the necessary shift in culture is too much to ask or expect. I recall 
Ahmed’s observations about solidity, “about how what appears as mobile and changing can hold 
its shape,” about the intransigence of institutions and the difficulty of social transformation 
(2012, p. 186). However, it is worthwhile to consider the complex tensions between institutional 
roles and personal relations.  
In a discussion of teachers and the institutional settings in which they work, Todd suggests 
that although we are constricted by institutional rules and procedures, we always exceed our 
institutional roles through personal, inter-human interactions. Teachers, she argues, have an 
ethical responsibility that goes beyond their institutional roles and duties; responsibility is 
fundamentally a personal, practical matter (2003, p. 143) rooted in the relation to the Other. 
Conceiving of ethics as applied morality, as something that can be captured in codes of ethics or 
principles of conduct, masks the nature of responsibility that lies in the actual encounter with 
another person. While rules are necessary and often useful, they cannot ultimately exempt us 
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from acting responsibly for the Other (p. 144). Todd offers examples, both micro and macro, of 
teachers refusing to follow rules or institutional regulations in order to accommodate a particular 
student’s needs (pp. 142-43).  
Similarly, I would argue, fertility clinic staff work within institutional systems, rules, and 
regulations, but also exceed them. The response of clinic staff to the semen regulations I 
described in chapter 4, involving recommendations to clients of ways to circumvent the 
regulations, are perhaps a good example of an ethical response superseding a rule-based one. 
Possibilities for change, then, lie in recognizing the “purely human and interpersonal dimension 
in which our responsibility is communicated” (Todd, 2003, p. 144). LGBTQ clients at fertility 
clinics want, more than anything, to be treated humanely in their interactions with clinic staff. 
 Social justice education, and I include institutional “diversity” training in this category, often 
hinges on the assumption that “corrective information, critical analysis, and empathic 
experience” (Taylor, 2009, p. 221) with or about a marginalized group will bring about change. 
Taylor (2009) cites the move in anti-bias education to accompany information about the Other, 
with “critical analysis of dominant culture’s role in making the lives of others miserable” (p. 
223) or what is often referred to as critically informed empathy. Pedagogical strategies might 
include 
exposing students to positive representations of marginalized groups, providing 
access to the voices of silenced populations, facilitating role-playing experiences 
that let students of dominant culture simulate marginalized people’s oppressive 
experiences, and providing students with corrective information about the 
oppressive experiences of the members of such groups (p. 223). 
Todd (2003) is particularly concerned with this kind of social justice education, asking two 
fundamental questions:  
First, are we (as researchers, teachers, and readers) enacting violences upon 
others as we engage their stories and narratives or self-identification, despite our 
best intentions? That is, in seeking to learn about them, can we be negligent of 
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learning from them? And, second, if so, how might we attend to the Other and 
preserve alterity as a nonviolent alternative while working toward the aim of 
social justice? (p. 3)? 
She argues that acknowledging the unknowable Other is the basis of a more ethical relation to 
the “many differences that are effected through power and social location” (p. 3). In other words, 
preserving the alterity of the Other is key to social justice. While I agree with Todd that, 
ultimately, ethical practice requires a turn from empathy to recognizing alterity, I raise questions 
about the role of empathy, both in clinical and pedagogical settings, in creating forms of 
affective connection which might allow or encourage openness and receptivity to alterity.  
Interrogating Sameness 
Ellen Lewin, in an early ethnography of lesbian motherhood, found that the lesbian mothers 
she interviewed “emphasized the centrality of their identities as mothers, representing 
motherhood as overwhelming or overshadowing other aspects of identity, including being a 
lesbian” (1995, p. 110). In other words, an identity as “mother” or “parent” often supersedes 
other identities, setting up a separation or divide between those who are parents and those who 
are not. Similarly, clients at a fertility clinic, regardless of sexual orientation, gender identity or 
family configuration, share a desire to become parents. In interactions with clinic staff, this 
shared desire or “sameness” with other fertility clinic clients can be a source of connection, 
comfort and reassurance. Sameness, in moments, has a place.  
However, Lewin also articulates important concerns about the focus on sameness, arguing 
that lesbian mothers, in their identification with other mothers, may be seeking a form of 
legitimacy as “women,” a legitimacy formerly denied them as lesbians. This potentially sets up a 
new form of reproductive stratification in which lesbians can inhabit the category of “mother,” 
leaving non-mothers, particularly lesbian non-mothers, as still “not quite women” (p. 115). 
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Lewin’s arguments point out, once again, the limits of a focus on sameness. While empathy and 
sameness have a place and can provide a useful starting point for connection, they must, 
ultimately be joined by an understanding of and openness to alterity. And perhaps the same is 
true in pedagogical settings. By way of example I refer to a presentation I offered recently to 
AHR service providers at the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society (CFAS) annual 
conference.  
In 2013 I delivered a plenary talk at the CFAS conference entitled “Exploring Models of 
Care: LGBTQ People and Fertility Clinics.” The presentation opened with photos of a pregnant 
me, my newborn child, and the (many) people who were present as she entered the world, 
followed by an image of her birth registration form which at the time could list only one of her 
moms —her other mother was absent from the form. I offered a history of LGBTQ parenting in 
Canada, beginning with stories of lesbians and gay men losing their children in custody cases in 
the 1970s and ’80s, provided information about definitions, language, and terminology and 
presented data from the COF study about LGBTQ people and AHR services. I concluded with 
another photo of my family, as well as my daughter’s corrected birth registration which included 
the names of both her moms, the result of a 2007 Charter of Rights and Freedoms challenge that 
changed Ontario birth registration procedures.  
Following this presentation I asked people to fill out a questionnaire. When asked what they 
learned from the presentation, three things stood out: the emotional impact of hearing about the 
recent history of LGBTQ people losing their children in custody cases; interest in legal 
developments, including birth registration developments; and lack of familiarity with or 
knowledge about heterosexism, a term and concept new to many, in contrast to homophobia, 
which was familiar to most people.  
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Many of those in attendance were parents, and most parents can relate both to the desire to 
have children and to the tragedy of losing them. On reflection, I wonder: did an empathic 
connection to me, as a fellow parent, and to larger LGBTQ communities historically, encourage 
receptivity to what was unfamiliar and not known? While I understand Todd’s view that 
empathy cannot be “called for” because it arises in spontaneous, unpredictable, and surprising 
ways, in the above example, the fact that people experienced a connection based on something 
they know — parenthood, perhaps left them more willing and able to explore the impact of 
heterosexism on the lives of LGBTQ people —something they do not, and cannot, know. The 
recognition of sameness, learning about the Other, can create a connection that opens the door to 
recognition of alterity and to learning from. Knowing something of the Other can provide a 
doorway to not knowing. 
Teaching Not-Knowing 
I have spent the past 20 years educating within LGBTQ communities and conducting training 
sessions, lectures and presentations in a huge range of professional and academic settings. I have 
worked with students of midwifery, nursing, medicine, social work, criminology, education, 
gender/women’s students/sexual diversity, and have conducted workshops in hospitals, legal 
settings, educational institutions, board rooms and fertility clinics. My goal in all this work is to 
create an environment in which people feel comfortable to ask difficult or uninformed questions 
about sexuality, gender and LGBTQ identities, and in which people can begin to unpack and 
critically explore ideas and beliefs they may not even be conscious that they hold. I pride myself 
on being an empathic, humorous, open, approachable, knowledgeable, and effective trainer.  
Early in most training sessions I raise questions of comfort and discomfort. I ask people to 
reflect on the earliest things they recall learning about lesbian and gay people, which typically 
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are mostly negative, sometimes extremely so. We talk about the often-unconscious impact of 
these beliefs or, in many cases, silences, and the need, in a move to become a “queer-positive” 
professional, to reflect on, talk back to, and, in some cases, unlearn them — the goal being to 
increase one’s comfort level in working with LGBTQ people. (I am referring here to educational 
settings in which most of those present are cisgender and straight — different strategies are 
called for when service providers are queer themselves). I often begin this discussion by sharing 
the following quote from a lesbian participant in a research study on the perinatal experiences of 
queer women:  
Every time I’m in a health situation, they’ll always ask, would you like your 
husband to come in, and I’ll just say no, my “friend” is here… I think it’s 
because I’m hesitant to create a situation where I think there’s going to be 
discomfort because it makes me uncomfortable when they get uncomfortable 
and I don’t want that. (Mothering on the Margins (MOMS) participant, 2004 as 
cited in Ross, Steele, & Epstein, 2005)  
As I understand her, this woman is suggesting that central to the practice of professional queer-
positivity is a basic “comfort” with Otherness. A provider can say the right words and ask the 
right questions, but if they are projecting a vibe of discomfort and unease, this can speak louder 
than anything else. Lucy, from the COF project, describes a couple of instances where she 
encounters this discomfort in practitioners:  
…that awkward conversation where I say something and …just like their face 
goes, kind of like that blank look. “Oh my god, this makes me really 
uncomfortable” and I have to think of some light-hearted joke to make… 
They were like, “Okay, mother, father.” And I was like “No, he has two 
mothers.” The nurse was like…frozen for a really long time. I was like, “Oh no, 
someone unfreeze her…she doesn’t know what to do.”  
In these situations clients sense the discomfort in their service providers which can lead to a lack 
of disclosure and a sort of role reversal, where the client begins to take care of the person who is 
supposed to be taking care of them. A service provider or practitioner seeking to become more 
comfortable seems like a worthwhile goal.  
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However, in an effort to seek comfort, people sometimes move instinctively to a search for 
what is familiar in the Other. Seeking the known and the familiar is easier than remaining in the 
place of discomfort or disorientation brought on by an encounter with the Other who is always 
unsettling, and therefore discomfiting, to the Self. The pedagogical question becomes how do we, 
as educators, encourage conditions that will contribute to practitioners’ comfort with not 
knowing and with the disorientation that comes from encounters with the unfamiliar? If, as 
diversity educators, our aim is to shift the quality of relations in professional settings, what can 
we do pedagogically to encourage receptivity to Otherness and alterity?  
When we enter pedagogical spaces, our students or participants become the Other to whom 
we are responsible. We do not know their personal histories, their feelings about the work they 
do, or the meanings they bring to it. If we take responsibility to listen to them, not from a 
position of knowing, but from one of ignorance, we model the relations we seek, that is, a stance 
of openness, receptivity, and not knowing. My experience in pedagogical settings tells me that 
something happens prior to receptivity to the Other, and that this is related to the stance of the 
educator. How do we establish a learning environment in which teachers and students, presenters 
and audience members, facilitators and participants can engage in a mutual process of not 
knowing in a non-judgmental pedagogical space where it is okay to not know, to be vulnerable, 
to ask questions, and to engage in dialogue.  
Assuming that training for professionals consists of a set of Power Point slides that anyone 
can present negates the impact of the relations and personal interactions that take place in this 
setting. Pre-fixed ideas about knowledge transfer and pedagogical outcomes stand in the way of 
the learning that can come from openness and a receptivity to difference and to what can be 
learned from the people in the room. As Todd puts it, “intentionality reduces the risks so 
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necessary for learning and ethical interaction and becomes a form of defense against the 
unpredictable challenges of the Other” (2003, p. 145). In our role as educators we need to pay 
attention to the nature and the quality of the relations and interactions that we practice as we 
teach. And when the students are professionals who will take what they learn back into their own 
practice, modelling the stance one hopes to encourage can be a powerful pedagogical tool.  
Of course, this is easier said than done and, as all educators know, students will say and do 
things we don’t like. We are confronted with students whose values clash with our own, and 
who, in one form or another, resist engagement. If, in these moments of discomfort, we can 
retain connection, remain open to learning and to an awareness of our own affective responses 
and our own ignorance, without knowing where things are going and without drawing on pre-
packaged responses, something surprising can happen. If we engage, not as experts, but in a 
mutual exploration of the subject at hand, offering our knowledge and perspective where it fits 
but remaining open to new perspectives and to the knowledge and experience of those in the 
room, we can begin to shift institutional habits rooted in “knowing about” the Other.  
The COF study provides a rich and vivid picture of LGBTQ people’s interactions with AHR 
services in Ontario and makes recommendations for change on many levels. The study offers 
practical suggestions such as the recommendations to:  
 Use inclusive language (that does not presume heterosexuality, cisgender 
identities, or particular family configurations). 
 Revise forms and documentation to reflect the diversity of sexual orientations, 
gender identities, and family structures of individuals accessing fertility clinics.  
 Increase LGBTQ visibility on websites and images in the clinic, and in 
provided porn. 
 Create gender-neutral washrooms near ultrasound rooms and andrology labs.  
And, on another level, the study makes recommendations that echo the issues I raise in this 
dissertation — a dismantling of the heterosexual matrix’s assumptions; recognition of the 
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diversity of LGBTQ kinship relations; a stance of not-knowing, receptivity, and openness; and 
recognition that LGBTQ (and all) fertility clinic clients are the experts on their own bodies and 
reproductive desires. (For the specific recommendations, see page 168 of this dissertation.) The 
COF participants stated clearly that most important to them is the quality of their interactions 
with fertility clinic staff.  
My experience has been, however, that service providers, when they begin to pay attention to 
LGBTQ inclusivity, tend to focus on the practical and pragmatic recommendations at the 
expense of the more complex, interpersonal and interactional ones. In particular, people focus on 
intake forms, perhaps viewing this as a simple and straightforward step toward improving 
LGBTQ accessibility. Implementing these more practical recommendations does, of course, 
contribute significantly to improving the quality of LGBTQ experience with AHR services, and 
their absence results in violations. However, paying attention to practical matters without 
incorporating a deeper understanding of the social relationships, sexual and gender identities, 
and family configurations involved, and without attending to issues of recognition and alterity, 
can result in things like “married, single, or gay” as check boxes on an intake form, or a separate 
form for “same-sex couples” which does not ask about a male partner. I have yet to see a revised 
form that truly creates space for the spectrum of LGBTQ identities, bodies, and kinship 
configurations, though such forms do exist.
2
  
I am not suggesting that we stop encouraging clinics to change their intake and procedure 
forms, to establish gender-neutral washrooms, to expand their porn collections, to improve their 
websites and to be transparent about their fee structures. Nor should we discontinue lobbying for 
provincial health coverage for AHR services, or for family law that adequately recognizes and 
protects queer and trans families of all configurations. However, the COF participants were most 
                                                 
2
 See, for example, the intake forms of the Sherbourne Health Centre or Hassle Free Clinic, in Toronto 
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concerned about the quality of the personal, inter-human interactions that are at the core of their 
experiences in fertility clinics where their bodies and identities are frequently misrecognized and 
unintelligible. Unless we pay equal or more attention to these relations, and to the pedagogical 
questions that they raise in relation to “diversity” training, we will never achieve the kind of 
substantive and systemic change the COF participants are calling for.  
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Appendix A: Lesbian and Bisexual Women’s Recommendations for 
Improving the Provision of AHR Services  
 
Lori E. Ross, PhD, Social Equity and Health Research Section, Centre for 
Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto, ON 
Leah S. Steele, MD, PhD, Department of Family and Community Medicine, 
St. Michael’s Hospital, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON 
Rachel Epstein, MA, Coordinator, LGBTQ Parenting Network, Sherbourne 
Health Centre, Toronto, ON 
 
Recommendations 
 
 Staff should be trained to be culturally competent in relation to LGBT 
communities — to be aware of and sensitive to the needs, concerns, and 
sensibilities of LGBT clients, including the specific needs of transidentified 
clients.  
 Intake and procedure forms should explicitly make room for family 
configurations that do not assume male/female relationships, or a two-parent 
model — i.e., that recognize the sometimes complex family configurations that 
LGBT people, and others, are forming.  
 Welcome the involvement of all parties desired by patients, including partners, 
known sperm donors, and co-parents. 
 Provide accessible fertility services for known sperm donors, including gay 
men. 
 Minimize costs for services and communicate a consistent fee structure.  
 Ensure that language and treatment recognizes that LGBT people are often 
accessing fertility clinics and sperm banks as part of routine family planning and 
not as infertility clients. 
 Provide opportunities for women to make informed choices about interventions 
that are consistent with their known or presumed fertility. 
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 Offer infertility support that is specific to lesbian and bisexual women (e.g., 
specialized groups) or is provided by individuals who are knowledgeable about 
issues relevant to lesbian and bisexual women. 
 Provide cues that services are LGBT positive. These might include positive 
space imagery or posters and brochures depicting LGBT families. Individual 
service providers can provide cues that they are open to LGBT families through 
choice of gender-neutral language, and attention to how questions are posed. 
 Ensure that information is available about local LGBT services, supports, and 
resources. Where feasible, offer LGBT-specific services or services in 
partnership with LGBT communities and/or service providers. 
 Expand the selection of donor semen, particularly with respect to donors of 
diverse ethno-cultural origins and identity release donors. 
 Strive for a unified standard of care across geographic regions, and facilitate 
access for people living outside of major urban centres.
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Lori Ross 
Rachel Epstein 
Leah Steele 
Stu Marvel 
datejie green  
Scott Anderson 
Lesley Tarasoff 
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COMMUNITY  
Nicole Nussbaum — Community member 
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Robin Fern — Community member 
Omo Akintan — Community member 
Chris Veldhoven — Queer Parenting Programs, 519 Community Centre 
 
SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Dr. Norman Barwin, Ottawa  
Dr. Anthony Auyeung, Toronto  
Dr. Clifford Librach — CReATe Fertility Centre 
Dr. Sergey Moskovtsev —CReATe Fertility Centre 
Debbie Davies, RN — CReATe Fertility Centre 
Dr. Marjorie Dixon — First Steps Fertility 
Dr. Alfonso Del Valle — ReproMed 
Dr. Tamer Said— ReproMed 
Jan Silverman — Fertility counsellor, Women’s College Hospital 
Dara Roth Edney — Fertility counsellor 
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Appendix C: Selected Demographic Characteristics of Participants 
Gender Identification 
 
Female (cisgender) 
Male (cisgender) 
Trans man/FTM 
spectrum 
Trans woman/MTF 
spectrum 
Number of 
People 
(Percentage) 
48 (72.7) 
9 (13.6) 
7 (10.6) 
2 (3.0) 
 
Sexual Orientation 
Lesbian 
Queer 
Gay 
Bisexual 
Two-Spirit 
Straight 
Other 
 
21 (31.8) 
18 (27.3) 
11 (16.7) 
11 (16.7) 
1 (1.5) 
2 (3.0) 
2 (3.0) 
 
- 1 also identified as queer 
 
- 2 also identified as queer 
- 1 also identified as queer/pansexual 
- also identified as bisexual 
- both identified as trans 
- included: homoandrophilic, fluid/no label  
Cultural/Racial 
Background 
White 
Mixed 
Black/African/Caribbean 
Aboriginal 
South Asian 
Other 
 
 
48 (72.7) 
8 (12.1) 
6 (9.1) 
3 (4.5) 
2 (3.0) 
3 (4.5) 
1 missing. Participants could select more 
than one so frequencies do not total 100% 
 
Relationship Status 
Legally married 
Common-law 
Partnered 
Multiple partners 
Single  
Divorced 
 
37 (56.1) 
20 (30.3) 
2 (3.0) 
1 (1.5) 
6 (9.1) 
1 (1.5) 
 2 missing 
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Region in Ontario 
Toronto 
Southwest 
Eastern 
North Eastern 
Hamilton/Niagara 
Central East 
Central West 
Northwest 
 
34 (51.5) 
10 (15.1) 
 9 (13.6) 
 4 (6.1) 
 3 (4.5) 
 2 (3.0) 
 2 (3.0) 
 2 (3.0) 
 
Highest Level of 
Education  
High school 
College 
University 
Postgraduate 
 
 
1 (1.5) 
7 (10.6) 
24 (36.4) 
31 (47.0) 
3 missing 
Household Income 
(CAD) 
Under $20,000 
$21,000-$35,000 
$36,000-$50,000 
$51,000-$65,000 
$66,000-$80,000 
$81,000-$100,000 
Over $100,000 
 
 
1 (1.5) 
2 (3.0) 
4 (6.1) 
6 (9.1) 
15 (22.7) 
8 (12.1) 
27 (20.9) 
3 missing 
Age  
Mean (range) 
26-30 
31-35 
36-40 
41-45 
45-50 
 
 
7 (10.6) 
22 (33.3) 
21 (31.8) 
15 (22.7) 
1 (1.5) 
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Appendix D: Interview Guide  
Creating Our Families (COF): A Pilot Study of the Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, and Trans People Accessing Assisted Human Reproduction Services in 
Ontario 
 
1. Tell me about how you (you and your partner, your co-parent) came to the 
decision to have kids. 
In this study, we’re interested in hearing about peoples’ experiences with 
assisted human reproduction, or AHR, services. AHR services include 
things like donor insemination, in vitro fertilization, egg donation, and other 
services that are typically offered through fertility clinics, doctor’s offices, 
and sperm banks. 
2. How did you come to consider AHR services as a possibility in building 
your family? 
a. Did you consider or try any other options for having children? 
b. When you were making your decision to use AHR services, where 
did you go for information about AHR? (How did you find out where 
to go for information? Was there any particular information you 
couldn’t find or had difficulty finding? Did you come across any 
specific information for LGBT people about AHR?) 
c. (If used services) What services, processes, or programs did you 
make use of? (Who used them? You, your partner, your co-parent, a 
donor, a surrogate, someone else?) 
3. What did you imagine [the service] would be like? 
a. Were you looking forward to your first visit? Feeling apprehensive? 
Did you have any specific worries or concerns? 
4.  (If they accessed any services, otherwise skip to question 10) Tell me about 
the first steps you took when you decided to access AHR services. 
a. How did you get a referral? 
b. How did you decide which AHR clinic to work with? (Did you have 
a choice?) 
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5. Tell me about your first interactions with [the service]. 
a. Did you feel welcomed, uncomfortable, etc.? 
b. Did they have any LGBT-specific resources? 
6. Tell us about the process after that. 
a. What providers were involved in your care? 
b. Who went with you to your appointments? 
c. Can you remember a particularly good or bad experience with your 
provider or clinic that you would like to share with us? 
d. Thinking back on your experiences, would you say you faced any 
particular challenges or difficulties in accessing AHR services? 
(Were these barriers related to your sexual orientation or gender 
identity? How?) 
e. Was there anything that happened during the process that was really 
helpful to you? 
f. (If applicable—FERTILITY INTERVENTIONS) Was it ever 
recommended that you take fertility drugs, or have any other 
interventions related to your fertility? How did you feel about that? 
(Did you feel like you were given a choice whether or not to have 
these interventions? Did you have all of the information you needed 
to make a decision? Did you feel like you were in control of your 
care? 
g. (If applicable—COMING OUT) How did you decide whether or not 
to out yourself to your AHR service providers? (At what stage did 
you decide to come out? Did you come out to everyone or only to 
some providers? What kind of reactions did you get when you came 
out? Did you ever feel you had to conceal your sexual orientation, 
gender identity, or family configuration? Why did you feel that way? 
What was that like for you?) 
h. (If applicable—LEGAL ISSUES) Were there any legal issues that 
arose? 
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9. Were you offered or required to have a counselling visit prior to receiving 
AHR services? (If yes, did you have one?) 
a. What was your experience with the counselling process? 
b. What did you talk about? 
c. Was there anything about the counselling session that was particularly 
helpful? 
d. Anything that seemed unhelpful or inappropriate to you? 
e. (If applicable) Was there any concern expressed about having different-
sex role models for your children? 
10.  (For those who did not use services, otherwise skip to question 12) So I 
understand from the information you gave us over the phone that you 
ultimately did not use AHR services. Can you talk about the factors that led 
to that? 
a. Did you choose not to use services, or was that decision made for 
you by someone else? (Who? Why?) 
b. Were there any issues specifically related to your sexual orientation 
or gender identity? 
c. Were there any issues related to cost of services? Other practical 
issues? 
11. Did you continue to try to build a family after AHR services were no longer 
a possibility for you? 
a. (If yes) How did you go about doing that? 
b. (If no) Why did you decide to stop? 
12. Thinking back on your experience, do you feel that you had any unique 
experiences or needs related to your identity as a insert relevant identity/ 
identities (lesbian, gay man, bisexual person, and/or trans person)?  
a. What about other identities that are important to you? (probe: age, 
race/ethnicity, social class, disability) 
b. (If participant lives outside of the GTA/Ottawa) Do you think there is 
anything unique about your experiences with AHR services because you 
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live here? (Did you have to travel to access services? How far? What 
was that like for you?) 
13. Based on your experiences, if you had five minutes with someone who could 
really make change in the AHR system, what would you recommend to them? 
14. Is there anything we haven’t covered that you feel is important for us to know 
about?
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Appendix E: Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
Study Title. Creating Our Families: A Pilot Study of the Experiences of Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, and Trans People Accessing Assisted Human Reproduction 
Services in Ontario 
INVESTIGATORS 
Lori Ross, PhD, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health 
Leah Steele, MD, PhD, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health 
Rachel Epstein, MA, LGBTQ Parenting Network, Sherbourne Health Centre 
Stewart Marvel, MA, LLM, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University 
Study Sponsor: Canadian Institutes for Health Research 
 
Introduction 
You are being invited to participate in a research project. This consent form provides 
all of the information about this research project in order to assist you in deciding 
whether or not you wish to participate. 
Before agreeing to participate in this research study, it is very important that you 
read and understand all of the information on this form. If you have any questions after 
you have read the form, you will be given as much time as you like to discuss them 
with the study investigator. You should not sign this form until you are sure that you 
understand and agree to all of the information about the research it provides. 
Purpose of this Research 
 Research on families formed through Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR) 
services (e.g., cycle monitoring, donor insemination, egg retrieval, sperm 
collection, in vitro fertilization, surrogacy) has focused on heterosexual 
relationships. However, there has been little research on the experiences of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT, please see Glossary at the end of this 
form) people who use AHR services, or who have considered using these 
services, but have decided not to. The few available data suggest that LGBT 
people may face significant barriers to AHR services. 
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 The goal of this research is to understand the experiences of LGBT people who 
access, attempt to access, or have considered accessing AHR services in Ontario 
since January 1st, 2007. 
 Part of this goal will be to explore the impact of the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act (AHRA) on LGBT people in Ontario. 
Description of the Research 
Who will be participating in this study? 
People who identify as LGBT and have used, considered using, or tried to use AHR 
services in Ontario since January 1, 2007. 
 
If I choose to participate, what will I be asked to do? 
1. Carefully read, consider, and sign this consent form. Once you have read and signed 
the consent form, you can return it to the interviewer. You will be given a copy to 
keep. 
2. Take part in a one hour interview in which you will be asked to tell your story of 
using or attempting to use AHR services, or of considering but choosing not to use 
these services. 
 We will make an audio recording of the interview. However, if you do not wish 
to be audio recorded, please let the interviewer know and he/she will take 
written notes of the interview. 
 During the interview you will be asked to provide details about your decision to 
use or not to use AHR services, and your related and/or resulting experiences. 
 The total interview will not take more than 1 hour. You can take a break from 
the interview any time you like, and if you are unable to finish the interview at 
the scheduled time, your interviewer will offer to schedule another time to finish 
the interview with you. 
3. Fill out a short, demographic questionnaire. 
 
Potential Harms (Injury, Discomforts or Inconvenience) 
 There are no known harms associated with participation in this study. 
192 
 
 It is possible that some of the questions you are asked may cause you to feel 
upset. If you feel upset, the interviewer can provide you with contact 
information for community support and/or mental health agencies that may be 
able to help you. You will also be encouraged to discuss any concerns you have 
with your family doctor. If you are uncomfortable with any of the questions or 
want to stop at any time during the interview, let the interviewer know. 
Potential Benefits 
You will not directly benefit from participating in this research study. 
Confidentiality and Privacy 
Your participation in this research is confidential (see glossary in Appendix H). Your 
responses to the questions in the interview will be available only to the study 
investigators listed at the top of this consent form, and specific trained research staff 
who are bound to our research protocol and confidentiality agreement. 
 Study investigators are required to report to the authorities if it is clear that you 
or someone else is at risk of immediate danger, or if they have any reasonable 
suspicions of neglect and/or physical or sexual abuse of a person less than 18 
years of age. Other than these legal exceptions, your responses to the interview 
will not be available to any individuals or organizations outside of the research 
team. 
 No information that reveals your identity will be released or published without 
your consent. Your responses and information will be held in strict 
confidentiality, and will be protected to the limits of the law. 
 All data will be safely stored in a locked facility and only research staff will 
have access to this information. 
 If you wish to participate in this study, but require anonymity of your records, 
you may select the option for anonymity on the signature page of this document 
(page 6). If you select this option, we will ensure the following: 
o Once the interview is completed, we will remove from all transcripts and 
notes any information that may identify you and your family. 
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o We will remove and/or delete all reference to your participation in this 
project so that none of your identifying data remain on record with us. 
Compensation 
You will be compensated $25.00 for your participation. Even if you choose to withdraw 
from the study before the end of the interview, you will still be compensated. 
Participation and Withdrawal 
 You can choose not to participate in any part of this research study, and you can 
choose not to answer any questions you are asked as part of the interview. 
 If you choose to participate in this study, you can stop your participation (i.e., 
withdraw from the study) at any time without any effect on the care you receive. 
In addition, you do not lose any of your legal rights by signing this consent 
form. Your decision not participate, or to withdraw your participation, will not 
influence the nature of your relationship with the researchers, Sherbourne Health 
Centre, CAMH, York University or any other group associated with this project, 
either now, or in the future. 
 If you decide to withdraw from the study before the end, the investigators will 
ask you if they can still use the data you have provided to them to whatever 
extent possible. Should you say no, we will destroy your data. 
Contact Information 
 If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant in this 
study, you may contact Dr. Padraig Darby, Chair, Research Ethics Board, 
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, at 416-535-8501 ext. 6876, or Ms. 
Alison Collins-Mrakas, Senior Manager and Policy Advisor, Office of Research 
Ethics, York Research Tower, York University at 416-736-5914. 
 If you have any questions about this research or your participation in this study, 
please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Lori Ross, at (416) 535-8501 ext. 
7383, or Secondary Investigator, Stewart Marvel, at (647) 669-4144. 
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Appendix F: Demographic Questionnaire 
Creating Our Families (COF): A Pilot Study of the Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, and Trans People Accessing Assisted Human Reproduction Services in 
Ontario 
 
The following questions will ask you about your age, education, employment, 
relationship status, etc. This information will be used to get a big-picture idea of the 
people who participated in this study. All information provided by you will remain 
confidential. 
 
1. How old are you? 
� 16 – 25 
� 26 – 30 
� 31 – 35 
� 36 – 40 
� 41 – 45 
� 45 – 50 
� 50 – 60 
� Over 60 
 
2. What is your current relationship status? Please select all that apply. 
� Legally married 
� Common law/living with a partner 
� Partnered / not living together 
� Multiple partners 
� Single 
� Separated 
� Divorced 
� Widowed 
� You don’t have an option that applies to me 
Alternative: 
 
195 
 
3. How do you describe your sexual orientation? 
 
4. How do you describe your gender identity? 
 
5. Do you identify as a person living with 
a) a disability 
� Yes 
� No 
and/or b) a chronic illness? 
� Yes 
� No 
IF Yes  a) What is the nature of your disability? _________________________ 
b) What is the nature of your health condition? ____________________ 
 
6. Have you tested positive for HIV? 
IF Yes Did you learn of your status before or after considering AHR? 
 
7. Do you currently have children? 
� Yes 
� No 
IF Yes  a) How many in total? 
 b) How many are living with you? 
 c) How old are they? 
 
8. Where were you born? 
� Canada 
� Outside Canada 
 
9. If you were born in Canada, please skip to question 11. 
 If you were born outside Canada, in which country were you born? 
 
10. How many years have you lived in Canada? 
 
11. How do you define your cultural and/or racial background? 
 
12. What is your current employment status? 
� Full-time employed 
� Part-time employed 
� Student 
� Not employed 
� Retired 
� On disability 
� On maternity/parental leave 
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� You don’t have an option that applies to me 
 ____________________________ 
 
13. How would you describe your highest level of education? 
� Less than high school 
� High school some or completed 
� College some or completed 
� University (e.g. BA, BSc) some or completed 
� Post Graduation (e.g. MA, MSc) some or completed 
 
14. What is your approximate household income? 
� under $20,000 
� $21,000–$35,000 
� $36,000–$50,000 
� $51,000–$65,000 
� $66,000–$80,000 
� $81,000–$100,000 
� over $100,000 
 
Thank you for your participation 
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Appendix G: Ethics Approval — CAMH Research Ethics Board  
PROTOCOL REFERENCE #048/2010  
 
June 2, 2010  
 
Dr. Lori E. Ross, PhD  
Research Scientist  
Social Equity & Health Research Section  
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health  
455 Spadina Avenue, Suite 300  
TORONTO ON M5S 2G8  
 
Dear Dr. Ross:  
 
Re:  Research protocol #048/2010 entitled “Creating our families: A pilot study of 
the experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans people accessing Assisted 
Human Reproduction services in Ontario” by Ross L., Steele L., Epstein, R.  
 
We are writing to advise you that the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health Research 
Ethics Board (CAMH REB) has granted approval to the above-named research study 
for a period of one year from the date of this letter1. IF THE STUDY IS 
EXPECTED TO CONTINUE BEYOND THE EXPIRY DATE, YOU ARE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THE STUDY RECEIVES RE-APPROVAL BY 
SUBMITTING THE CAMH REB “ANNUAL RENEWAL OF ETHICS APPROVAL” 
FORM ON OR BEFORE May 1, 2011. Should the study be completed prior to the 
annual renewal date, please submit a final report. The level of continuing review for 
this study is Level 2.2  
 
The revised “Consent to Participate in a Research Study” and advertisement received 
May 18, 2010 have been approved and are attached. Subjects should receive a copy of 
their consent form.  
 
Please contact Polly Thompson, Manager, CAMH Research Communications, ext. 
4932 prior to using any advertisement.  
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During the course of the research, any significant deviations from the approved protocol 
(that is, any deviation which would lead to an increase in risk or a decrease in 
benefit to human subjects) and/or any unanticipated developments within the research 
should be brought to the attention of the Research Ethics Office. Best wishes for the 
successful completion of your project.  
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
Susan Pilon, MHSc  
Manager, Research Ethics Office, CAMH
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Appendix H: Glossary of LGBTQ Terms 
 
Term
1
 Definition 
Sexual Orientation A person’s sexual orientation is defined by the gender(s) to 
which he or she is sexually attracted. Examples: gay, straight, 
bisexual, lesbian.  
Gay A male whose primarily sexual orientation is to other men. This 
term is sometimes used by lesbians (i.e., gay woman). 
Lesbian A female whose primary sexual orientation is to other women. 
Bisexual A person whose sexual orientation is directed towards 
individuals of more than one sex or gender, though not 
necessarily at the same time. 
Queer A term that has traditionally been used as a derogatory and 
offensive word for LGBTQ people. Many have reclaimed this 
word and use it proudly to describe their identity and/or as an 
umbrella term for LGBTQ people or communities. 
Heteronormativity The assumption, in individuals or in institutions, that everyone is 
heterosexual, and that heterosexuality is superior to 
homosexuality and bisexuality. 
Gender Identity A person’s own identification of being masculine, feminine, 
male, female, or trans. Gender identity is unrelated to sexual 
                                                 
1
 This glossary of terms was compiled by L.A. Tarasoff in May 2012 and was included as part of the 
consent form given to participants in the COF project. This is not meant to be a standardized list of 
definitions. Because ideas and attitudes are constantly changing within LGBTQ communities and 
among society at large, these definitions may be used differently by different people and in different 
regions. Many of these terms have been adapted from the following sources: Barbara A. M., Doctor, 
F., & Chaim, G. Glossary. In Asking the right questions 2: Talking about sexual orientation and 
gender identity in mental health, counselling and addiction settings. rev. ed. (Toronto, ON: Centre for 
Addiction & Mental Health, 2007: 55-60); Bauer et al., 2009; Green E., & Peterson E. N, LGBTQI 
Terminology. Available at: http://www.lgbt.ucla.edu/documents/LGBTTerminology.pdf Accessed 
January 8, 2012. 
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orientation; not all trans people identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
or queer. 
Gender 
Expression 
The public expression of gender identity; actions, dress, 
hairstyles, etc., performed to demonstrate one’s gender identity.  
Cisgender A person whose gender identity matches the gender they were 
assigned at birth; someone who is not trans. 
Trans An umbrella term referring to people who do not embrace 
traditional binary gender norms of masculine and feminine 
and/or whose gender identity or expression does not fit with the 
one they were assigned at birth; can refer to transgender, 
transitioned, and transsexual people, as well as some two-spirit 
people.  
Transgender An umbrella term describing anyone who falls outside of 
traditional gender categories or norms. Literally means “across 
gender,” and conveys the idea of transcending the boundaries of 
the gender-binary system. Not necessarily a desire to be of the 
“opposite” sex.  
Transsexual Someone who feels their gender identity does not match the sex 
that they were assigned at birth. Many transsexual people choose 
to go through sex reassignment, including hormone treatment 
and surgeries, so that their sex and gender identity match. 
Transition  The process of changing from the sex one was assigned at birth 
to one’s self-perceived gender. May involve dressing in the 
manner of the self-perceived gender, changing one’s name and 
identification, and undergoing hormone therapy and/or sex 
reassignment surgeries to change one’s secondary sex 
characteristics to reflect the self-perceived gender. 
FTM Trans man; a female-to-male transsexual; someone who was 
assigned as female at birth and identifies as male. 
MTF Trans woman; a male-to-female transsexual; someone who was 
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assigned as male at birth and identifies as female. 
Two-Spirit An English-language term used to reflect specific cultural words 
used by First Nations people who have both a masculine and a 
feminine spirit or to describe their sexual, gender, and/or spiritual 
identity.  
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